Adequacy of Legal Aid System Questioned
Day 258
Adequacy of Legal Aid System Questioned
Day 258
Borisav Jovic, former Serbian representative to and President of the Presidency of the Socialist People's Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), appeared under subpoena as a prosecution witness at the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. In 1995, Mr. Jovic published his contemporaneous diary from his years close to the seat of power in book form, titled, 'The Last Days of the SFRY: A Diary.' Immediately after it was published, then President Milosevic dismissed him from the position he held at that time, vice president of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). In 2001, Mr. Jovic published another book, this one about Slobodan Milosevic. Both books formed the basis of his written statement submitted to the Tribunal.
In court, lead Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice asked the witness if he still held the opinion expressed in the second book, that the Accused was the key figure and main actor in the Serbian tragedy. Mr. Jovic replied, 'Of course for more than a decade Milosevic was the main political figure in Serbia. He held absolute authority with the people and the party. He had the possibility for a decisive role on all decisions. He was the main actor of everything that came to pass during that time.'
The one time Serbian representative on the SFRY Presidency and close Milosevic ally described Milosevic as an autocratic ruler, who surrounded himself with people who would obey him unquestioningly. Despite clear statements to this effect in his written statement, Mr. Jovic said in court, 'It is a very unpleasant question for me here before this Court. . . . A personal opinion of mine can't and shouldn't serve as the basis for anyone's judgment.' This cautionary statement appeared to reflect an effort to soften his written statement now that he is confronting Milosevic in public. However, he also testified in court that he stood by his written statement and everything he wrote in his Diary and the Milosevic book.
In his written statement, Mr. Jovic wrote about Milosevic's autocratic power: 'Milosevic had the final word in all important and even not so important decisions. Especially, he personally decided on the election of people for official positions. He often made big decisions without consulting others and when he did consult them, he had the last word. He was interested in the realization of the set goals as well as remaining in power for as long as possible. He easily rejected people after using them to reach his goals. Milosevic was not a person who used to show much compassion to others. It was not his style.'
Responding to the Prosecutor's question, to what extent was the Accused motivated by the desire to retain power vs. policy goals, Mr. Jovic replied, 'If viewed in the context of achieving program objectives or sacrificing some to retain power, the advantage would be given to retaining power rather than achieving program objectives.'
According to Mr. Jovic, who was Vice President and President of the SPS at different times, Milosevic also had absolute control over the SPS, whether he had any official position or not. In his statement, Mr. Jovic declared, 'Milosevic had absolutely the highest authority in our Party from the moment it was founded onwards regardless of whether he was President or not. . . . While, as it turned out, he could dismiss me whenever he wanted to, I could never dismiss him. He had the absolute authority in the party.'
As it turned out, Milosevic dismissed Mr. Jovic immediately after his Diary was published. Mr. Jovic not only lost his party position, but all political and social connections with the ruling regime. He was even expunged from a video recording of the declaration of Yugoslavia's new constitution. Since he gave the speech, only the applauding audience was shown, not the speaker. Another time, when a primary school was to be ceremonially opened in his home town, local officials told him they'd been ordered not to invite him. 'If you invite Borisav Jovic to attend, there will be no celebration,' they were told. In court, Mr. Jovic explained this was a method of retaliation, not a crime, as if he feared it might be used to convict his former leader. Nevertheless, the witness obviously suffered because of Milosevic's ill treatment of him. 'I was replaced without explanation, vote, right to appeal or written decision,' as well as being isolated in social festivities, he told the Court.
Mr. Jovic was not the only one to fall from Milosevic's favor and disappear from the halls of power. Others mentioned in his testimony or his statement include: Milan Babic (replaced as president of the Serb Krajina), Milan Panic (replaced as President of the Federal Government), Branko Kostic (replaced as candidate for President of the FRY), Dobrica Cosic (replaced as President of FRY), General Veljko Kadijevic (replaced as Federal Minister of Defense). In his statement, Mr. Jovic also describes the replacement of JNA generals. 'In the end of 1991, we [Milosevic and Jovic] decided to retire a number of generals and admirals to reform the Army according to the political vision we had of the new Yugoslavia.' He states they obtained consent of the military leadership and set out to implement their plan over time using a certain 'technology.' Branko Kostic violated their procedure by attempting to retire Marko Negovanovic, Serbia's Minister of Defense, without Milosevic's prior authorization. Milosevic, Mr. Jovic wrote, 'was furious.' Negovanovic was reinstated in his position, though as a civilian Minister.
At one point in their relationship, Mr. Jovic expressed his objection to the personality cult that seemed to be developing around Milosevic, himself and a few others. 'I asked Milosevic to make it stop,' he wrote. 'We had had enough of the personality cults of Stalin and Tito. His reaction was meek, as if it had been a trivial issue, but what was done was that all other photographs were removed except his.'
As an important part of his autocratic power, Milosevic effected control of the major media, which included state radio and television and the major state-run newspaper, Politika. The witness wrote that Milosevic was able to select editors and executive staff of these media organs. His philosophy, Mr. Jovic told the Court, was that 'If it was not published, it didn't happen.' 'He [Milosevic] thought it was important for TV and radio to report in the interests of current politics. If it was not in the interests of current politics, it didn't have to be published.' Milosevic also used the media to 'elevate or undermine fellow Serb leaders,' such as Milan Babic, Milan Martic, Vojislav Seselj and Radovan Karadzic. Babic and Karadzic ran afoul of Milosevic when they refused to support peace plans he was trying to push through.
Milosevic's influence on policy was apparent in his handling of the Carrington Plan put forward at The Hague Conference to resolve the growing crisis in a dissolving Yugoslavia, which he expected his supporters on the Presidency to oppose. The Plan was for a loose confederal state with no change of internal borders. Milosevic opposed it, proposing instead that republics and nations (i.e. ethnicities) who wanted to leave Yugoslavia could do so, while those who wanted to remain could do so as well. But Milosevic needed at least two republics to maintain the fiction of a still existing Yugoslavia. Given the sentiment of other republics and the fear of their non-Serb populations of Serbian dominance in any rump Yugoslavia, Milosevic was counting on Serbia and Montenegro to 'remain part of' Yugoslavia.
To Jovic's and Milosevic's shock, Montenegro's representative, Branko Kostic, said Montenegro was going to support the Carrington plan. When Milosevic tried to call Momir Bulatovic (then President of Montenegro), Bulatovic wouldn't take his calls. Eventually reached, Bulatovic stood firm, and Milosevic and Jovic considered replacing him, as Jovic's Diary memorializes: 'We believe that it would be easier for us to overthrow them than to develop a new and worthy political platform for further, separate action.' In the end, Montenegro caved in and the Carrington Plan was abandoned. Mr. Jovic testified that Milosevic required Bulatovic to put forward his proposed 'compromise' to The Hague Conference. Bulatovic resisted for the better part of a day, but relented in the end.
Mr. Jovic said that he shared Milosevic's concern in 1991 that the JNA would be considered an occupying army once Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence was recognized. Its withdrawal from Bosnia would be demanded by the international community, which would effectively leave the Serb population in Bosnia 'unprotected' against the developing Croatian and Muslim 'paramilitaries.' Noting that the JNA was then largely a Serbian/Montenegrin force due to the withdrawal of Croats and Muslims to form their own paramilitary groups, Milosevic proposed that all JNA members be dispersed to their home republics. While Serbs and Montenegrins would leave Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs serving in the JNA outside Bosnia would return to Bosnia. There, they would take over the remnants of the JNA While Jovic did not address the issue, this maneuver provided a way to transfer JNA assets to the Bosnian Serbs. General Kadijevic, Minister of Defense, initially opposed it because it meant the end of the JNA. However, within a month he did what Milosevic wanted and implemented it. Milosevic relies on the maneuver to support his contention that the Bosnian war was a civil war with which Serbia and the FRY had nothing to do.
Prosecutor Nice asked the witness about Milosevfic's and the Army's control over paramilitaries. Mr. Jovic said they were regarded as volunteers and were subordinated to the JNA according to regulations. When Mr. Nice asked him about Arkan, the witness replied that he was a criminal. He testified that he spoke once to Milosevic about Arkan and his group, complaining about their apparent ties to the Serbian police. Jovic's written statement continues, 'Milosevic's reply was that Arkan was a criminal and that it was unthinkable that our official organs would co-operate with someone like Arkan. I then stated that we should clear it up and break any possible connection with that criminal Arkan, thus avoiding any attacks on our reputation. Milosevic agreed. However, nothing was ever done. Arkan even became so powerful that he had his own Army, his own uniforms, etc. He had become a state within a state.' On the stand, Jovic attempted to soften his statement, saying that he knew only of connections Arkan had with the army in the field, not mentioning the police. Nevertheless, Mr. Jovic has affirmed his written statement.
Mr. Nice asked the witness if he had knowledge of the meeting between Franjo Tudjman and Milosevic at Karadjordjevo where they agreed to divide up Bosnia between them. Mr. Jokic said he was never informed of such a meeting and thought it most unlikely. He was told of it by Stjepan Mesic, Croatian representative on the Federal Presidency, but dismissed it as Mesic's way of trying to undermine Tudjman with whom he had political differences. Mr. Nice persisted, 'If it did happen and the Accused didn't tell you, what would it mean about your opinion of him?' Mr. Jovic responded, 'Very simple. It means, in that case, Milosevic didn't want to inform me about it. It is highly unlikely. But it would be another blot on our relationship which was otherwise one of trust and confidence.'
Mr. Jovic testified that he also knew nothing about the JNA shelling of Dubrovnik, except for two shells accidentally fired into the Old Town. Mr. Nice presented clips from two videotapes, one showing massive clouds of smoke rising from Dubrovnik's Old Town as explosions are heard, the other showing damage to various places in the Old Town (except for one burned out building, the damage shown was not extensive). The witness held to his position that it is still not clear to him that the JNA shelled Old Town Dubrovnik in 1991.
Mr. Jovic was also ignorant of the massacre of civilians and prisoners of war in Vukovar, though concerns had been addressed to him at the time by international representatives. Mr. Nice asked, 'You know the nature of allegations about Vukovar. Do you accept that this massacre occurred? You were Commander in Chief of the Army.' Mr. Jovic: 'I was never informed of that while I occupied my post. Much later, I learned about it from the work of this Tribunal.' Mr. Nice: 'If the JNA was involved and you were Commander in Chief, how did it never come to your attention?' Mr. Jovic: ''If' the Army were involved. It is hypothetical. The Army did not receive orders to do anything like that . . . . I don't know that anyone from the Army ordered or carried it out.'
Mr. Jovic's ignorance of these major events at a time when he was effectively Commander in Chief of the Army is hard to believe, unless, as he seems to suggest, he served in name only, while Milosevic held all the power and pulled all the strings. He appears to be walking a fine line between infuriating his former leader and worrying about his own vulnerability to indictment by the Tribunal. [Another insider who testified against Milosevic, Milan Babic, was indicted yesterday by the ICTY for his part in the joint criminal enterprise, as well as his individual command responsibility as President of the Serbian Autonomous Province of Krajina.] Mr. Jovic returns to the stand for a second day tomorrow, where Mr. Nice will complete examination in chief, followed by Milosevic's cross examination. The Court has allowed the Accused six hours for cross examination.
In court, lead Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice asked the witness if he still held the opinion expressed in the second book, that the Accused was the key figure and main actor in the Serbian tragedy. Mr. Jovic replied, 'Of course for more than a decade Milosevic was the main political figure in Serbia. He held absolute authority with the people and the party. He had the possibility for a decisive role on all decisions. He was the main actor of everything that came to pass during that time.'
The one time Serbian representative on the SFRY Presidency and close Milosevic ally described Milosevic as an autocratic ruler, who surrounded himself with people who would obey him unquestioningly. Despite clear statements to this effect in his written statement, Mr. Jovic said in court, 'It is a very unpleasant question for me here before this Court. . . . A personal opinion of mine can't and shouldn't serve as the basis for anyone's judgment.' This cautionary statement appeared to reflect an effort to soften his written statement now that he is confronting Milosevic in public. However, he also testified in court that he stood by his written statement and everything he wrote in his Diary and the Milosevic book.
In his written statement, Mr. Jovic wrote about Milosevic's autocratic power: 'Milosevic had the final word in all important and even not so important decisions. Especially, he personally decided on the election of people for official positions. He often made big decisions without consulting others and when he did consult them, he had the last word. He was interested in the realization of the set goals as well as remaining in power for as long as possible. He easily rejected people after using them to reach his goals. Milosevic was not a person who used to show much compassion to others. It was not his style.'
Responding to the Prosecutor's question, to what extent was the Accused motivated by the desire to retain power vs. policy goals, Mr. Jovic replied, 'If viewed in the context of achieving program objectives or sacrificing some to retain power, the advantage would be given to retaining power rather than achieving program objectives.'
According to Mr. Jovic, who was Vice President and President of the SPS at different times, Milosevic also had absolute control over the SPS, whether he had any official position or not. In his statement, Mr. Jovic declared, 'Milosevic had absolutely the highest authority in our Party from the moment it was founded onwards regardless of whether he was President or not. . . . While, as it turned out, he could dismiss me whenever he wanted to, I could never dismiss him. He had the absolute authority in the party.'
As it turned out, Milosevic dismissed Mr. Jovic immediately after his Diary was published. Mr. Jovic not only lost his party position, but all political and social connections with the ruling regime. He was even expunged from a video recording of the declaration of Yugoslavia's new constitution. Since he gave the speech, only the applauding audience was shown, not the speaker. Another time, when a primary school was to be ceremonially opened in his home town, local officials told him they'd been ordered not to invite him. 'If you invite Borisav Jovic to attend, there will be no celebration,' they were told. In court, Mr. Jovic explained this was a method of retaliation, not a crime, as if he feared it might be used to convict his former leader. Nevertheless, the witness obviously suffered because of Milosevic's ill treatment of him. 'I was replaced without explanation, vote, right to appeal or written decision,' as well as being isolated in social festivities, he told the Court.
Mr. Jovic was not the only one to fall from Milosevic's favor and disappear from the halls of power. Others mentioned in his testimony or his statement include: Milan Babic (replaced as president of the Serb Krajina), Milan Panic (replaced as President of the Federal Government), Branko Kostic (replaced as candidate for President of the FRY), Dobrica Cosic (replaced as President of FRY), General Veljko Kadijevic (replaced as Federal Minister of Defense). In his statement, Mr. Jovic also describes the replacement of JNA generals. 'In the end of 1991, we [Milosevic and Jovic] decided to retire a number of generals and admirals to reform the Army according to the political vision we had of the new Yugoslavia.' He states they obtained consent of the military leadership and set out to implement their plan over time using a certain 'technology.' Branko Kostic violated their procedure by attempting to retire Marko Negovanovic, Serbia's Minister of Defense, without Milosevic's prior authorization. Milosevic, Mr. Jovic wrote, 'was furious.' Negovanovic was reinstated in his position, though as a civilian Minister.
At one point in their relationship, Mr. Jovic expressed his objection to the personality cult that seemed to be developing around Milosevic, himself and a few others. 'I asked Milosevic to make it stop,' he wrote. 'We had had enough of the personality cults of Stalin and Tito. His reaction was meek, as if it had been a trivial issue, but what was done was that all other photographs were removed except his.'
As an important part of his autocratic power, Milosevic effected control of the major media, which included state radio and television and the major state-run newspaper, Politika. The witness wrote that Milosevic was able to select editors and executive staff of these media organs. His philosophy, Mr. Jovic told the Court, was that 'If it was not published, it didn't happen.' 'He [Milosevic] thought it was important for TV and radio to report in the interests of current politics. If it was not in the interests of current politics, it didn't have to be published.' Milosevic also used the media to 'elevate or undermine fellow Serb leaders,' such as Milan Babic, Milan Martic, Vojislav Seselj and Radovan Karadzic. Babic and Karadzic ran afoul of Milosevic when they refused to support peace plans he was trying to push through.
Milosevic's influence on policy was apparent in his handling of the Carrington Plan put forward at The Hague Conference to resolve the growing crisis in a dissolving Yugoslavia, which he expected his supporters on the Presidency to oppose. The Plan was for a loose confederal state with no change of internal borders. Milosevic opposed it, proposing instead that republics and nations (i.e. ethnicities) who wanted to leave Yugoslavia could do so, while those who wanted to remain could do so as well. But Milosevic needed at least two republics to maintain the fiction of a still existing Yugoslavia. Given the sentiment of other republics and the fear of their non-Serb populations of Serbian dominance in any rump Yugoslavia, Milosevic was counting on Serbia and Montenegro to 'remain part of' Yugoslavia.
To Jovic's and Milosevic's shock, Montenegro's representative, Branko Kostic, said Montenegro was going to support the Carrington plan. When Milosevic tried to call Momir Bulatovic (then President of Montenegro), Bulatovic wouldn't take his calls. Eventually reached, Bulatovic stood firm, and Milosevic and Jovic considered replacing him, as Jovic's Diary memorializes: 'We believe that it would be easier for us to overthrow them than to develop a new and worthy political platform for further, separate action.' In the end, Montenegro caved in and the Carrington Plan was abandoned. Mr. Jovic testified that Milosevic required Bulatovic to put forward his proposed 'compromise' to The Hague Conference. Bulatovic resisted for the better part of a day, but relented in the end.
Mr. Jovic said that he shared Milosevic's concern in 1991 that the JNA would be considered an occupying army once Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence was recognized. Its withdrawal from Bosnia would be demanded by the international community, which would effectively leave the Serb population in Bosnia 'unprotected' against the developing Croatian and Muslim 'paramilitaries.' Noting that the JNA was then largely a Serbian/Montenegrin force due to the withdrawal of Croats and Muslims to form their own paramilitary groups, Milosevic proposed that all JNA members be dispersed to their home republics. While Serbs and Montenegrins would leave Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs serving in the JNA outside Bosnia would return to Bosnia. There, they would take over the remnants of the JNA While Jovic did not address the issue, this maneuver provided a way to transfer JNA assets to the Bosnian Serbs. General Kadijevic, Minister of Defense, initially opposed it because it meant the end of the JNA. However, within a month he did what Milosevic wanted and implemented it. Milosevic relies on the maneuver to support his contention that the Bosnian war was a civil war with which Serbia and the FRY had nothing to do.
Prosecutor Nice asked the witness about Milosevfic's and the Army's control over paramilitaries. Mr. Jovic said they were regarded as volunteers and were subordinated to the JNA according to regulations. When Mr. Nice asked him about Arkan, the witness replied that he was a criminal. He testified that he spoke once to Milosevic about Arkan and his group, complaining about their apparent ties to the Serbian police. Jovic's written statement continues, 'Milosevic's reply was that Arkan was a criminal and that it was unthinkable that our official organs would co-operate with someone like Arkan. I then stated that we should clear it up and break any possible connection with that criminal Arkan, thus avoiding any attacks on our reputation. Milosevic agreed. However, nothing was ever done. Arkan even became so powerful that he had his own Army, his own uniforms, etc. He had become a state within a state.' On the stand, Jovic attempted to soften his statement, saying that he knew only of connections Arkan had with the army in the field, not mentioning the police. Nevertheless, Mr. Jovic has affirmed his written statement.
Mr. Nice asked the witness if he had knowledge of the meeting between Franjo Tudjman and Milosevic at Karadjordjevo where they agreed to divide up Bosnia between them. Mr. Jokic said he was never informed of such a meeting and thought it most unlikely. He was told of it by Stjepan Mesic, Croatian representative on the Federal Presidency, but dismissed it as Mesic's way of trying to undermine Tudjman with whom he had political differences. Mr. Nice persisted, 'If it did happen and the Accused didn't tell you, what would it mean about your opinion of him?' Mr. Jovic responded, 'Very simple. It means, in that case, Milosevic didn't want to inform me about it. It is highly unlikely. But it would be another blot on our relationship which was otherwise one of trust and confidence.'
Mr. Jovic testified that he also knew nothing about the JNA shelling of Dubrovnik, except for two shells accidentally fired into the Old Town. Mr. Nice presented clips from two videotapes, one showing massive clouds of smoke rising from Dubrovnik's Old Town as explosions are heard, the other showing damage to various places in the Old Town (except for one burned out building, the damage shown was not extensive). The witness held to his position that it is still not clear to him that the JNA shelled Old Town Dubrovnik in 1991.
Mr. Jovic was also ignorant of the massacre of civilians and prisoners of war in Vukovar, though concerns had been addressed to him at the time by international representatives. Mr. Nice asked, 'You know the nature of allegations about Vukovar. Do you accept that this massacre occurred? You were Commander in Chief of the Army.' Mr. Jovic: 'I was never informed of that while I occupied my post. Much later, I learned about it from the work of this Tribunal.' Mr. Nice: 'If the JNA was involved and you were Commander in Chief, how did it never come to your attention?' Mr. Jovic: ''If' the Army were involved. It is hypothetical. The Army did not receive orders to do anything like that . . . . I don't know that anyone from the Army ordered or carried it out.'
Mr. Jovic's ignorance of these major events at a time when he was effectively Commander in Chief of the Army is hard to believe, unless, as he seems to suggest, he served in name only, while Milosevic held all the power and pulled all the strings. He appears to be walking a fine line between infuriating his former leader and worrying about his own vulnerability to indictment by the Tribunal. [Another insider who testified against Milosevic, Milan Babic, was indicted yesterday by the ICTY for his part in the joint criminal enterprise, as well as his individual command responsibility as President of the Serbian Autonomous Province of Krajina.] Mr. Jovic returns to the stand for a second day tomorrow, where Mr. Nice will complete examination in chief, followed by Milosevic's cross examination. The Court has allowed the Accused six hours for cross examination.
