Airbase Eviction May Weaken Kyrgyzstan
Former American envoy says US can locate military base elsewhere, but Kyrgyzstan needs to weigh up the consequences for its own security.
Airbase Eviction May Weaken Kyrgyzstan
Former American envoy says US can locate military base elsewhere, but Kyrgyzstan needs to weigh up the consequences for its own security.
A former United States ambassador to Kyrgyzstan says the country’s decision to close a major American airbase may deprive Kyrgyzstan of a counterbalance in its dealings with large and powerful neighbours like Russia and China.
In an exclusive interview for IWPR, John O'Keefe predicted that the US would be able to find an alternative location for an airbase to supply military operations in Afghanistan.
On February 19, the Kyrgyz parliament voted to end the US military presence at Manas airport near the capital Bishkek. The decision followed President Kurmanbek Bakiev's announcement that the base was to close, made during a visit to Moscow earlier in the month, during which he secured pledges of loans and investment worth two billion dollars. Some analysts argued that Bakiev traded the US base for Russian financial and political support.
As ambassador, O'Keefe played a central role in negotiating the opening of the Manas facility in 2001, which was used as a transit point for personnel and freight going to support Coalition operations in Afghanistan and as a base for aerial refuelling planes.
Q: As an official who negotiated the opening of the military base in Bishkek, what did you think about first when you heard the news of its closure?
A: At first, because the announcement that the base would close had happened before at an SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organisation] conference in Astana, I was wondering if this was a serious statement. But within the context of the assistance package and the manner in which it was announced with President Medvedev, I did feel that this is probably a real possibility. This has been such a topic of discussion over the past several years, so it was not a big surprise.
Q: How do you think officials in Washington perceived the threats to terminate the contract that came from time to time from Bishkek?
A: I am not with the State Department any longer, so I am a little bit out reach of what they think. Looking at it from the outside, it did strike me that — as with lots of things in international arena — this was originally a bit of a negotiating tactic. Nevertheless, there were some serious issues that really needed to be resolved between the countries. But also… other issues of cooperative operations within the Kyrgyz Republic and the [Kyrgyz-US] relationship… fighting terrorism, regional stability and reducing cross-border tensions seemed tied up in this process.
Q: During the parliamentary discussions, some Kyrgyz deputies suggested that there was nothing tragic about the closure of the base, and Kyrgyzstan would be able to reopen it any time if it needed to. As a person familiar with the process, do you agree it would be easy?
A: No, I think it would be very difficult to reopen it once the base is closed, but not impossible. You can look at newspaper reports of the US exploring with neighbouring countries — Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — the possibility of opening bases there. The base could be brought back again, but probably not if alternate support mechanisms are available.
I think though, within the Kyrgyz context, it might be somewhat more difficult, because in one sense, the public dialogue is a lot more open in some ways in Kyrgyzstan. So that the question of reopening the base is not simply the question of President Bakiev saying this is a good idea. He would need to convince parliament that would have to be done and inform public opinion so the people of Kyrgyzstan would see that it is in their interest as well.
Q: It looks like Washington is trying to negotiate with all relevant parties. How far do you think Washington could go in an attempt to keep the base?
A: The real question is whether it is money, or policy, or national interest, or regional stability. To me, you can break this down and you can say, what's the compensation package? The US could perhaps have an attractive package, but I don't think the US is in a position to offer the credits that have been reported to have been given from the Russian side.
The real question to me, if you are the president of Kyrgyzstan and you are the parliament of Kyrgyzstan, you must look at the base and its relationship to Kyrgyz interests in retaining it and the advantages of having it removed. Then you get a different kind of equation; it's a non-monetary equation.
The advantages of retaining the base are these — Afghanistan as we have seen, before 2001, was destabilising the region. The people who committed terrorist acts in Kyrgyzstan before 2001 [the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan] had support from Afghanistan and training there. So the first question is, if things really go bad in Afghanistan because there is a problem with logistical support, how does that affect Kyrgyz interests and how much does Kyrgyzstan — as an international actor and a sovereign nation — decide that it wants to be part of a coalition that is trying to bring stability to Afghanistan
The second question is, what are the advantages in dealing with other countries within the region by having a US presence? I think that you could reasonably argue that it helps Kyrgyzstan in its negotiations with its neighbours and others. Without the base, the negotiating position of Kyrgyzstan may be weaker. And that's something that the president and the parliament have to decide for themselves. They are closer to it than I, and must live with that decision.
The third question is that the base, I think, is viewed in the US, by people in the Congress and in the administration, as sort of giving Kyrgyzstan a somewhat more special place in public opinion toward Kyrgyzstan. Within the Washington context, the members of Congress, the Senators and people in the administration are very aware of the help that Kyrgyz people have provided by hosting the base.
Q: Do you mean that because of the base, US policies towards Kyrgyzstan have been somewhat favourable?
A: I would say they have been more favourable; the desire to run assistance programmes has been a little bit better. And there are also some of the intangibles. I will just reflect on my experiences arriving in 2000, and then a year and a month later when operations in Afghanistan began.
Before September 2001, getting Washington policy attention on Kyrgyzstan was not so easy, because in terms of US attention there were other things more pressing. But once we had a presence there then it was easier for me as the US ambassador to argue the case for Kyrgyzstan.
So I think with the removal of the base, when you are a country of five million next to a country of over a billion [China], and a country that has good and close relations with Russia, it is always useful to have friendships that counterbalance some of those other relationships, as positive as they might be.
Q: Do you think the U.S. policy towards Kyrgyzstan and the region will change significantly after the base is removed?
A: No, I don't think so. The region is one that has strategic interest, there still will be a desire for economic and democratic progress from the US side. That interest won't be as great, nor the attention as much. However, I could be completely wrong.
Q: How do you think the airbase closure could affect the current plans of the US to expand its operations and troop numbers in Afghanistan?
A: I am no expert on military logistics, but I know that [State Department] Under Secretary [William] Burns was recently in the region to discuss the other options, and General [David] Petraeus [commander of US Central Command] visited Uzbekistan to carry out discussions. I think what they will try to do is to find alternative means for supply. It is always do-able, sometimes it's just harder. So with the loss of the base in Kyrgyzstan, they will just have to find another way to supply these troops — which they will.
Q: What are the alternatives? Do you think it is possible to re-open the base in Uzbekistan? (Ed. the Uzbek government forced the US military to close its base at Karshi because it was unhappy with American demands for an international investigation into the Andijan violence of May 2005.)
A: In 2001, when the question of where we have a base came up, the Coalition group which was led by a general from Turkey looked at the options in Tajikistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, and they were all on the table. And the decision was to go for Bishkek. I discussed it with President [Askar] Akaev at that time; the Kyrgyz government was very supportive. 2009 is not 2001, but those options are there, so I would think that if in fact the Coalition can work out an arrangement with a country in the region, they would certainly take that one up.
It’s a complicated question and I can't speak authoritatively about the bases in the other countries, so I can't say how much infrastructure investment would be necessary. I would observe there were operations out of Uzbekistan until couple of years ago, so I presume that infrastructure there is just fine.
Q: What about Tajikistan? Some say that airports there are not quite adequate for military purposes.
A: I think when they made this decision in 2001, it was less that this is one wasn't adequate and that one was; it was a question of which was the best one. At the time, Manas had substantial infrastructure in terms of storage, runway length, air traffic control, and a very welcoming government. That made it the best option.
Q: Do you think Pakistan and India might be good alternatives to Manas?
A: It appears that neither may be an option, from what I've been reading in the press.
Q: Some argue that military cooperation with Russian and its military presence at the Kant base [near Bishkek] is enough for Kyrgyzstan to maintain security. What do you think about that?
Q: It depends on where you view the threat to stability for the region. If you believe that if Afghanistan falls back into chaos, it will affect Kyrgyz stability through the export of individuals who want to overthrow the government or establish a different kind of government, then I don't believe the Russian base is going to help with Afghanistan. If you look at it in a different way, I guess the question I would ask is, by having the Russian base there… what theoretical threat are they addressing? I don't know exactly what that is. I am not too sure what the purpose of the Russian base is.
Q: Russia has announced it is ready to provide logistical help to NATO forces in Afghanistan; however, it apparently also offered Kyrgyzstan a pay-off for evicting the airbase. What do you make of that?
A: I think that perhaps the Russian leadership is looking for ways to work the new Obama administration. This [Afghan logistical cooperation] offer would in fact be a good step towards improving these relationships.
Q: Do you allow the possibility that it could be an attempt to eliminate third parties in the negotiating process with the US?
A: I think the Russians have always negotiated directly with the US. I don't know whether it is to eliminate third parties, but it is certainly is a way to work with a new group in Washington in a constructive way.
Q: Would you like to add anything?
A: I would like to add that having spent three years in the Kyrgyz Republic and going back a few times, I have a very profound wish for the people of the country and its leadership that they will find a good road for a better life for all who live in Kyrgyzstan.
Elina Karakulova is IWPR’s former chief editor in Bishkek, currently based in Washington.
In an exclusive interview for IWPR, John O'Keefe predicted that the US would be able to find an alternative location for an airbase to supply military operations in Afghanistan.
On February 19, the Kyrgyz parliament voted to end the US military presence at Manas airport near the capital Bishkek. The decision followed President Kurmanbek Bakiev's announcement that the base was to close, made during a visit to Moscow earlier in the month, during which he secured pledges of loans and investment worth two billion dollars. Some analysts argued that Bakiev traded the US base for Russian financial and political support.
As ambassador, O'Keefe played a central role in negotiating the opening of the Manas facility in 2001, which was used as a transit point for personnel and freight going to support Coalition operations in Afghanistan and as a base for aerial refuelling planes.
Q: As an official who negotiated the opening of the military base in Bishkek, what did you think about first when you heard the news of its closure?
A: At first, because the announcement that the base would close had happened before at an SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organisation] conference in Astana, I was wondering if this was a serious statement. But within the context of the assistance package and the manner in which it was announced with President Medvedev, I did feel that this is probably a real possibility. This has been such a topic of discussion over the past several years, so it was not a big surprise.
Q: How do you think officials in Washington perceived the threats to terminate the contract that came from time to time from Bishkek?
A: I am not with the State Department any longer, so I am a little bit out reach of what they think. Looking at it from the outside, it did strike me that — as with lots of things in international arena — this was originally a bit of a negotiating tactic. Nevertheless, there were some serious issues that really needed to be resolved between the countries. But also… other issues of cooperative operations within the Kyrgyz Republic and the [Kyrgyz-US] relationship… fighting terrorism, regional stability and reducing cross-border tensions seemed tied up in this process.
Q: During the parliamentary discussions, some Kyrgyz deputies suggested that there was nothing tragic about the closure of the base, and Kyrgyzstan would be able to reopen it any time if it needed to. As a person familiar with the process, do you agree it would be easy?
A: No, I think it would be very difficult to reopen it once the base is closed, but not impossible. You can look at newspaper reports of the US exploring with neighbouring countries — Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — the possibility of opening bases there. The base could be brought back again, but probably not if alternate support mechanisms are available.
I think though, within the Kyrgyz context, it might be somewhat more difficult, because in one sense, the public dialogue is a lot more open in some ways in Kyrgyzstan. So that the question of reopening the base is not simply the question of President Bakiev saying this is a good idea. He would need to convince parliament that would have to be done and inform public opinion so the people of Kyrgyzstan would see that it is in their interest as well.
Q: It looks like Washington is trying to negotiate with all relevant parties. How far do you think Washington could go in an attempt to keep the base?
A: The real question is whether it is money, or policy, or national interest, or regional stability. To me, you can break this down and you can say, what's the compensation package? The US could perhaps have an attractive package, but I don't think the US is in a position to offer the credits that have been reported to have been given from the Russian side.
The real question to me, if you are the president of Kyrgyzstan and you are the parliament of Kyrgyzstan, you must look at the base and its relationship to Kyrgyz interests in retaining it and the advantages of having it removed. Then you get a different kind of equation; it's a non-monetary equation.
The advantages of retaining the base are these — Afghanistan as we have seen, before 2001, was destabilising the region. The people who committed terrorist acts in Kyrgyzstan before 2001 [the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan] had support from Afghanistan and training there. So the first question is, if things really go bad in Afghanistan because there is a problem with logistical support, how does that affect Kyrgyz interests and how much does Kyrgyzstan — as an international actor and a sovereign nation — decide that it wants to be part of a coalition that is trying to bring stability to Afghanistan
The second question is, what are the advantages in dealing with other countries within the region by having a US presence? I think that you could reasonably argue that it helps Kyrgyzstan in its negotiations with its neighbours and others. Without the base, the negotiating position of Kyrgyzstan may be weaker. And that's something that the president and the parliament have to decide for themselves. They are closer to it than I, and must live with that decision.
The third question is that the base, I think, is viewed in the US, by people in the Congress and in the administration, as sort of giving Kyrgyzstan a somewhat more special place in public opinion toward Kyrgyzstan. Within the Washington context, the members of Congress, the Senators and people in the administration are very aware of the help that Kyrgyz people have provided by hosting the base.
Q: Do you mean that because of the base, US policies towards Kyrgyzstan have been somewhat favourable?
A: I would say they have been more favourable; the desire to run assistance programmes has been a little bit better. And there are also some of the intangibles. I will just reflect on my experiences arriving in 2000, and then a year and a month later when operations in Afghanistan began.
Before September 2001, getting Washington policy attention on Kyrgyzstan was not so easy, because in terms of US attention there were other things more pressing. But once we had a presence there then it was easier for me as the US ambassador to argue the case for Kyrgyzstan.
So I think with the removal of the base, when you are a country of five million next to a country of over a billion [China], and a country that has good and close relations with Russia, it is always useful to have friendships that counterbalance some of those other relationships, as positive as they might be.
Q: Do you think the U.S. policy towards Kyrgyzstan and the region will change significantly after the base is removed?
A: No, I don't think so. The region is one that has strategic interest, there still will be a desire for economic and democratic progress from the US side. That interest won't be as great, nor the attention as much. However, I could be completely wrong.
Q: How do you think the airbase closure could affect the current plans of the US to expand its operations and troop numbers in Afghanistan?
A: I am no expert on military logistics, but I know that [State Department] Under Secretary [William] Burns was recently in the region to discuss the other options, and General [David] Petraeus [commander of US Central Command] visited Uzbekistan to carry out discussions. I think what they will try to do is to find alternative means for supply. It is always do-able, sometimes it's just harder. So with the loss of the base in Kyrgyzstan, they will just have to find another way to supply these troops — which they will.
Q: What are the alternatives? Do you think it is possible to re-open the base in Uzbekistan? (Ed. the Uzbek government forced the US military to close its base at Karshi because it was unhappy with American demands for an international investigation into the Andijan violence of May 2005.)
A: In 2001, when the question of where we have a base came up, the Coalition group which was led by a general from Turkey looked at the options in Tajikistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, and they were all on the table. And the decision was to go for Bishkek. I discussed it with President [Askar] Akaev at that time; the Kyrgyz government was very supportive. 2009 is not 2001, but those options are there, so I would think that if in fact the Coalition can work out an arrangement with a country in the region, they would certainly take that one up.
It’s a complicated question and I can't speak authoritatively about the bases in the other countries, so I can't say how much infrastructure investment would be necessary. I would observe there were operations out of Uzbekistan until couple of years ago, so I presume that infrastructure there is just fine.
Q: What about Tajikistan? Some say that airports there are not quite adequate for military purposes.
A: I think when they made this decision in 2001, it was less that this is one wasn't adequate and that one was; it was a question of which was the best one. At the time, Manas had substantial infrastructure in terms of storage, runway length, air traffic control, and a very welcoming government. That made it the best option.
Q: Do you think Pakistan and India might be good alternatives to Manas?
A: It appears that neither may be an option, from what I've been reading in the press.
Q: Some argue that military cooperation with Russian and its military presence at the Kant base [near Bishkek] is enough for Kyrgyzstan to maintain security. What do you think about that?
Q: It depends on where you view the threat to stability for the region. If you believe that if Afghanistan falls back into chaos, it will affect Kyrgyz stability through the export of individuals who want to overthrow the government or establish a different kind of government, then I don't believe the Russian base is going to help with Afghanistan. If you look at it in a different way, I guess the question I would ask is, by having the Russian base there… what theoretical threat are they addressing? I don't know exactly what that is. I am not too sure what the purpose of the Russian base is.
Q: Russia has announced it is ready to provide logistical help to NATO forces in Afghanistan; however, it apparently also offered Kyrgyzstan a pay-off for evicting the airbase. What do you make of that?
A: I think that perhaps the Russian leadership is looking for ways to work the new Obama administration. This [Afghan logistical cooperation] offer would in fact be a good step towards improving these relationships.
Q: Do you allow the possibility that it could be an attempt to eliminate third parties in the negotiating process with the US?
A: I think the Russians have always negotiated directly with the US. I don't know whether it is to eliminate third parties, but it is certainly is a way to work with a new group in Washington in a constructive way.
Q: Would you like to add anything?
A: I would like to add that having spent three years in the Kyrgyz Republic and going back a few times, I have a very profound wish for the people of the country and its leadership that they will find a good road for a better life for all who live in Kyrgyzstan.
Elina Karakulova is IWPR’s former chief editor in Bishkek, currently based in Washington.
