Attack on Dubrovnik Planned at Highest Level
Attack on Dubrovnik Planned at Highest Level
The second part of General Nojko Marinovic's testimony concerned his leadership in the defense of Dubrovnik, after having resigned from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA or JA) in September 1991. In his statement, he wrote, 'I was really shocked at how disorganized and unprepared they were for anything that might happen. . . . I . . . quickly formed the opinion that there was no effective defense plan for Dubrovnik.' With very few resources, he then set about making one.
While the General gathered what forces, equipment and weapons he could, and devised a strategy to defend Southern Dalmatia, he was hampered in his efforts to defend Dubrovnik by an earlier order of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. In a meeting of Tudjman, Milosevic and federal Minister of Defense Veljko Kadijevic, the latter had assured Tudjman that the JNA would not attack Dubrovnik, 'and Tudjman had taken these assurances to heart.' He issued an order in August 1991 'that no overt defensive measures were to be taken in the region' of Dubrovnik.
Serb propaganda at the time maintained there were 2000 Croatian paramilitaries in Dubrovnik. An earlier witness, Nikola Samardzic former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, testified that Serb authorities claimed Croatia had 30,000 troops massed on the Montenegrin border, prepared to attack Montenegro. These claims were made to justify the JNA's military operations in southern Dalmatia, including the old walled city of Dubrovnik, a world heritage protected site. An attack against a cultural monument is a violation of the laws of war.
The JNA's three-month siege of the Old Town began October 1, 1990. As of that date, General Marinovic had 670 soldiers to defend the entire southern Dalmatian region, 150 of whom were deployed around the Dubrovnik municipality. Only 37 had sufficient training and experience. The JNA's troop strength 'dedicated to the Dubrovnik campaign was around 5,000 - 7,000 men at a minimum.' Equipment and weapons were similarly disproportionate. The JNA attack also included air and sea forces. Yet the small Croatian force succeeded in holding Dubronik.
The General credited the determination of his forces who were fighting for something they believed in, as opposed to the Serbian forces, where desertion was frequent and commitment often minimal. The JNA had anticipated an easy campaign, taking Southern Dalmatia in a matter of weeks. When those weeks stretched into months and casualties mounted, their troops became demoralized. In addition, according to Marinovic, the Serbian forces had not anticipated the international outcry over unprovoked attacks against a UNESCO heritage site. Finally, Marinovic claimed that 'their own propaganda boomeranged on them.' Having told their soldiers that thousands of Croatian Ustashe and foreign mercenaries were inside the city, 'they became extremely cautious as they moved closer and closer to the city.'
In his statement, General Marinovic contemplated the unanswered question: why would Serbian forces attack a demilitarized UN protected site whose Serb population was small? 'It is hard for me to say why they shelled the Old Town. I believe that the JA had originally moved against Dubrovnik with the idea that it would be an easy territorial acquisition. They felt like no one in Dubrovnik would fight -- that these were hotel workers, waiters, tour guides, etc. who had no stomach for warfare. In fact, this was the first time in its history that Dubrovnik had had to depend on arms to defend its freedom. In the past, it had always relied on diplomacy, trade, or even payments of money to maintain its freedom.'
'I am sure,' the General continued, 'that the JA believed that if they came in with force and occupied Dubrovnik, the people of the city would accept their offer to create a 'Dubrovnik Republic' and then just go back to the business of tourism. They tried to sell this idea of a 'Dubrovnik Republic' as a sort of autonomous area within the enlarged Serbia.' The citizens of Dubrovnik were not interested, however.
Another possible reason for the assault on Dubrovnik was its strategic location in Serbia's plan to expand its borders. The Dubrovnik/Southern Dalmatia Campaign was part of a larger military action. According to General Marinovic, the plan was for Southern Dalmatia to be attacked by forces coming from two directions -- Montenegro and Sarajevo/Mostar. After Southern Dalmatia was taken, the enlarged Serbian force would 'move in a northwesterly direction until they joined the SAO Krajina forces move [sic] southeasterly.'
None of this, however, fully explains why Serbian forces sought to take over a region whose Serb population was miniscule. Nor does it indicate whether the takeover plan included the expulsion of the Croat civilian population. If it did not, Dubrovnik appears to be an exception to the overall plan as of fall 1991, which allegedly was to annex Serb dominated areas of Croatia to the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, after expelling the non-Serb population. Whether the Serbian forces intended to ethnically cleanse Dubrovnik, their attack on a world heritage site and a wholly civilian target violated international law.
Serbian forces justified firing on the Old Town as defensive, claiming they were merely retaliating against Croatian forces who were intentionally provoking a response in order to gain international sympathy. General Marinovic stated that Croatian forces were not stationed in and did not fire from the Old Town. He wrote in his sworn statement that, 'I can say with certainty that we never fired from the Old Town, never conducted any military operations there, and never gave the JA any reason to attack it.' In response to General Kadijevic's frequently cited claim that the Old Town was not shelled, 'but that it was actually the Croats burning old tires,' Marinovic wrote that '[It] is so preposterous that it doesn't even deserve a response. For anyone who entertains such ideas, I would suggest that they watch the videotapes of JA missiles hitting the Old Town.'
Nor was the attack on Dubrovnik a spontaneous action or one undertaken by a rogue element in the Serbian forces, according to General Marinovic: '[It] would have been unthinkable that the military activity would have been undertaken without the prior knowledge, planning, participation, and supervision of the chain of command all the way to the top of the Operational Group [commanded by Lt. General Pavle Strugar]. There is no way that they could have not known what was happening, nor that they could have failed to report it up to the General Staff. These battles were too important and the JA just did not work like that.'
The 20 year JNA veteran also explained that the JNA was a 'typical communist army,' almost over regulated. In other words, the siege of Dubrovnik was not a rogue action.
The same logic applies to the larger military campaign described above.
General Marinovic also pointed out the highly irregular cooperation between the military and civilian politicians, which 'would have been unthinkable in the old JA.' In support, he quoted an intercepted conversation between Bozidar Vucurevic, mayor of Trebinje, and Major Bogdan Kovac, Commander of the JNA 472nd Brigade, where Vucurevic appeared to reprimand the Major: 'What's wrong, I don't hear you killing those beasts down there?' Kovac answered, 'Don't worry, we will do it.' Before the JNA pulled out of the region, Mayor Vucurevic was overheard in another conversation, telling Admiral Miodrag Jokic, Commander of the 9th VPS, to make sure the airport at Cilipi was mined. Jokic assured him it had already been done.
The General also referred to videotapes showing civilian politicians, as well as most of the high ranking officers, visiting the front, including Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic, President and Prime Minister of Montenegro respectively, who brought lambs for the Montenegrin troops in Zvekovica.
General Marinovic's statement leaves little doubt that the JNA and Serbian attack on Dubrovnik was planned at the highest level. He provides convincing testimony that there was no military justification for the attack and siege -- there was no outgoing fire from the Old Town, which remained demilitarized. The assault on the entire region of Southern Dalmatia was an unprovoked, aggressive attack against a largely civilian population.
Other witnesses, including members of the alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise, have testified that Milosevic had control over the Joint Federal Presidency by the time of the Dubrovnik campaign (fall 1991). The Joint Presidency became the Supreme Command, with authority over the JNA, after the declaration of a state of imminent threat of war on October 1, 1991. That provides a pretty clear connection to Milosevic. As for General Marinovic's testimony, Milosevic will have a chance to cross examine him when he returns to court from his latest bout of high blood pressure and exhaustion. Perhaps there's a connection here, too?
While the General gathered what forces, equipment and weapons he could, and devised a strategy to defend Southern Dalmatia, he was hampered in his efforts to defend Dubrovnik by an earlier order of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. In a meeting of Tudjman, Milosevic and federal Minister of Defense Veljko Kadijevic, the latter had assured Tudjman that the JNA would not attack Dubrovnik, 'and Tudjman had taken these assurances to heart.' He issued an order in August 1991 'that no overt defensive measures were to be taken in the region' of Dubrovnik.
Serb propaganda at the time maintained there were 2000 Croatian paramilitaries in Dubrovnik. An earlier witness, Nikola Samardzic former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, testified that Serb authorities claimed Croatia had 30,000 troops massed on the Montenegrin border, prepared to attack Montenegro. These claims were made to justify the JNA's military operations in southern Dalmatia, including the old walled city of Dubrovnik, a world heritage protected site. An attack against a cultural monument is a violation of the laws of war.
The JNA's three-month siege of the Old Town began October 1, 1990. As of that date, General Marinovic had 670 soldiers to defend the entire southern Dalmatian region, 150 of whom were deployed around the Dubrovnik municipality. Only 37 had sufficient training and experience. The JNA's troop strength 'dedicated to the Dubrovnik campaign was around 5,000 - 7,000 men at a minimum.' Equipment and weapons were similarly disproportionate. The JNA attack also included air and sea forces. Yet the small Croatian force succeeded in holding Dubronik.
The General credited the determination of his forces who were fighting for something they believed in, as opposed to the Serbian forces, where desertion was frequent and commitment often minimal. The JNA had anticipated an easy campaign, taking Southern Dalmatia in a matter of weeks. When those weeks stretched into months and casualties mounted, their troops became demoralized. In addition, according to Marinovic, the Serbian forces had not anticipated the international outcry over unprovoked attacks against a UNESCO heritage site. Finally, Marinovic claimed that 'their own propaganda boomeranged on them.' Having told their soldiers that thousands of Croatian Ustashe and foreign mercenaries were inside the city, 'they became extremely cautious as they moved closer and closer to the city.'
In his statement, General Marinovic contemplated the unanswered question: why would Serbian forces attack a demilitarized UN protected site whose Serb population was small? 'It is hard for me to say why they shelled the Old Town. I believe that the JA had originally moved against Dubrovnik with the idea that it would be an easy territorial acquisition. They felt like no one in Dubrovnik would fight -- that these were hotel workers, waiters, tour guides, etc. who had no stomach for warfare. In fact, this was the first time in its history that Dubrovnik had had to depend on arms to defend its freedom. In the past, it had always relied on diplomacy, trade, or even payments of money to maintain its freedom.'
'I am sure,' the General continued, 'that the JA believed that if they came in with force and occupied Dubrovnik, the people of the city would accept their offer to create a 'Dubrovnik Republic' and then just go back to the business of tourism. They tried to sell this idea of a 'Dubrovnik Republic' as a sort of autonomous area within the enlarged Serbia.' The citizens of Dubrovnik were not interested, however.
Another possible reason for the assault on Dubrovnik was its strategic location in Serbia's plan to expand its borders. The Dubrovnik/Southern Dalmatia Campaign was part of a larger military action. According to General Marinovic, the plan was for Southern Dalmatia to be attacked by forces coming from two directions -- Montenegro and Sarajevo/Mostar. After Southern Dalmatia was taken, the enlarged Serbian force would 'move in a northwesterly direction until they joined the SAO Krajina forces move [sic] southeasterly.'
None of this, however, fully explains why Serbian forces sought to take over a region whose Serb population was miniscule. Nor does it indicate whether the takeover plan included the expulsion of the Croat civilian population. If it did not, Dubrovnik appears to be an exception to the overall plan as of fall 1991, which allegedly was to annex Serb dominated areas of Croatia to the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, after expelling the non-Serb population. Whether the Serbian forces intended to ethnically cleanse Dubrovnik, their attack on a world heritage site and a wholly civilian target violated international law.
Serbian forces justified firing on the Old Town as defensive, claiming they were merely retaliating against Croatian forces who were intentionally provoking a response in order to gain international sympathy. General Marinovic stated that Croatian forces were not stationed in and did not fire from the Old Town. He wrote in his sworn statement that, 'I can say with certainty that we never fired from the Old Town, never conducted any military operations there, and never gave the JA any reason to attack it.' In response to General Kadijevic's frequently cited claim that the Old Town was not shelled, 'but that it was actually the Croats burning old tires,' Marinovic wrote that '[It] is so preposterous that it doesn't even deserve a response. For anyone who entertains such ideas, I would suggest that they watch the videotapes of JA missiles hitting the Old Town.'
Nor was the attack on Dubrovnik a spontaneous action or one undertaken by a rogue element in the Serbian forces, according to General Marinovic: '[It] would have been unthinkable that the military activity would have been undertaken without the prior knowledge, planning, participation, and supervision of the chain of command all the way to the top of the Operational Group [commanded by Lt. General Pavle Strugar]. There is no way that they could have not known what was happening, nor that they could have failed to report it up to the General Staff. These battles were too important and the JA just did not work like that.'
The 20 year JNA veteran also explained that the JNA was a 'typical communist army,' almost over regulated. In other words, the siege of Dubrovnik was not a rogue action.
The same logic applies to the larger military campaign described above.
General Marinovic also pointed out the highly irregular cooperation between the military and civilian politicians, which 'would have been unthinkable in the old JA.' In support, he quoted an intercepted conversation between Bozidar Vucurevic, mayor of Trebinje, and Major Bogdan Kovac, Commander of the JNA 472nd Brigade, where Vucurevic appeared to reprimand the Major: 'What's wrong, I don't hear you killing those beasts down there?' Kovac answered, 'Don't worry, we will do it.' Before the JNA pulled out of the region, Mayor Vucurevic was overheard in another conversation, telling Admiral Miodrag Jokic, Commander of the 9th VPS, to make sure the airport at Cilipi was mined. Jokic assured him it had already been done.
The General also referred to videotapes showing civilian politicians, as well as most of the high ranking officers, visiting the front, including Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic, President and Prime Minister of Montenegro respectively, who brought lambs for the Montenegrin troops in Zvekovica.
General Marinovic's statement leaves little doubt that the JNA and Serbian attack on Dubrovnik was planned at the highest level. He provides convincing testimony that there was no military justification for the attack and siege -- there was no outgoing fire from the Old Town, which remained demilitarized. The assault on the entire region of Southern Dalmatia was an unprovoked, aggressive attack against a largely civilian population.
Other witnesses, including members of the alleged Joint Criminal Enterprise, have testified that Milosevic had control over the Joint Federal Presidency by the time of the Dubrovnik campaign (fall 1991). The Joint Presidency became the Supreme Command, with authority over the JNA, after the declaration of a state of imminent threat of war on October 1, 1991. That provides a pretty clear connection to Milosevic. As for General Marinovic's testimony, Milosevic will have a chance to cross examine him when he returns to court from his latest bout of high blood pressure and exhaustion. Perhaps there's a connection here, too?
