Croatian General Gives 'Very Useful' Testimony, Milosevic Says
Day 210
Croatian General Gives 'Very Useful' Testimony, Milosevic Says
Day 210
Milosevic found the testimony of Retired Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) Colonel and Croatian Army four star General Imra Agotic “very useful,” he told the witness. For the most part, treating respectfully a man he might have considered his enemy, Milosevic was pleased to hear that a Croatian Army commander and chief negotiator didn’t say Serbia was involved in the JNA’s war with Croatia. General Agotic, agreeing that he had negotiated only with the JNA in trying to end the fighting, said it was up to others to establish that Serbia was involved. The Accused also welcomed General Agotic’s partial agreement that the infamous Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line did not necessarily represent an intended border change for Serbia, but the JNA’s attempt to preserve a reduced Yugoslavia.
On direct examination the General testified how the JNA became Serbianized and took the Serb side among the republics when the center would no longer hold. As early as 1989, he became concerned, eventually writing to Federal Secretary for National Defense Veljko Kadijevic. “I saw that the JNA in preventing conflict could play a much more significant and effective role, and it could have done so had it not taken anyone’s side, had it sought a peaceful solution.” However, Kadijevic never responded and the JNA chose to take the Serb side, he said. By March 1991, then-Colonel Agotic was effectively sidelined. He resigned in July after the attack on Slovenia and offered his services to Franjo Tudjman, President of Croatia.
In 1990, General Adzic, JNA Chief of Staff, issued an order that the Territorial Defense (TO) in each Republic should turn over their weapons and ammunition to the JNA. Milosevic suggested the purpose was to prevent Slovenia and Croatia from seceding militarily from the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). General Agotic disagreed. He testified that while the JNA collected Croatian TO weapons, it armed the Croatian Serbs. At the time, the ostensible purpose of JNA weapons' collection was to insure the safety and security of the weapons, which were the property of each republic. However, once they were turned over, the JNA stored them in dumps, depots and rooms in barracks. “The gist of the order was not to place them under safer conditions,” General Agotic said. “The aim was to replace the TO guards and the MUP guards, who were guarding the warehouses until then, with JNA guards.”
In August 1991, Tudjman directed General Agotic to assume command of the Croatian National Guard (ZNG). By this time, Croatia controlled only 70% of its territory; the remaining 30% was held by the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Regions. There was an influx of volunteers to the ZNG but not enough weapons for them. Naturally, one of the General’s first requests of Tudjman was for additional weapons. In August 1991, Tudjman responded, “Don’t worry. There won’t be war. We’ll solve the problems peacefully.” When the prosecutor asked General Agotic why Tudjman believed that, the witness responded, “I know and heard later he had frequent telephone contacts with the Serbian leadership, which, in our judgment, was the partner with which to negotiate the situation in Croatia.” When war became a reality, according to the General, the JNA’s illegal confiscation of TO weapons and the fact that “war was raging” justified the Croatian Army surrounding JNA barracks and capturing some of the weapons by force.
At the same time that the JNA was replacing non-Serbs in its higher ranks and confiscating weapons, it was pursuing plans to assure the territorial integrity of the SFRY in the face of its disintegration. Excepting Slovenia, Plan A would have toppled the Croatian government and placed all of Croatia under JNA control. When that became untenable due to fierce Croatian resistance, failure of JNA mobilization and international pressure, the plan was modified to cover Croatian territory up to the Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line (Plan B). Eventually, it was modified further (Plan C) to include only territories predominantly inhabited by Serbs.
The factors leading to Plan C also led to negotiations. While they were being pursued, Serb forces shelled Dubrovnik, the JNA laid siege to Vukovar, including an assault on the hospital, and Croatian Serb and JNA forces continued to attack villages and force out the Croatian population. General Agotic told of making daily protests to the JNA about these issues. JNA chief negotiator Raseta responded that Croatian forces were firing from Dubrovnik’s Old Town and the JNA was merely returning fire, and Croats were leaving their villages voluntarily. With regard to Vukovar, they negotiated the evacuation of the hospital. When a sizeable number of patients and others sheltering in the hospital failed to arrive, Raseta responded, “We don’t know where they are. It will take place. Wait. We’ll organize it.” Many of the 250 missing were later found in a mass grave. No official response was ever received from the JNA.
Eventually, Croatia and the JNA negotiated a cease fire and the simultaneous lifting of blockaded JNA barracks and withdrawal of JNA forces. Though the JNA returned some of the Croatian TO weapons, it took the rest of its equipment and weapons with it – or blew them up to prevent them being used by the Croats. The cease fire held until the spring and summer of 1995 when Croatia launched Operations Flash and Storm to recover the territory taken by the Croatian Serbs. General Agotic said he participated in Operation Storm and denied any organized or intentional assault on civilians, claiming the executions that occurred in the wake of Croat forces were revenge attacks.
In response to questions by the Accused about the role nationalism played in the SFRY break-up, General Agotic said that Albanian nationalism was blown out of proportion. Milosevic brought up the case of an Albanian soldier, Aziz Kelmendi, who killed four of his fellow soldiers in their sleep before killing himself, which he claimed was an example of Kosovar Albanian nationalism. The General said Kelmendi was an insane individual who committed an irrational act, which was used to justify a witch hunt against Albanians. “It was used to create a psychosis of fear,” he testified.
Similarly, the General disagreed with Milosevic that Kosovar Albanians were pressuring Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins to leave Kosovo from 1980 to 1990. “I do know people were leaving. Whether they all did it under pressure, I’d say a very small portion did that compared to what the media would have us believe.” Milosevic asked whether he knew nothing of the violence Albanians perpetrated against the Kosovar Serbs, to which the General replied, “Based on my talks with people from Kosovo – Serbs and Monenegrins in the JNA and Albanians – I concluded this problem was far exaggerated to the advantage of the Serbs.” As a 20 year member of the Federal Security Service, he was in a position to know.
On direct examination the General testified how the JNA became Serbianized and took the Serb side among the republics when the center would no longer hold. As early as 1989, he became concerned, eventually writing to Federal Secretary for National Defense Veljko Kadijevic. “I saw that the JNA in preventing conflict could play a much more significant and effective role, and it could have done so had it not taken anyone’s side, had it sought a peaceful solution.” However, Kadijevic never responded and the JNA chose to take the Serb side, he said. By March 1991, then-Colonel Agotic was effectively sidelined. He resigned in July after the attack on Slovenia and offered his services to Franjo Tudjman, President of Croatia.
In 1990, General Adzic, JNA Chief of Staff, issued an order that the Territorial Defense (TO) in each Republic should turn over their weapons and ammunition to the JNA. Milosevic suggested the purpose was to prevent Slovenia and Croatia from seceding militarily from the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). General Agotic disagreed. He testified that while the JNA collected Croatian TO weapons, it armed the Croatian Serbs. At the time, the ostensible purpose of JNA weapons' collection was to insure the safety and security of the weapons, which were the property of each republic. However, once they were turned over, the JNA stored them in dumps, depots and rooms in barracks. “The gist of the order was not to place them under safer conditions,” General Agotic said. “The aim was to replace the TO guards and the MUP guards, who were guarding the warehouses until then, with JNA guards.”
In August 1991, Tudjman directed General Agotic to assume command of the Croatian National Guard (ZNG). By this time, Croatia controlled only 70% of its territory; the remaining 30% was held by the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Regions. There was an influx of volunteers to the ZNG but not enough weapons for them. Naturally, one of the General’s first requests of Tudjman was for additional weapons. In August 1991, Tudjman responded, “Don’t worry. There won’t be war. We’ll solve the problems peacefully.” When the prosecutor asked General Agotic why Tudjman believed that, the witness responded, “I know and heard later he had frequent telephone contacts with the Serbian leadership, which, in our judgment, was the partner with which to negotiate the situation in Croatia.” When war became a reality, according to the General, the JNA’s illegal confiscation of TO weapons and the fact that “war was raging” justified the Croatian Army surrounding JNA barracks and capturing some of the weapons by force.
At the same time that the JNA was replacing non-Serbs in its higher ranks and confiscating weapons, it was pursuing plans to assure the territorial integrity of the SFRY in the face of its disintegration. Excepting Slovenia, Plan A would have toppled the Croatian government and placed all of Croatia under JNA control. When that became untenable due to fierce Croatian resistance, failure of JNA mobilization and international pressure, the plan was modified to cover Croatian territory up to the Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line (Plan B). Eventually, it was modified further (Plan C) to include only territories predominantly inhabited by Serbs.
The factors leading to Plan C also led to negotiations. While they were being pursued, Serb forces shelled Dubrovnik, the JNA laid siege to Vukovar, including an assault on the hospital, and Croatian Serb and JNA forces continued to attack villages and force out the Croatian population. General Agotic told of making daily protests to the JNA about these issues. JNA chief negotiator Raseta responded that Croatian forces were firing from Dubrovnik’s Old Town and the JNA was merely returning fire, and Croats were leaving their villages voluntarily. With regard to Vukovar, they negotiated the evacuation of the hospital. When a sizeable number of patients and others sheltering in the hospital failed to arrive, Raseta responded, “We don’t know where they are. It will take place. Wait. We’ll organize it.” Many of the 250 missing were later found in a mass grave. No official response was ever received from the JNA.
Eventually, Croatia and the JNA negotiated a cease fire and the simultaneous lifting of blockaded JNA barracks and withdrawal of JNA forces. Though the JNA returned some of the Croatian TO weapons, it took the rest of its equipment and weapons with it – or blew them up to prevent them being used by the Croats. The cease fire held until the spring and summer of 1995 when Croatia launched Operations Flash and Storm to recover the territory taken by the Croatian Serbs. General Agotic said he participated in Operation Storm and denied any organized or intentional assault on civilians, claiming the executions that occurred in the wake of Croat forces were revenge attacks.
In response to questions by the Accused about the role nationalism played in the SFRY break-up, General Agotic said that Albanian nationalism was blown out of proportion. Milosevic brought up the case of an Albanian soldier, Aziz Kelmendi, who killed four of his fellow soldiers in their sleep before killing himself, which he claimed was an example of Kosovar Albanian nationalism. The General said Kelmendi was an insane individual who committed an irrational act, which was used to justify a witch hunt against Albanians. “It was used to create a psychosis of fear,” he testified.
Similarly, the General disagreed with Milosevic that Kosovar Albanians were pressuring Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins to leave Kosovo from 1980 to 1990. “I do know people were leaving. Whether they all did it under pressure, I’d say a very small portion did that compared to what the media would have us believe.” Milosevic asked whether he knew nothing of the violence Albanians perpetrated against the Kosovar Serbs, to which the General replied, “Based on my talks with people from Kosovo – Serbs and Monenegrins in the JNA and Albanians – I concluded this problem was far exaggerated to the advantage of the Serbs.” As a 20 year member of the Federal Security Service, he was in a position to know.
