Deception and Threat Led Montenegro Into War: Former Foreign Minister says Generals lied to Assembly about Durbrovnik
Day 106
Deception and Threat Led Montenegro Into War: Former Foreign Minister says Generals lied to Assembly about Durbrovnik
Day 106
Montenegro was dragged into the war against Croatia by deception and threat, according to Nikola Samardzic, former Montenegrin politician and businessman. The deception occurred at an extraordinary session of the Montenegrin Assembly where it was announced that 30,000 'Ustasha' from Croatia were ready to attack the Bay of Kotor. In fact, the opposite was true. Yugoslav Army (JNA) forces were amassed to attack the old walled city of Dubrovnik, a UNESCO heritage site, which evokes strong feelings among former Yugoslavs and non-Yugoslavs alike.
The threat occurred when Montenegrin officials, along with representatives of all Yugoslav republics, defied Slobodan Milosevic and voted to adopt a peaceful solution to the crisis occasioned by the imminent collapse of Yugoslavia. Samardzic, close to then Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, testified that Bulatovic told him Milosevic's emissaries had made a veiled threat against his life if he didn't fall into line, which he ultimately did.
When Samardzic discovered that it was JNA forces threatening Dubrovnik rather than the other way around, he prevailed upon Bulatovic and the Montenegrin Assembly to initiate actions to open negotiations with Croatia to avoid war. In the process, the Montenegrin Assembly recognized Croatian independence. The response from Croatia was positive, but a proposed meeting between Samardzic and Croatian officials in Zagreb was trumped by an international meeting to discuss what was known as 'the Carrington Plan.'
In the meantime, the Serbian Government wrote a threatening letter to the Croatian authorities, accusing them of installing mercenaries in Dubrovnik to launch an armed rebellion against the Bay of Kotor. The letter apprised Croatia that the Serbian Government was 'of the firm conviction that the JNA will protect this historic town.' Samardzic characterized the letter 'as cynical as anything done in the times of Goebbels.' For Milosevic's present plight, however, the letter is one more piece of evidence tying him, as President of Serbia, to the JNA and the war in Croatia.
According to Samardzic, at the same time Milosevic was creating a pretext for war, he was scuttling international peace efforts. The Carrington Plan was one of a number of international proposals for a negotiated settlement for Yugoslavia. It consisted of three major points: 1) the republics of the SFRY would become independent states and would secure UN membership; 2) they could associate and form an association of independent states or form associations among themselves; 3) minority rights would be respected, notably those of the Serbian minority in the Krajina region of Croatia. Representatives of all former Yugoslav republics were summoned to a meeting at The Hague to vote on whether to accept or reject the Carrington Plan.
The Montenegro Assembly met in all night session before the vote. There, Samardzic made an impassioned speech: 'If we don't accept the Carrington Plan,' he warned, 'we are leading the Serbian people in Croatia into the greatest possible abyss.' Ultra-rightists stormed the Assembly, called him a traitor and very nearly beat him up. According to Samardzic, then President Bulatovic felt the Carrington Plan was the only way out of the crisis, but remained uncertain how he would vote because he was afraid of what Milosevic would do. The fear was not unfounded.
At the meeting in The Hague, Milosevic took the floor ahead of everyone to oppose the Carrington Plan. While he admitted Croatia had the right to set up an independent state, he maintained that the Croatian Serbs did as well. When prosecutor Geoffrey Nice asked Samardzic about Milosevic's demeanor, Milosevic could no longer restrain himself in the courtroom. He objected to the witness testifying to what he, Milosevic, had said. Judge May said Samardzic could continue; Milosevic, 'in due course,' could contradict his testimony with the minutes of the meeting if he was wrong. Milosevic responded, 'He can read the minutes, too. I don't know why I should listen to him.'
When the vote was taken, all republics voted in favor of the Carrington Plan -- except Slobodan Milosevic representing Serbia. According to Samardzic, Milosevic was furious and threatened the Montenegrins: 'I'll give you 'what for' if you want an independent and sovereign Montenegro.' The next day, after a visit from Milosevic's emissaries, Bulatovic changed his position. According to Samardzic, Bulatovic told him the message from Milosevic was, 'We'll bring in other people if you don't want to change.' That, Samardzic said, was understood to mean Bulatovic would lose his life.
The result was nearly another year of war in Croatia, including significant damage to Dubrovnik, followed by war in Bosnia and Kosovo. Bulatovic kept his life, while a couple hundred thousand others lost theirs. Montenegro, which had very nearly stopped the war, became ever more deeply implicated in the siege of Dubrovnik. As Sumardzic said with great passion, 'It was a war of conquest, an unjust war against Croatia, a war in which Montenegro disgraced itself by putting itself in the service of the Yugoslav Army and Slobodan Milosevic. This shame will remain with us for perhaps another 100 years.'
In 1997, the citizens of Montenegro voted Bulatovic out of office in favor of Milo Djukanovic. Though an early Milosevic supporter, Djukanovic 'realized his error and turned against Slobodan Milosevic,' Samardzic testified. As President, Djukanovic went to Dubrovnik where he made an official apology for the destruction caused by Montenegrins. He was the first leader who admitted responsibility for a part in the Yugoslav wars. Montenegro, on the other hand, remains tied to Serbia and divided among its citizens over where its future lies.
Milosevic's immediate future lies in a courtroom in The Hague, where he faces more testimony from Mr. Samardzic before he has the opportunity to question him. If prior experience is any indication, the Accused's inept cross examination will provide Mr. Samardzic with still more opportunities to expose Milosevic's connections to the war in Croatia.
The threat occurred when Montenegrin officials, along with representatives of all Yugoslav republics, defied Slobodan Milosevic and voted to adopt a peaceful solution to the crisis occasioned by the imminent collapse of Yugoslavia. Samardzic, close to then Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, testified that Bulatovic told him Milosevic's emissaries had made a veiled threat against his life if he didn't fall into line, which he ultimately did.
When Samardzic discovered that it was JNA forces threatening Dubrovnik rather than the other way around, he prevailed upon Bulatovic and the Montenegrin Assembly to initiate actions to open negotiations with Croatia to avoid war. In the process, the Montenegrin Assembly recognized Croatian independence. The response from Croatia was positive, but a proposed meeting between Samardzic and Croatian officials in Zagreb was trumped by an international meeting to discuss what was known as 'the Carrington Plan.'
In the meantime, the Serbian Government wrote a threatening letter to the Croatian authorities, accusing them of installing mercenaries in Dubrovnik to launch an armed rebellion against the Bay of Kotor. The letter apprised Croatia that the Serbian Government was 'of the firm conviction that the JNA will protect this historic town.' Samardzic characterized the letter 'as cynical as anything done in the times of Goebbels.' For Milosevic's present plight, however, the letter is one more piece of evidence tying him, as President of Serbia, to the JNA and the war in Croatia.
According to Samardzic, at the same time Milosevic was creating a pretext for war, he was scuttling international peace efforts. The Carrington Plan was one of a number of international proposals for a negotiated settlement for Yugoslavia. It consisted of three major points: 1) the republics of the SFRY would become independent states and would secure UN membership; 2) they could associate and form an association of independent states or form associations among themselves; 3) minority rights would be respected, notably those of the Serbian minority in the Krajina region of Croatia. Representatives of all former Yugoslav republics were summoned to a meeting at The Hague to vote on whether to accept or reject the Carrington Plan.
The Montenegro Assembly met in all night session before the vote. There, Samardzic made an impassioned speech: 'If we don't accept the Carrington Plan,' he warned, 'we are leading the Serbian people in Croatia into the greatest possible abyss.' Ultra-rightists stormed the Assembly, called him a traitor and very nearly beat him up. According to Samardzic, then President Bulatovic felt the Carrington Plan was the only way out of the crisis, but remained uncertain how he would vote because he was afraid of what Milosevic would do. The fear was not unfounded.
At the meeting in The Hague, Milosevic took the floor ahead of everyone to oppose the Carrington Plan. While he admitted Croatia had the right to set up an independent state, he maintained that the Croatian Serbs did as well. When prosecutor Geoffrey Nice asked Samardzic about Milosevic's demeanor, Milosevic could no longer restrain himself in the courtroom. He objected to the witness testifying to what he, Milosevic, had said. Judge May said Samardzic could continue; Milosevic, 'in due course,' could contradict his testimony with the minutes of the meeting if he was wrong. Milosevic responded, 'He can read the minutes, too. I don't know why I should listen to him.'
When the vote was taken, all republics voted in favor of the Carrington Plan -- except Slobodan Milosevic representing Serbia. According to Samardzic, Milosevic was furious and threatened the Montenegrins: 'I'll give you 'what for' if you want an independent and sovereign Montenegro.' The next day, after a visit from Milosevic's emissaries, Bulatovic changed his position. According to Samardzic, Bulatovic told him the message from Milosevic was, 'We'll bring in other people if you don't want to change.' That, Samardzic said, was understood to mean Bulatovic would lose his life.
The result was nearly another year of war in Croatia, including significant damage to Dubrovnik, followed by war in Bosnia and Kosovo. Bulatovic kept his life, while a couple hundred thousand others lost theirs. Montenegro, which had very nearly stopped the war, became ever more deeply implicated in the siege of Dubrovnik. As Sumardzic said with great passion, 'It was a war of conquest, an unjust war against Croatia, a war in which Montenegro disgraced itself by putting itself in the service of the Yugoslav Army and Slobodan Milosevic. This shame will remain with us for perhaps another 100 years.'
In 1997, the citizens of Montenegro voted Bulatovic out of office in favor of Milo Djukanovic. Though an early Milosevic supporter, Djukanovic 'realized his error and turned against Slobodan Milosevic,' Samardzic testified. As President, Djukanovic went to Dubrovnik where he made an official apology for the destruction caused by Montenegrins. He was the first leader who admitted responsibility for a part in the Yugoslav wars. Montenegro, on the other hand, remains tied to Serbia and divided among its citizens over where its future lies.
Milosevic's immediate future lies in a courtroom in The Hague, where he faces more testimony from Mr. Samardzic before he has the opportunity to question him. If prior experience is any indication, the Accused's inept cross examination will provide Mr. Samardzic with still more opportunities to expose Milosevic's connections to the war in Croatia.
