Early Warnings of Ethnic Cleansing
Day 140
Early Warnings of Ethnic Cleansing
Day 140
The Yugoslav tragedy has heroes as well as villains. You just don't hear about the heroes as much. Charles Kirudja, an international civil servant with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) who testified at the Milosevic trial on Friday, might well be one of them, for his early warnings of ethnic cleansing -- if only those with power had listened to him.
Mr. Kirudja was first posted to the area of Western Slavonia in Croatia to help implement the Vance Plan in April 1992. The Vance Plan, negotiated to stop the war in Croatia, provided for a cease fire, complete demobilization of all military forces, turnover of weapons to the UN, provision for local police forces to maintain law and order, and the voluntary return of displaced persons. Fairly quickly, Mr. Kirudja discovered that Serbs and Croats had two very different views of the Vance Plan. Where Croats considered that the Plan required UNPROFOR to deploy along the civil borders between the former republics, the Serbs understood the international force would deploy along the confrontation line, thus securing their victories in recent fighting. The disputed areas came to be known as 'The Pink Zone.'
Not long after his arrival, Mr. Kirudja also became aware that local Serb officials were operating on their own agenda, i.e. that all Serbs should live in one country, separated from non-Serbs. General Spiro Nikovic, Commander of the JNA 10th Corps, who Mr. Kirudja described as 'a very impressive man . . . truly dedicated to his profession, trying to do a fair job . . . to demobilize,' described his understanding of the new reality, a reconstituted Yugoslavia made up of seven countries. In it, eighty percent of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be under the control of the Serbs, who would also control 93% of what he called the Republic of Serbian Krajina. While the intention to control the Krajina illustrates the Serb view that the Vance Plan consolidated their war gains, the intention to control Bosnia-Hercegovina is an indication that the war had just begun. The truce in Croatia allowed Serbian forces to regroup for the Bosnia campaign.
As part of the demobilization, General Nikovic conscientiously informed Mr. Kirudja that the JNA had orders to withdraw all non-native born officers from the Krajina and Bosnia-Hercegovina, with the exception of 13 officers who would remain. In addition, he provided Mr. Kirudja with a list of troops and weapons that would be left behind 'for the territorial defense (TO).' General Nikovic declared the JNA's intention was to leave a clear and clean situation in Croatia when the JNA pulled out. He was never able to see that realized. With two to three weeks left to complete demobilization, General Nikovic was retired. It was 'unmistakably something he did not expect,' according to Mr. Kirudja. It made way for the transformation of the local TO from a law enforcement organ into an army.
Local Serbs, according to Mr. Kirudja, found a major loophole in the Vance Plan for disarmament and demobilization of UN protected areas -- the requirement to form local police forces for civilian law enforcement purposes. They merely changed the military green camouflage to police blue and repainted their armed personnel carriers. They didn't bother to change the command structure or the names of its divisions. Eventually, after Croatia stormed the Maslinica Bridge, its only connection to Dalmatia, Serbian forces had the excuse they need to retake weapons they'd turned over to the UN. Their new armed force was called the Army of the Republic of Serbia Krajina.
How the Serb intention to control 80% of Bosnia-Hercegovina was to be realized also emerged in events on the ground. Mr. Kirudja began to notice disquieting signs in the area that became known as the Bihac Pocket. Serbs withdrew from the predominantly Muslim enclave and took up positions on the surrounding hills, from which they soon began shelling Bihac. On the 15th of May, the JNA blew up the airport. Mr. Kirudja wrote a report to his superiors in which he relayed his concern. 'I fear that behind the mountains . . . unspeakable atrocities may be unfolding.' His intention, he wrote, was to 'alert the authorities with competence to address the problems of the desperate people in the area.'
Problems were also coming from another direction. The mayor of Dvor, then Serb controlled, approached him with a strange request. The mayor and his counterpart in Bosanski Novi across the river had agreed to transport 5000 people through Bosanski Novi so they could relocate in Austria or Slovenia. The mayor wanted UNPROFOR to provide a film crew to record that the people were transiting safely. Mr. Kirudja replied that it seemed unnatural for so many people to leave their homes, and he asked who they were. When the mayor said they were all Muslims, Mr. Kirudja protested that the mayor didn't have the authority to transport people from another country, i.e. Bosnia-Hercegovina. To this, the mayor informed him there was a new government in central Bosnia where the people were moving from, which was now part of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was an entity Mr. Kirudja had never heard of before.
Mr. Kirudja rejected the request. He felt the UN was being asked to participate in creating thousands of refugees, a problem they usually assist in resolving. The local Serb officials were not dissuaded. The next day the mayor of Bosanski Novi showed up to reiterate the request and provide a more detailed explanation. Under Mr. Kirudja's probing, the mayor revealed the transferees were Muslim men who had refused to swear allegiance to the new government or to fight for it. Mr. Kirudja said it did not sound like they were leaving voluntarily. He recorded the mayor's reply in his diary and read it out in court at the request of prosecutor Dermot Groome: 'I admit that the Muslims have been under pressure from armed Serbian military irregulars.' The mayor didn't get a UN escort. Apparently, the mayors went ahead with their plans anyway.
One of the most dramatic moments in Mr. Kirudja's testimony came when he testified about receiving a flash report from the UN Military Observer post across the river from Bosanski Novi. The observer described seeing hundreds of people being herded into a football stadium, some being detained and others loaded onto buses. Mr. Groome asked the witness whether there was anything peculiar about the arrangement of people on the football field. Mr. Kirudja's response ended the day's testimony: 'They had formed themselves into an 'SOS.'' Mr. Groome: 'The universal sign for help?' Mr. Kirudja: 'Yes.'
In this way, the so-called cease fire in Croatia set the stage for the war in Bosnia. Mr. Kirudja continues his testimony Monday.
Mr. Kirudja was first posted to the area of Western Slavonia in Croatia to help implement the Vance Plan in April 1992. The Vance Plan, negotiated to stop the war in Croatia, provided for a cease fire, complete demobilization of all military forces, turnover of weapons to the UN, provision for local police forces to maintain law and order, and the voluntary return of displaced persons. Fairly quickly, Mr. Kirudja discovered that Serbs and Croats had two very different views of the Vance Plan. Where Croats considered that the Plan required UNPROFOR to deploy along the civil borders between the former republics, the Serbs understood the international force would deploy along the confrontation line, thus securing their victories in recent fighting. The disputed areas came to be known as 'The Pink Zone.'
Not long after his arrival, Mr. Kirudja also became aware that local Serb officials were operating on their own agenda, i.e. that all Serbs should live in one country, separated from non-Serbs. General Spiro Nikovic, Commander of the JNA 10th Corps, who Mr. Kirudja described as 'a very impressive man . . . truly dedicated to his profession, trying to do a fair job . . . to demobilize,' described his understanding of the new reality, a reconstituted Yugoslavia made up of seven countries. In it, eighty percent of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be under the control of the Serbs, who would also control 93% of what he called the Republic of Serbian Krajina. While the intention to control the Krajina illustrates the Serb view that the Vance Plan consolidated their war gains, the intention to control Bosnia-Hercegovina is an indication that the war had just begun. The truce in Croatia allowed Serbian forces to regroup for the Bosnia campaign.
As part of the demobilization, General Nikovic conscientiously informed Mr. Kirudja that the JNA had orders to withdraw all non-native born officers from the Krajina and Bosnia-Hercegovina, with the exception of 13 officers who would remain. In addition, he provided Mr. Kirudja with a list of troops and weapons that would be left behind 'for the territorial defense (TO).' General Nikovic declared the JNA's intention was to leave a clear and clean situation in Croatia when the JNA pulled out. He was never able to see that realized. With two to three weeks left to complete demobilization, General Nikovic was retired. It was 'unmistakably something he did not expect,' according to Mr. Kirudja. It made way for the transformation of the local TO from a law enforcement organ into an army.
Local Serbs, according to Mr. Kirudja, found a major loophole in the Vance Plan for disarmament and demobilization of UN protected areas -- the requirement to form local police forces for civilian law enforcement purposes. They merely changed the military green camouflage to police blue and repainted their armed personnel carriers. They didn't bother to change the command structure or the names of its divisions. Eventually, after Croatia stormed the Maslinica Bridge, its only connection to Dalmatia, Serbian forces had the excuse they need to retake weapons they'd turned over to the UN. Their new armed force was called the Army of the Republic of Serbia Krajina.
How the Serb intention to control 80% of Bosnia-Hercegovina was to be realized also emerged in events on the ground. Mr. Kirudja began to notice disquieting signs in the area that became known as the Bihac Pocket. Serbs withdrew from the predominantly Muslim enclave and took up positions on the surrounding hills, from which they soon began shelling Bihac. On the 15th of May, the JNA blew up the airport. Mr. Kirudja wrote a report to his superiors in which he relayed his concern. 'I fear that behind the mountains . . . unspeakable atrocities may be unfolding.' His intention, he wrote, was to 'alert the authorities with competence to address the problems of the desperate people in the area.'
Problems were also coming from another direction. The mayor of Dvor, then Serb controlled, approached him with a strange request. The mayor and his counterpart in Bosanski Novi across the river had agreed to transport 5000 people through Bosanski Novi so they could relocate in Austria or Slovenia. The mayor wanted UNPROFOR to provide a film crew to record that the people were transiting safely. Mr. Kirudja replied that it seemed unnatural for so many people to leave their homes, and he asked who they were. When the mayor said they were all Muslims, Mr. Kirudja protested that the mayor didn't have the authority to transport people from another country, i.e. Bosnia-Hercegovina. To this, the mayor informed him there was a new government in central Bosnia where the people were moving from, which was now part of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was an entity Mr. Kirudja had never heard of before.
Mr. Kirudja rejected the request. He felt the UN was being asked to participate in creating thousands of refugees, a problem they usually assist in resolving. The local Serb officials were not dissuaded. The next day the mayor of Bosanski Novi showed up to reiterate the request and provide a more detailed explanation. Under Mr. Kirudja's probing, the mayor revealed the transferees were Muslim men who had refused to swear allegiance to the new government or to fight for it. Mr. Kirudja said it did not sound like they were leaving voluntarily. He recorded the mayor's reply in his diary and read it out in court at the request of prosecutor Dermot Groome: 'I admit that the Muslims have been under pressure from armed Serbian military irregulars.' The mayor didn't get a UN escort. Apparently, the mayors went ahead with their plans anyway.
One of the most dramatic moments in Mr. Kirudja's testimony came when he testified about receiving a flash report from the UN Military Observer post across the river from Bosanski Novi. The observer described seeing hundreds of people being herded into a football stadium, some being detained and others loaded onto buses. Mr. Groome asked the witness whether there was anything peculiar about the arrangement of people on the football field. Mr. Kirudja's response ended the day's testimony: 'They had formed themselves into an 'SOS.'' Mr. Groome: 'The universal sign for help?' Mr. Kirudja: 'Yes.'
In this way, the so-called cease fire in Croatia set the stage for the war in Bosnia. Mr. Kirudja continues his testimony Monday.
