Former Slovenian President Confronts Milosevic
Day 189
Former Slovenian President Confronts Milosevic
Day 189
Mr. Kucan began his direct testimony by attesting to the accuracy of Milosevic's January 30, 1989, speech at a Communist Party Central Committee meeting, which he also attended. In the speech, read out by the prosecutor, Milosevic said, 'Things that can't be changed institutionally and must be changed because people want it, will be changed uninstitutionally. . . . [I]f Yugoslavia were to be conceived of in a community in which Serbia was divided into three parts, . . . Serbia would be against Yugoslavia.'
Mr. Kucan interpreted this and Milosevic's subsequent speech at Kosovo Polje a few months later as a threat to the institutional order. Milosevic repeated the threat the following year in June 1990 when he addressed the Serbian Parliament on the proposal for a new Serbian constitution. According to Kucan, 'The message was, should Yugoslavia fall apart, Serbia will never agree to a solution where Serbs live outside the borders [of a Serbian state]. He also implied that borders might be redrawn by use of force.'
Unlike the Slovenes who lived in a republic where the administrative borders encompassed nearly all Slovenes (and only tiny minorities of other ethnicities), Serbs lived in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in substantial numbers. If Yugoslavia dissolved along its administrative borders, large numbers of Serbs would remain outside Serbia. Milosevic opposed this. The alternative, however, was redrawing borders with Croatia and Bosnia who would both be required to cede land to Serbia. The additional 'problem' was that Serbs did not inhabit those lands alone. Therein lay the seeds of war and ethnic cleansing.
Mr. Kucan testified that Milosevic's approach was a populist one, organizing huge rallies to destabilize the political order and carry out his programs. The rallies led to the resignation and replacement of leaders in Vojvodina and Montenegro. Through that, together with the change of Serbia's constitution which revoked the autonomy of Yugoslavia's two provinces,Vojvodina and Kosovo, Milosevic obtained control of four members of the SFRY collective presidency (consisting of 9 members, one from each of the republics and the two autnomous provinces). It was a major step in his power grab.
Throughout Milosevic's backstage maneuvering, Slovenia attempted to find a political solution to the crisis, which followed on from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, in Kucan's view. Yugoslavia needed redefinition, just as Czechoslovakia did. However, for reasons that will continue to be analyzed for years to come, Czechoslovakia separated peacefully, while Yugoslavia erupted into a ten year war.
According to Kucan, Slovenia's efforts met a stone wall. They could get none of their proposals passed in federal or party bodies. When they attempted to protect themselves by adopting a constitutional amendment to the Slovenian constitution that clarified Slovenia's right to self determination, they were threatened by the League of Communists' Central Committee. If they went ahead with their proposal, the Slovenes were told, the League would use 'all other means at their disposal' to stop them. 'We knew it meant a state of emergency and possible use of the Army to secure order in Slovenia.'
Four months later in January 1990, at the 14th Congress of the League of Communists, the Slovene delegation walked out when all the amendments it proposed were voted down, by delegates following Milosevic's lead. The amendments, Kucan said, included an endorsement of political pluralism, the release of all political prisoners and the prohibition of torture. Kucan testified that Slovenia's walkout marked the effective end of Yugoslavia as a state.
The JNA disarmed the Slovenian Territorial Defense (TO) within a few months (May 1990), as it did the TOs of Croatia and Bosnia. It was done without notice to the Republics, who had paid for the weapons and controlled them as part of the All People's Defense system. When Kucan protested to General Hocevar (appointed head of the Slovene TO by the federal presidency without consulting Slovenia) Hocevar responded, 'I've had instructions that neither you nor any leadership was to be informed of this. I'm not clear whose order to follow, so I'll follow this.' The JNA later distributed the weapons to Serb forces fighting in Croatia and Bosnia.
On cross examination, Milosevic accused Slovenia of illegally arming the Croats and Bosnians. Kucan admitted Slovenia had done so, but denied it was illegal. The former president maintained that despite the cease fire in Slovenia, the war moved to Croatia. Slovenia's arming Croatia and Bosnia, both fighting Serbian forces, was a matter of self defense, he said. In June 1993, Slovenia decided to discontinue arming the other two entities.
One is left with the thought that there was more Kucan might have told the Court. The prosecutor deferred asking him detailed questions about Serbia's constitutional machinations, specifically the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy, because the prosecution anticipated a constitutional law expert would provide the information. However, the Trial Chamber rejected that part of the proposed constitutional law expert's testimony. The prosecution must now find another witness who has the expertise or experience to educate the Court. Another question that remains after Mr. Kucan's testimony is whether any backroom agreement was made between Slovene and Serb leaders to let Slovenia go with only token resistance. Barring testimony from another insider, the answer may have to wait for the memoirs and autobiographies.