How To Make A War: Tanic testifies to Milosevic's desire for war in Kosovo
Day 46
How To Make A War: Tanic testifies to Milosevic's desire for war in Kosovo
Day 46
The Tribunal came one step closer to the inner ring of power around the Milosevic throne when protected witness K-3 told what he knew of Milosevic's quest for war in Kosovo. Witness K-3 is Ratomir Tanic, former advisor to the Serbian State Security Service (SDB) and to Dusan Mihajlovic, President of the New Democracy party which joined Milosevic's SPS and Mira Markovic's Jugoslav Left (JUL) parties to form a coalition government in Serbia from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Tanic has been living abroad under an assumed name for 2 ½ years, following his imprisonment and torture by pro-Milosevic members of the SDB. While he testified in public session, his physical identity was hidden behind screens and his face distorted on video projection.
Mr. Tanic testified that in the spring of 1997, Milosevic began pursuing a policy designed to promote conflict in Kosovo, despite ongoing negotiations--which he had authorized--to reach a political solution. His ostensible goal was to reduce the number of Albanians in Kosovo, so they wouldn't be entitled to rights as a constituent minority. The real one was likely to rally support following massive demonstrations against him in the winter of 1996-97. In a highly charged exchange between the witness and Milosevic on cross examination, Mr. Tanic disclosed that the SDB and Army secretly began monitoring Milosevic's conversations at that time for fear he would provoke a civil war. Milosevic's about-face was one reason why New Democracy withdrew from the Coalition Government: 'Instead of a political settlement that had already existed and that had already been concluded to such an extent that it would have guaranteed the resolving of the Kosovo problem, . . .Mr. Milosevic opted for a policy of conflict, and that is one of the reasons why we abandoned the coalition.'
Given his history in Croatia and Bosnia, Milosevic needed no instructions on how to start a war. His first problem was creating an enemy. The KLA in 1996, according to Serbian intelligence professionals, numbered about 2000 poorly armed young male villagers, distributed in small groups with no central command. The KLA grew out of frustration over the lack of international attention to Kosovo at Dayton and lack of support and success for the policy of nonviolent resistance. It was also nourished by Milosevic's rejection of a political solution and his intentional provocation of violence, according to Mr.Tanic. In one of many heated exchanges with Milosevic, Mr. Tanic testified that those who opposed Milosevic's confrontational policy also opposed KLA terrorism. Tanic: 'There's no dispute. Only about the methods of dealing with it.' Milosevic: 'Was that the position of the international community?' Tanic: 'Yes. The question was who was provoking it [terrorism]. You provoked it, not them.'
Mr. Tanic described the pattern of attacks followed in Kosovo, citing as an example, the attack on the Jashari family in the Drenica region in January 1998. First, Mr. Tanic said, they allowed a small number of Serb victims in order to raise tensions. Then, Serbian forces mounted a massive retaliatory attack against the civilian population, with 'nonselective' use of force. In the case of the Jashari's, Mr. Tanic testified that Serbian forces knew the Jashari brothers were in their houses with their families. 'Our forces intervened en masse -- women, children killed without need at all.' Another example he cited was the attack on an alleged sniper nest in Decani on Easter 1998. The center of Decani was razed to the ground by a tank unit of the Yugoslav Army under the pretext of doing away with a terrorist sniper nest. While the sniper nest was not destroyed, the operation was successful in raising tensions in Kosovo. Also in 1998, Mr. Tanic testified that he was present at a reception where Milosevic, in casual conversation, remarked angrily that since there was collective support of the Albanian people for the terrorists, the death of civilians in a war context was a natural consequence.
The cynical disregard for life by Milosevic and others at the apex of power in the FRY was not confined to Kosovar Albanians, according to Mr. Tanic. On one occasion, Serb police were sent into a terrorist stronghold in Likosane without proper equipment. They were 'thrown to their deaths,' Tanic said citing an internal police investigation as his source. The expendability of Serbian lives was an element of Milosevic's strategy during the NATO bombing campaign, as well (see below). Mr. Tanic relayed a statement by Vladimir Stambuk, a close Milosevic associate, in a conversation with the German and British Ambassadors in which he observed 'that official Belgrade had nothing against a small scale bombing operation by NATO against Serbia.' Mr. Tanic has written a book focused on Milosevic's victimization of Kosovar Serbs. Milosevic confronted the witness about it on cross examination: Milosevic: 'You're claiming I wanted to ethnically cleanse Albanians and kill Serbs, too?' Tanic: 'In your own interests. That is what you did.'
The second problem was getting a large proportion of the Albanian population to leave Kosovo. While repression and terror were useful tactics, they were not enough. Despite the fact that more than 300,000 Kosovar Albanians were internally displaced by military activities during 1998, they didn't start crossing the borders out of Kosovo en masse until Milosevic put the colloquially-called Operation Horseshoe into effect -- before NATO bombing. Mr. Tanic testified that Operation Horseshoe was an age-old training exercise which was resurrected by Milosevic to deal with the situation in Kosovo. Its use was opposed by leaders of the Army, SDB and the 'reformist' wing of the ruling coalition for the reason that it was premised on a situation of foreign aggression and none existed at that time.
According to the witness, Milosevic set up a private chain of command to sidestep official government, military and police command structures. Mr. Tanic disclosed a letter from then-army commander, General Momcilo Perisic, to Milosevic, in July 1998, strongly protesting Milosevic's use of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) outside official channels, its subordination to the Serbian police and the appropriation of army equipment for use by the police. General Perisic also objected to Milosevic's use of the VJ against the KLA without an official declaration of a state of emergency or designation of the KLA as a terrorist organization. Mr. Tanic said Milosevic avoided these official declarations because they would have required a public debate in Parliament. Milosevic replaced General Perisic as head of the VJ in fall 1998 with General Nebojsa Pavkovic.
During the war with NATO, Milosevic, through his private chain of command, intentionally used civilian structures, including an elementary school, to house the military command, had soldiers dress in civilian clothing and deployed tanks around the church of Saint Sava. Though informed in advance of NATO targets, Milosevic would sometimes evacuate the civilian population and sometimes not, depending on the usefulness of civilian casualties to him. Mr. Tanic, with close ties to the SDB, testified that Serbian authorities knew two days in advance that the Radio Television Serbia building (RTS) was going to be bombed, but did not evacuate civilians because they wanted Serbian casualties. This followed an explicit policy, according to the witness, to extend the war with NATO because 'civilian loss of lives and civilian destruction would constitute a moral victory over NATO.' When presented with a proposed ceasefire for Catholic Easter, Milosevic responded, 'We have not finished the job down there yet . . . . Once we do finish, we'll see to it.' The job, presumably, was to 'cleanse' Kosovo of Albanians. On redirect examination, the Prosecution also presented a letter from Zoran Lilic, a moderate member of Milosevic's party, dated May 5, 1999, confirming that it was possible to end the war with NATO. The war lasted another month.
In the summer of 1999, in researching for his book, Mr. Tanic had several conversations with people closer to the seat of power than he was (Zoran Mijatovic and Dusan Mihajlovic, among others). One topic of conversation was the mass graves that later came to light. According to his sources, the Serbian police had investigated the allegations, located some of the sites and identified perpetrators, but the investigation was stopped. It was his secondhand knowledge of these investigations that prompted Mr. Tanic's kidnapping and interrogation under torture.
By all evidence, Mr. Tanic's testimony stirred up a hornets' nest. Over two days, Milosevic assailed Mr. Tanic's character, credentials and motives for testifying. He produced documents from Tanic's former colleagues and sources, all denying Tanic's testimony. Ratko Markovic sent a letter. New Democracy issued a formal statement to the press, faxed to Milosevic in The Hague. RTS sent a certified statement. Vuk Draskovic spoke to the newspaper Blic. Dusan Mihajlovic went on Serbian television. All denouncing Mr. Tanic as a charlatan and a liar. All this prompted Mr.Tanic to observe, 'It appears everyone is washing their hands of it.' He might have said, 'washing their hands of me,' as they publicly disavowed former associations with him.
Nevertheless, Mr. Tanic stalwartly maintained that he had two or three independent sources to substantiate everything he testified about. The prosecution produced some of those on redirect examination -- a copy of the letter from General Perisic to Milosevic, objecting to his private chain of command, and the letter from Zoran Lilic, advising Milosevic the war with NATO could be ended. Mr. Tanic provided additional documents to the prosecution after he finished testifying, including three photos, one showing him with Milosevic who, at one point, denied knowing him.
Tanic's decision to testify only to facts which he knew could be substantiated by two to three additional sources was not necessarily a wise one. It put his oral testimony at odds with his earlier statements to the Office of the Prosecutor, which were admitted into evidence in written form. At one point, Milosevic confronted Mr. Tanic with the discrepancy between his written statement where he'd said he had met Milosevic 'some twenty times,' and his oral testimony the day before where he said he'd met Milosevic five to seven times. Mr. Tanic said both were correct. 'My [oral] testimony is based on what can be proved by other witnesses -- and the [written] statement is correct.' The Court will have to decide whether Mr. Tanic's explanation is plausible or whether the differences between his oral testimony and written statements undermine his credibility.
Milosevic demonstrated his skill at provocation by honing in on Mr. Tanic's unease over his formal educational credentials. The witness refused to answer whether he had received a university degree or not, even when Judge May intervened to tell him he must answer. In an intriguing response that neither the Court nor the prosecution followed up on, Mr. Tanic said, 'I don't want to answer. The question was already put to me in the basement under torture.' He was similarly reluctant to discuss a 1977 conviction as a 19 year old student because it had been expunged. Milosevic produced a certified document from the District Court in Belgrade stating the particulars of the conviction, including that his original sentence of 1 year 7 months was reduced on appeal to 7 months and that the case was later 'annulled.'
These are matters bearing on the credibility of the witness which the Trial Chamber will assess, along with his detailed testimony tying Milosevic directly to war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. For the most part, Mr. Tanic gave plausible answers to Milosevic's cross examination. Additional insider testimony that supports even some of what Mr. Tanic reported will go a long way toward resolving the credibility issues and proving the Indictment.
Mr. Tanic testified that in the spring of 1997, Milosevic began pursuing a policy designed to promote conflict in Kosovo, despite ongoing negotiations--which he had authorized--to reach a political solution. His ostensible goal was to reduce the number of Albanians in Kosovo, so they wouldn't be entitled to rights as a constituent minority. The real one was likely to rally support following massive demonstrations against him in the winter of 1996-97. In a highly charged exchange between the witness and Milosevic on cross examination, Mr. Tanic disclosed that the SDB and Army secretly began monitoring Milosevic's conversations at that time for fear he would provoke a civil war. Milosevic's about-face was one reason why New Democracy withdrew from the Coalition Government: 'Instead of a political settlement that had already existed and that had already been concluded to such an extent that it would have guaranteed the resolving of the Kosovo problem, . . .Mr. Milosevic opted for a policy of conflict, and that is one of the reasons why we abandoned the coalition.'
Given his history in Croatia and Bosnia, Milosevic needed no instructions on how to start a war. His first problem was creating an enemy. The KLA in 1996, according to Serbian intelligence professionals, numbered about 2000 poorly armed young male villagers, distributed in small groups with no central command. The KLA grew out of frustration over the lack of international attention to Kosovo at Dayton and lack of support and success for the policy of nonviolent resistance. It was also nourished by Milosevic's rejection of a political solution and his intentional provocation of violence, according to Mr.Tanic. In one of many heated exchanges with Milosevic, Mr. Tanic testified that those who opposed Milosevic's confrontational policy also opposed KLA terrorism. Tanic: 'There's no dispute. Only about the methods of dealing with it.' Milosevic: 'Was that the position of the international community?' Tanic: 'Yes. The question was who was provoking it [terrorism]. You provoked it, not them.'
Mr. Tanic described the pattern of attacks followed in Kosovo, citing as an example, the attack on the Jashari family in the Drenica region in January 1998. First, Mr. Tanic said, they allowed a small number of Serb victims in order to raise tensions. Then, Serbian forces mounted a massive retaliatory attack against the civilian population, with 'nonselective' use of force. In the case of the Jashari's, Mr. Tanic testified that Serbian forces knew the Jashari brothers were in their houses with their families. 'Our forces intervened en masse -- women, children killed without need at all.' Another example he cited was the attack on an alleged sniper nest in Decani on Easter 1998. The center of Decani was razed to the ground by a tank unit of the Yugoslav Army under the pretext of doing away with a terrorist sniper nest. While the sniper nest was not destroyed, the operation was successful in raising tensions in Kosovo. Also in 1998, Mr. Tanic testified that he was present at a reception where Milosevic, in casual conversation, remarked angrily that since there was collective support of the Albanian people for the terrorists, the death of civilians in a war context was a natural consequence.
The cynical disregard for life by Milosevic and others at the apex of power in the FRY was not confined to Kosovar Albanians, according to Mr. Tanic. On one occasion, Serb police were sent into a terrorist stronghold in Likosane without proper equipment. They were 'thrown to their deaths,' Tanic said citing an internal police investigation as his source. The expendability of Serbian lives was an element of Milosevic's strategy during the NATO bombing campaign, as well (see below). Mr. Tanic relayed a statement by Vladimir Stambuk, a close Milosevic associate, in a conversation with the German and British Ambassadors in which he observed 'that official Belgrade had nothing against a small scale bombing operation by NATO against Serbia.' Mr. Tanic has written a book focused on Milosevic's victimization of Kosovar Serbs. Milosevic confronted the witness about it on cross examination: Milosevic: 'You're claiming I wanted to ethnically cleanse Albanians and kill Serbs, too?' Tanic: 'In your own interests. That is what you did.'
The second problem was getting a large proportion of the Albanian population to leave Kosovo. While repression and terror were useful tactics, they were not enough. Despite the fact that more than 300,000 Kosovar Albanians were internally displaced by military activities during 1998, they didn't start crossing the borders out of Kosovo en masse until Milosevic put the colloquially-called Operation Horseshoe into effect -- before NATO bombing. Mr. Tanic testified that Operation Horseshoe was an age-old training exercise which was resurrected by Milosevic to deal with the situation in Kosovo. Its use was opposed by leaders of the Army, SDB and the 'reformist' wing of the ruling coalition for the reason that it was premised on a situation of foreign aggression and none existed at that time.
According to the witness, Milosevic set up a private chain of command to sidestep official government, military and police command structures. Mr. Tanic disclosed a letter from then-army commander, General Momcilo Perisic, to Milosevic, in July 1998, strongly protesting Milosevic's use of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) outside official channels, its subordination to the Serbian police and the appropriation of army equipment for use by the police. General Perisic also objected to Milosevic's use of the VJ against the KLA without an official declaration of a state of emergency or designation of the KLA as a terrorist organization. Mr. Tanic said Milosevic avoided these official declarations because they would have required a public debate in Parliament. Milosevic replaced General Perisic as head of the VJ in fall 1998 with General Nebojsa Pavkovic.
During the war with NATO, Milosevic, through his private chain of command, intentionally used civilian structures, including an elementary school, to house the military command, had soldiers dress in civilian clothing and deployed tanks around the church of Saint Sava. Though informed in advance of NATO targets, Milosevic would sometimes evacuate the civilian population and sometimes not, depending on the usefulness of civilian casualties to him. Mr. Tanic, with close ties to the SDB, testified that Serbian authorities knew two days in advance that the Radio Television Serbia building (RTS) was going to be bombed, but did not evacuate civilians because they wanted Serbian casualties. This followed an explicit policy, according to the witness, to extend the war with NATO because 'civilian loss of lives and civilian destruction would constitute a moral victory over NATO.' When presented with a proposed ceasefire for Catholic Easter, Milosevic responded, 'We have not finished the job down there yet . . . . Once we do finish, we'll see to it.' The job, presumably, was to 'cleanse' Kosovo of Albanians. On redirect examination, the Prosecution also presented a letter from Zoran Lilic, a moderate member of Milosevic's party, dated May 5, 1999, confirming that it was possible to end the war with NATO. The war lasted another month.
In the summer of 1999, in researching for his book, Mr. Tanic had several conversations with people closer to the seat of power than he was (Zoran Mijatovic and Dusan Mihajlovic, among others). One topic of conversation was the mass graves that later came to light. According to his sources, the Serbian police had investigated the allegations, located some of the sites and identified perpetrators, but the investigation was stopped. It was his secondhand knowledge of these investigations that prompted Mr. Tanic's kidnapping and interrogation under torture.
By all evidence, Mr. Tanic's testimony stirred up a hornets' nest. Over two days, Milosevic assailed Mr. Tanic's character, credentials and motives for testifying. He produced documents from Tanic's former colleagues and sources, all denying Tanic's testimony. Ratko Markovic sent a letter. New Democracy issued a formal statement to the press, faxed to Milosevic in The Hague. RTS sent a certified statement. Vuk Draskovic spoke to the newspaper Blic. Dusan Mihajlovic went on Serbian television. All denouncing Mr. Tanic as a charlatan and a liar. All this prompted Mr.Tanic to observe, 'It appears everyone is washing their hands of it.' He might have said, 'washing their hands of me,' as they publicly disavowed former associations with him.
Nevertheless, Mr. Tanic stalwartly maintained that he had two or three independent sources to substantiate everything he testified about. The prosecution produced some of those on redirect examination -- a copy of the letter from General Perisic to Milosevic, objecting to his private chain of command, and the letter from Zoran Lilic, advising Milosevic the war with NATO could be ended. Mr. Tanic provided additional documents to the prosecution after he finished testifying, including three photos, one showing him with Milosevic who, at one point, denied knowing him.
Tanic's decision to testify only to facts which he knew could be substantiated by two to three additional sources was not necessarily a wise one. It put his oral testimony at odds with his earlier statements to the Office of the Prosecutor, which were admitted into evidence in written form. At one point, Milosevic confronted Mr. Tanic with the discrepancy between his written statement where he'd said he had met Milosevic 'some twenty times,' and his oral testimony the day before where he said he'd met Milosevic five to seven times. Mr. Tanic said both were correct. 'My [oral] testimony is based on what can be proved by other witnesses -- and the [written] statement is correct.' The Court will have to decide whether Mr. Tanic's explanation is plausible or whether the differences between his oral testimony and written statements undermine his credibility.
Milosevic demonstrated his skill at provocation by honing in on Mr. Tanic's unease over his formal educational credentials. The witness refused to answer whether he had received a university degree or not, even when Judge May intervened to tell him he must answer. In an intriguing response that neither the Court nor the prosecution followed up on, Mr. Tanic said, 'I don't want to answer. The question was already put to me in the basement under torture.' He was similarly reluctant to discuss a 1977 conviction as a 19 year old student because it had been expunged. Milosevic produced a certified document from the District Court in Belgrade stating the particulars of the conviction, including that his original sentence of 1 year 7 months was reduced on appeal to 7 months and that the case was later 'annulled.'
These are matters bearing on the credibility of the witness which the Trial Chamber will assess, along with his detailed testimony tying Milosevic directly to war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. For the most part, Mr. Tanic gave plausible answers to Milosevic's cross examination. Additional insider testimony that supports even some of what Mr. Tanic reported will go a long way toward resolving the credibility issues and proving the Indictment.
