The Kind of Witness Every Lawyer Wants
Day 218
The Kind of Witness Every Lawyer Wants
Day 218
In the Milosevic trial, a little more light was shed on the secret relations between Milosevic and Tudjman with the testimony of Stjepan Kljuic, former member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and a Bosnian Croat. He also served as president of the HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union. From an insider's perspective, Mr. Kljuic spoke about the political maneuvering among the leaders of the Yugoslav Republics before war broke out and in its early stages. He also opened the prosecution's evidence on the siege of Sarajevo.
Mr. Kljuic testified that former Croatian President Tudjman 'told me on one occasion that he had been given Cazin Krajina by Mr. Milosevic.' The area in northwestern Bosnia, also known as Turkish Croatia, was predominantly Muslim. Mr. Kljuic responded to Tudjman, 'that is the same as if I were to give you Sardinia or Sicily. It does not belong to him.' On cross examination, Milosevic agreed with the witness that he had no such power, implying it meant he could not have made the offer. However, the witness's testimony does not stand alone. Other evidence has suggested Milosevic and Tudjman made an agreement to divide Bosnia between them at the infamous 'Karadjordjevo meeting.'
In the early years of Yugoslavia's disintegration, 1990 - 91, the various nationalities and interests were jockeying for position, seeking alliances with those who would later become their enemies. Mr. Kljuic learned that Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), had improperly held talks with Milosevic without informing him, as Bosnian Croat Presidency member. Allegedly, Milosevic was trying to win Izetbegovic's agreement to keep BiH in the rump Yugoslavia. Mr. Kljuic confronted the Bosnian President: 'I said, 'If you stay, you will be number two in Yugoslavia. Who is number two now? The Albanians. So they are offering you their position?'' He reported that Izetbegovic replied, 'Stjepan, nothing will come of it.'
In September 1991, while war was already raging in Croatia, Tudjman sent Mr. Kljuic to see Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia, to explore possible Bosnian Serb recognition of Croatian independence within borders that included territory the Bosnian Serbs thought should be theirs. The noteworthy part of Kljuic's conversation with Karadzic was not his anticipated rejection of the proposal, but the fact that he was not surprised that Kljuic approached him with it. 'It could be assumed Tudjman and Milosevic had been in touch,' the witness explained to the Court.
It was Tudjman who was surprised at the rejection of his proposal. The Croatian President's reaction, Mr. Kljuic testified, was 'dreadful.' 'Maybe he just realized what he was advocating at a higher level [i.e., with Milosevic] had still not reached the Bosnian Serbs.' That may be a diplomatic way of saying Milosevic was telling both the Bosnian Serbs and Tudjman what each wanted to hear.
Earlier in the year (January 1991), the witness had a conversation with Milosevic himself, following negotiations among the parties. Mr. Kljuic told the Court, 'Mr. Milosevic showed a high degree of hospitality towards me and even friendlier feelings. . . . He said he understood the feelings of the people of Western Herzegovina to join Croatia.' Milosevic went on to advise Mr. Kljuic that a smaller segment of Bosnia would be allowed to unite with Croatia. The two leaders sparred in a friendly fashion about what would be included in this territory. But the witness informed the Court, 'What is important for this case is that I said to Milosevic, 'So the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be yours.'' Mr. Kljuic concluded, 'He was a charming and charismatic man,' who apparently did not disagree with the witness's conclusion.
Despite talks and negotiations, it was clear by December 1991 that Yugoslavia could not prevail, according to the witness. Following Slovenia and Croatia, the Bosnian Assembly proposed a referendum on independence. Radovan Karadzic, president of the SDS, addressed the Assembly with a threat, 'If you insist on the referendum, there will be no Bosnia and Muslims will disappear.' The Bosnian Serbs, led by Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic, walked out. [The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, which passed overwhelmingly with 93 % of the vote on March 3, 1992.]
In Mr. Kljuic's testimony, Milosevic's presence is felt more than seen, but it is no less real. Indeed, when Mr. Kljuic came face to face with the Serbian President, Milosevic confirmed what he had heard from others. It seems to be a position Milosevic enjoys, maneuvering and manipulating other players while he remains behind the scenes, emerging center stage only to receive the accolades.
In late 1991 and early 1992, the witness and other political leaders became aware of increasing JNA activities around Sarajevo. The JNA said it was going to do training, but observers saw a gradual encirclement of the town and the building of fortifications. By March, both sides were erecting barricades.
It was at that time the Serbian paramilitaries showed up. According to the witness, they included Arkan's men and Seselj's men, the latter known for their brutality and looting. On cross examination, Milosevic referred to stenographic notes of a Bosnian Presidency meeting where Mr. Kljuic was said to have reported on a conversation between Jerko Doko, Bosnian Defense Minister, and Arkan, in which Arkan supposedly said he didn't recognize either Milosevic or Karadzic. Turning to the witness, Milosevic demanded, 'Wouldn't you agree this shows you were clearly informed that Serbia was not involved [in the war in Bosnia].' Kljuic quickly responded, 'I would if you would convince me Arkan was not acting under your command or that of military formations in Yugoslavia.'
Giving some of the first testimony in the trial about the shelling of Sarajevo, Mr. Kljuic testified that, though the shelling was continuous, 'real hell broke out with the arrival of Ratko Mladic . . . .' Sarajevo was surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces who laid siege to the city for 3 1/2 years. The witness told the Court that the Serbian blockade of the territorial defense within Sarajevo kept it from preventing ethnic cleansing in nearby towns. During cross examination, Milosevic attempted to show that Sefer Halilovic organized the Bosnian Government army six months before the conflict broke out. Mr. Kljuic responded that there was no army. 'If there had been, Sarajevo would have been defended better and there would have been no casualties.'
On cross examination, Mr. Kljuic was a straightforward and credible witness. He did not shrink from admitting that Croats and Bosniaks committed crimes, as well as making serious errors of judgment. Nor was he hesitant in agreeing or disagreeing with Milosevic, lending support to the view that his interest was in telling the truth as he knew it.
When Milosevic asked him to agree that he, Milosevic, had advocated for the continuation of Yugoslavia, Mr. Kljuic agreed, then added, 'I think our tragedy is that Milosevic formally advocated Yugoslavia and did everything for it to cease.'
In another example, the witness concluded that the first HDZ convention in 1990 was not anti-Serb, but anti-communist. Correcting himself, he added, 'but it could also be said to be anti-Serb.' The Accused expressed his appreciation.
Milosevic spent some time asking about the role of the Mujahedeen in the Bosnian Army. Mr. Kljuic, though disagreeing about the number of Mujahedeen, nevertheless agreed they were present as of 1993 and that they damaged the Bosnian cause. With their arrival, he said, the Army lost its multi-ethnic character. Regardless, he pointed out that 'the arming of Croats and Muslims was child's play? compared to arms Serbia held and supplied to their Bosnian brethren.
Given that the JNA had collected all weapons belonging to the local TO's (territorial defense) and only returned weapons to the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, the BiH Army had to start from scratch. Mr. Kljuic was forthcoming about Bosnia's attempts to secure weapons. When Milosevic produced a document purporting to be a request for weapons from Izetbegovic to Slovenia, the witness responded: 'That is not unnatural. You don't suppose, I assume, we stood around waiting to be killed by the JNA instead of looking for a way out by securing weapons. Personally, had I had a chance I would have asked the devil for weapons to defend myself.'
Mr. Kljuic was also forthright about forced labor and the existence of detention camps in Bosnian government-held territory. In response to Milosevic's questioning, the witness said there were cases of forced mobilization for work in Sarajevo, as well as groups who would 'occasionally' unlawfully arrest people. One of his preconditions for rejoining the BiH Presidency was that the armed groups, acting outside the BiH Army, be arrested. According to Mr. Kljuic, it was done.
Testifying about the camps, Mr. Kljuic said that by 1994 'we were receiving information from various sides that there were camps or prisons, facilities in which Serbs were held and not just captured soldiers, Serb citizens. . . . I and most of the presidency were against this.'
Mr. Kljuic is the kind of witness every lawyer wants -- one who understands that truth is not a dichotomy between black and white, good and bad. That crimes were committed by Bosnian Muslims and Croats as well as Bosnian Serbs does not mean that each cancels out the other and none should be punished. Indeed, the work of the Tribunal is to see that individuals -- of whatever ethnicity -- are punished for their crimes. The work of this trial is to determine whether Milosevic is guilty of some or all of the crimes he has been charged with committing. The guilt of others is a matter for other trials.
Mr. Kljuic testified that former Croatian President Tudjman 'told me on one occasion that he had been given Cazin Krajina by Mr. Milosevic.' The area in northwestern Bosnia, also known as Turkish Croatia, was predominantly Muslim. Mr. Kljuic responded to Tudjman, 'that is the same as if I were to give you Sardinia or Sicily. It does not belong to him.' On cross examination, Milosevic agreed with the witness that he had no such power, implying it meant he could not have made the offer. However, the witness's testimony does not stand alone. Other evidence has suggested Milosevic and Tudjman made an agreement to divide Bosnia between them at the infamous 'Karadjordjevo meeting.'
In the early years of Yugoslavia's disintegration, 1990 - 91, the various nationalities and interests were jockeying for position, seeking alliances with those who would later become their enemies. Mr. Kljuic learned that Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), had improperly held talks with Milosevic without informing him, as Bosnian Croat Presidency member. Allegedly, Milosevic was trying to win Izetbegovic's agreement to keep BiH in the rump Yugoslavia. Mr. Kljuic confronted the Bosnian President: 'I said, 'If you stay, you will be number two in Yugoslavia. Who is number two now? The Albanians. So they are offering you their position?'' He reported that Izetbegovic replied, 'Stjepan, nothing will come of it.'
In September 1991, while war was already raging in Croatia, Tudjman sent Mr. Kljuic to see Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia, to explore possible Bosnian Serb recognition of Croatian independence within borders that included territory the Bosnian Serbs thought should be theirs. The noteworthy part of Kljuic's conversation with Karadzic was not his anticipated rejection of the proposal, but the fact that he was not surprised that Kljuic approached him with it. 'It could be assumed Tudjman and Milosevic had been in touch,' the witness explained to the Court.
It was Tudjman who was surprised at the rejection of his proposal. The Croatian President's reaction, Mr. Kljuic testified, was 'dreadful.' 'Maybe he just realized what he was advocating at a higher level [i.e., with Milosevic] had still not reached the Bosnian Serbs.' That may be a diplomatic way of saying Milosevic was telling both the Bosnian Serbs and Tudjman what each wanted to hear.
Earlier in the year (January 1991), the witness had a conversation with Milosevic himself, following negotiations among the parties. Mr. Kljuic told the Court, 'Mr. Milosevic showed a high degree of hospitality towards me and even friendlier feelings. . . . He said he understood the feelings of the people of Western Herzegovina to join Croatia.' Milosevic went on to advise Mr. Kljuic that a smaller segment of Bosnia would be allowed to unite with Croatia. The two leaders sparred in a friendly fashion about what would be included in this territory. But the witness informed the Court, 'What is important for this case is that I said to Milosevic, 'So the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be yours.'' Mr. Kljuic concluded, 'He was a charming and charismatic man,' who apparently did not disagree with the witness's conclusion.
Despite talks and negotiations, it was clear by December 1991 that Yugoslavia could not prevail, according to the witness. Following Slovenia and Croatia, the Bosnian Assembly proposed a referendum on independence. Radovan Karadzic, president of the SDS, addressed the Assembly with a threat, 'If you insist on the referendum, there will be no Bosnia and Muslims will disappear.' The Bosnian Serbs, led by Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic, walked out. [The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, which passed overwhelmingly with 93 % of the vote on March 3, 1992.]
In Mr. Kljuic's testimony, Milosevic's presence is felt more than seen, but it is no less real. Indeed, when Mr. Kljuic came face to face with the Serbian President, Milosevic confirmed what he had heard from others. It seems to be a position Milosevic enjoys, maneuvering and manipulating other players while he remains behind the scenes, emerging center stage only to receive the accolades.
In late 1991 and early 1992, the witness and other political leaders became aware of increasing JNA activities around Sarajevo. The JNA said it was going to do training, but observers saw a gradual encirclement of the town and the building of fortifications. By March, both sides were erecting barricades.
It was at that time the Serbian paramilitaries showed up. According to the witness, they included Arkan's men and Seselj's men, the latter known for their brutality and looting. On cross examination, Milosevic referred to stenographic notes of a Bosnian Presidency meeting where Mr. Kljuic was said to have reported on a conversation between Jerko Doko, Bosnian Defense Minister, and Arkan, in which Arkan supposedly said he didn't recognize either Milosevic or Karadzic. Turning to the witness, Milosevic demanded, 'Wouldn't you agree this shows you were clearly informed that Serbia was not involved [in the war in Bosnia].' Kljuic quickly responded, 'I would if you would convince me Arkan was not acting under your command or that of military formations in Yugoslavia.'
Giving some of the first testimony in the trial about the shelling of Sarajevo, Mr. Kljuic testified that, though the shelling was continuous, 'real hell broke out with the arrival of Ratko Mladic . . . .' Sarajevo was surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces who laid siege to the city for 3 1/2 years. The witness told the Court that the Serbian blockade of the territorial defense within Sarajevo kept it from preventing ethnic cleansing in nearby towns. During cross examination, Milosevic attempted to show that Sefer Halilovic organized the Bosnian Government army six months before the conflict broke out. Mr. Kljuic responded that there was no army. 'If there had been, Sarajevo would have been defended better and there would have been no casualties.'
On cross examination, Mr. Kljuic was a straightforward and credible witness. He did not shrink from admitting that Croats and Bosniaks committed crimes, as well as making serious errors of judgment. Nor was he hesitant in agreeing or disagreeing with Milosevic, lending support to the view that his interest was in telling the truth as he knew it.
When Milosevic asked him to agree that he, Milosevic, had advocated for the continuation of Yugoslavia, Mr. Kljuic agreed, then added, 'I think our tragedy is that Milosevic formally advocated Yugoslavia and did everything for it to cease.'
In another example, the witness concluded that the first HDZ convention in 1990 was not anti-Serb, but anti-communist. Correcting himself, he added, 'but it could also be said to be anti-Serb.' The Accused expressed his appreciation.
Milosevic spent some time asking about the role of the Mujahedeen in the Bosnian Army. Mr. Kljuic, though disagreeing about the number of Mujahedeen, nevertheless agreed they were present as of 1993 and that they damaged the Bosnian cause. With their arrival, he said, the Army lost its multi-ethnic character. Regardless, he pointed out that 'the arming of Croats and Muslims was child's play? compared to arms Serbia held and supplied to their Bosnian brethren.
Given that the JNA had collected all weapons belonging to the local TO's (territorial defense) and only returned weapons to the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, the BiH Army had to start from scratch. Mr. Kljuic was forthcoming about Bosnia's attempts to secure weapons. When Milosevic produced a document purporting to be a request for weapons from Izetbegovic to Slovenia, the witness responded: 'That is not unnatural. You don't suppose, I assume, we stood around waiting to be killed by the JNA instead of looking for a way out by securing weapons. Personally, had I had a chance I would have asked the devil for weapons to defend myself.'
Mr. Kljuic was also forthright about forced labor and the existence of detention camps in Bosnian government-held territory. In response to Milosevic's questioning, the witness said there were cases of forced mobilization for work in Sarajevo, as well as groups who would 'occasionally' unlawfully arrest people. One of his preconditions for rejoining the BiH Presidency was that the armed groups, acting outside the BiH Army, be arrested. According to Mr. Kljuic, it was done.
Testifying about the camps, Mr. Kljuic said that by 1994 'we were receiving information from various sides that there were camps or prisons, facilities in which Serbs were held and not just captured soldiers, Serb citizens. . . . I and most of the presidency were against this.'
Mr. Kljuic is the kind of witness every lawyer wants -- one who understands that truth is not a dichotomy between black and white, good and bad. That crimes were committed by Bosnian Muslims and Croats as well as Bosnian Serbs does not mean that each cancels out the other and none should be punished. Indeed, the work of the Tribunal is to see that individuals -- of whatever ethnicity -- are punished for their crimes. The work of this trial is to determine whether Milosevic is guilty of some or all of the crimes he has been charged with committing. The guilt of others is a matter for other trials.
