Milosevic Link to War in Bosnia, Croatia Strengthened
Day 142
Milosevic Link to War in Bosnia, Croatia Strengthened
Day 142
Milosevic's legal assistants must be gnashing their teeth after his cross examination of Charles Kirudja, UN Special Representative Asuhi Akashi's Delegate in Belgrade in 1994 and 1995. Rather than focus on Mr. Kirudja's recollections of him as a peace advocate or to challenge his testimony that Milosevic controlled the Krajina Serbs, Milosevic questioned him about irrelevant topics and those of which he had no personal knowledge. Presiding Judge May intervened repeatedly to admonish the accused to move on to something relevant.
In direct testimony, Mr. Kirudja said he personally met with Milosevic about six times as Mr. Akashi's representative. Revealing the role Milosevic often played with international interlocutors, Mr. Kirudja testified that Milosevic was 'very professional, very kind and courteous. At no time was an Akashi request turned down.' In a number of meetings, Milosevic expressed his preference for a peaceful outcome to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In the process, he also revealed his overarching authority. Oddly, Milosevic barely addressed either of these in cross examination.
At an informal meeting in October 1994, according to the witness, Milosevic mentioned that hard liners and hawks, such as Vojislav Seselj, were losing power. He went on to say that Seselj's parliamentary immunity had been withdrawn so he could face charges. In addition, a Seselj supporter in the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) had been removed. Milosevic did not explicitly say he was responsible for any of these actions.
In a later meeting on November 23, 1994, Mr. Kirudja had occasion to see Milosevic demonstrate his power directly. That meeting was attended by the witness and Milan Martic, by then President of the RSK, formerly head of its military and police forces. It was a tense meeting following an incident resulting in NATO air strikes against a Serb missile site in Bosnia. Martic denied the RSK had done anything to cause the attack, said he was trying to prevent his people from attacking the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in retaliation and requested Akashi to condemn the strikes. After listening to his complaints, Milosevic indicated he agreed that NATO action was uncalled for. He then addressed Martic, telling him not to do things that would result in the war option being exercised. At the same meeting, Martic admitted his forces were preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Bihac pocket in Bosnia. Milosevic intervened to 'make it clear to Martic that such action was not to be contemplated and humanitarian assistance had to be allowed.'
Milosevic did not follow up on any of this, leaving the Court to assume Martic obeyed his orders, humanitarian aid was allowed through and there was no retaliation. Instead, the accused spent considerable time reading from official UN reports, asking Mr. Kirudja about the origin of the hostilities, and demanding to know whether he thought the Serbs had the right to self-defense. The latter two issues are for the court to decide, as Judge May pointed out. Since the Court also must decide the pivotal issue of whether Milosevic controlled or influenced fellow Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, Milosevic would have been wise to challenge this part of Mr. Kirudja's testimony.
At the conclusion of direct examination, Mr. Groome asked the witness his opinion of Milosevic's role and authority regarding the governments of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs. Mr. Kirudja responded that he had told his superiors they only need deal with Milosevic. He further stated that in all his official activities on behalf of Mr. Akashi, he had never dealt with Zoran Lilic, then president of the rump Yugoslavia. That left only one conclusion: that Milosevic pulled all the strings; Lilic was a place holder.
With Mr. Kirudja's testimony, the prosecution has strengthened the connection between Milosevic and war in Croatia and Bosnia. One has to wonder if Milosevic noticed.
In direct testimony, Mr. Kirudja said he personally met with Milosevic about six times as Mr. Akashi's representative. Revealing the role Milosevic often played with international interlocutors, Mr. Kirudja testified that Milosevic was 'very professional, very kind and courteous. At no time was an Akashi request turned down.' In a number of meetings, Milosevic expressed his preference for a peaceful outcome to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In the process, he also revealed his overarching authority. Oddly, Milosevic barely addressed either of these in cross examination.
At an informal meeting in October 1994, according to the witness, Milosevic mentioned that hard liners and hawks, such as Vojislav Seselj, were losing power. He went on to say that Seselj's parliamentary immunity had been withdrawn so he could face charges. In addition, a Seselj supporter in the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) had been removed. Milosevic did not explicitly say he was responsible for any of these actions.
In a later meeting on November 23, 1994, Mr. Kirudja had occasion to see Milosevic demonstrate his power directly. That meeting was attended by the witness and Milan Martic, by then President of the RSK, formerly head of its military and police forces. It was a tense meeting following an incident resulting in NATO air strikes against a Serb missile site in Bosnia. Martic denied the RSK had done anything to cause the attack, said he was trying to prevent his people from attacking the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in retaliation and requested Akashi to condemn the strikes. After listening to his complaints, Milosevic indicated he agreed that NATO action was uncalled for. He then addressed Martic, telling him not to do things that would result in the war option being exercised. At the same meeting, Martic admitted his forces were preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Bihac pocket in Bosnia. Milosevic intervened to 'make it clear to Martic that such action was not to be contemplated and humanitarian assistance had to be allowed.'
Milosevic did not follow up on any of this, leaving the Court to assume Martic obeyed his orders, humanitarian aid was allowed through and there was no retaliation. Instead, the accused spent considerable time reading from official UN reports, asking Mr. Kirudja about the origin of the hostilities, and demanding to know whether he thought the Serbs had the right to self-defense. The latter two issues are for the court to decide, as Judge May pointed out. Since the Court also must decide the pivotal issue of whether Milosevic controlled or influenced fellow Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, Milosevic would have been wise to challenge this part of Mr. Kirudja's testimony.
At the conclusion of direct examination, Mr. Groome asked the witness his opinion of Milosevic's role and authority regarding the governments of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs. Mr. Kirudja responded that he had told his superiors they only need deal with Milosevic. He further stated that in all his official activities on behalf of Mr. Akashi, he had never dealt with Zoran Lilic, then president of the rump Yugoslavia. That left only one conclusion: that Milosevic pulled all the strings; Lilic was a place holder.
With Mr. Kirudja's testimony, the prosecution has strengthened the connection between Milosevic and war in Croatia and Bosnia. One has to wonder if Milosevic noticed.
