Milosevic Makes Theater, But a Poor Defense: Accused confronts Mesic over politics
Day 103
Milosevic Makes Theater, But a Poor Defense: Accused confronts Mesic over politics
Day 103
In nearly five hours of cross examination, Milosevic did little to undermine Croatian President Stjepan Mesic's testimony implicating him as the man who unleashed and directed the forces that caused so much death and destruction throughout the former Yugoslavia. True to his pledge to not defend himself, but to use the trial as an opportunity to make his political case, Milosevic spent the majority of his time questioning Mr. Mesic as if he were on trial, arguing with him over his version of events, making speeches about his view of reality, and interminably 'testing the witness's credibility.'
The Trial Chamber became so exasperated that it turned to the amicus and asked for assistance in determining how much leeway Milosevic should be given to ask questions designed to attack the witness's credibility. Mr. Kay pointed out that the real issue for the defendant is the amount of time he chooses to spend on matters not productive of a defense. He added, 'I believe he is aware of those issues.' Nevertheless, he suggested that the Court might have more success in limiting Milosevic's time wasting irrelevancies if it acknowledges that it is aware of matters he has put in issue. Perhaps then, Mr. Kay said, reinforcement (i.e. repetition) will not be necessary. At least in the cross examination of President Mesic, the Court's attempt to do that had little effect.
President Mesic's testimony was significant in several respects. He showed how Milosevic took control of the federal presidency, Serbianized the federal army (JNA), orchestrated bank loans to finance the JNA, which chose to support him as the best possibility for maintaining its strength, and provoked or fabricated conflicts that enabled the JNA to impose its authority on Yugoslav soil (Croatia, Slovenia) to separate the 'warring parties.' According to Mesic, Milosevic wanted a Greater Serbia, as well as a significant change in the demographics of Kosovo (80 to 90% Albanian at that time), which he attempted to accomplish in part by forcing the Krajina Serbs to move there after Croatia retook and ousted them from the Krajina.
President Mesic also described the results of the infamous meeting between Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman at Karadjordjevo, where they are rumored to have reached an agreement to carve up Bosnia between them. Though Mesic was originally to have attended the meeting, Tudjman went alone. Afterwards, he told Mesic that Milosevic didn't want any of Croatia; his real object was 66% of Bosnia. Also following the meeting, Tudjman no longer expressed concern about preserving Bosnia, since Milosevic had promised him a share.
Mesic did attend an earlier meeting between the two leaders, where Milosevic showed Tudjman an 'expert' report claiming that if the SFRY fell apart, 500,000 Muslims who had been forcibly transferred to Turkey earlier in the century would return to the Balkans. Tudjman later repeated this in Croatia, citing the report's author as a 'world expert,' not disclosing it was a Serbian report.
Milosevic barely touched on any of this testimony in his lengthy cross examination, preferring to point fingers at Mesic's alleged role in the break up of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed. On a few occasions, tucked into a speech barely disguised as a question, Milosevic offhandedly asserted that he, of course, as President of Serbia had no control over the JNA or the 'rump' presidency of SFRY. But he never effectively attacked or undermined the substantive evidence President Mesic gave -- the evidence that goes to show Milosevic had de facto control over the JNA and the rump SFRY presidency, and a plan to rearrange the demographics of the Balkans through force -- to serve his ends.
The Trial Chamber became so exasperated that it turned to the amicus and asked for assistance in determining how much leeway Milosevic should be given to ask questions designed to attack the witness's credibility. Mr. Kay pointed out that the real issue for the defendant is the amount of time he chooses to spend on matters not productive of a defense. He added, 'I believe he is aware of those issues.' Nevertheless, he suggested that the Court might have more success in limiting Milosevic's time wasting irrelevancies if it acknowledges that it is aware of matters he has put in issue. Perhaps then, Mr. Kay said, reinforcement (i.e. repetition) will not be necessary. At least in the cross examination of President Mesic, the Court's attempt to do that had little effect.
President Mesic's testimony was significant in several respects. He showed how Milosevic took control of the federal presidency, Serbianized the federal army (JNA), orchestrated bank loans to finance the JNA, which chose to support him as the best possibility for maintaining its strength, and provoked or fabricated conflicts that enabled the JNA to impose its authority on Yugoslav soil (Croatia, Slovenia) to separate the 'warring parties.' According to Mesic, Milosevic wanted a Greater Serbia, as well as a significant change in the demographics of Kosovo (80 to 90% Albanian at that time), which he attempted to accomplish in part by forcing the Krajina Serbs to move there after Croatia retook and ousted them from the Krajina.
President Mesic also described the results of the infamous meeting between Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman at Karadjordjevo, where they are rumored to have reached an agreement to carve up Bosnia between them. Though Mesic was originally to have attended the meeting, Tudjman went alone. Afterwards, he told Mesic that Milosevic didn't want any of Croatia; his real object was 66% of Bosnia. Also following the meeting, Tudjman no longer expressed concern about preserving Bosnia, since Milosevic had promised him a share.
Mesic did attend an earlier meeting between the two leaders, where Milosevic showed Tudjman an 'expert' report claiming that if the SFRY fell apart, 500,000 Muslims who had been forcibly transferred to Turkey earlier in the century would return to the Balkans. Tudjman later repeated this in Croatia, citing the report's author as a 'world expert,' not disclosing it was a Serbian report.
Milosevic barely touched on any of this testimony in his lengthy cross examination, preferring to point fingers at Mesic's alleged role in the break up of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed. On a few occasions, tucked into a speech barely disguised as a question, Milosevic offhandedly asserted that he, of course, as President of Serbia had no control over the JNA or the 'rump' presidency of SFRY. But he never effectively attacked or undermined the substantive evidence President Mesic gave -- the evidence that goes to show Milosevic had de facto control over the JNA and the rump SFRY presidency, and a plan to rearrange the demographics of the Balkans through force -- to serve his ends.
