Milosevic Was the Man In Charge, Testifies Ambassador
Day 154
Milosevic Was the Man In Charge, Testifies Ambassador
Day 154
Another international dignitary from Milosevic’s glory days came to an ICTY courtroom to bear witness to Milosevic’s power to manipulate and control events in the former Yugoslavia when he was President of Serbia. Ambassador Herbert Ocun, the UN Secretary General’s envoy to Yugoslavia, together with then U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, met with Milosevic on many occasions to try to broker a peace deal on Croatia and, later, Bosnia-Herzegovina. When they needed agreement of the federal army (JNA), the rump Yugoslav presidency, local Serbian and paramilitary forces in Croatia and Bosnia, they sought out Milosevic because “He was certainly the man in charge.”
While Cyrus Vance has since died, Ambassador Ocun was often able to give verbatim accounts of those meetings by referring to his meticulously kept diaries from that time. For example, in a 3 hour meeting with Milosevic, Vance, Foreign Minister Jovanovic and himself, Ambassador Ocun recorded an exchange about the role of paramilitaries in Bosnia.
VANCE: “What about Arkan on the Drina [on the Bosnian side]? General Adzic [JNA Chief of Staff] says he’s there.” Milosevic denies Arkan is there, says it is completely prohibited for him to go outside Serbia, then admits he was in Bijeljina but only as an individual. According to the Ambassador’s diary, Vance didn’t believe him: “No, that won’t wash,” he replied. Milosevic then says Arkan was only there at the beginning of the fighting. VANCE: “Let me be frank. People I trust have seen Arkan and other Serbian types with heavy equipment along the Drina. Why is this happening?” MILOSEVIC: “There were only some individuals. They are not in the control of Serb authorities. We forbade paramilitaries. Arkan was in Bijeljina only at the beginning.” VANCE: “To be perfectly frank, you and Serbia are being hurt. If this continues it will have a negative effect on Serbian recognition and de-recognition [declaring it an outlaw state].” MILOSEVIC: “I agree. We are being hurt. We can’t check on every Serb.” VANCE: “You have a real problem. You have to CLEAN IT UP. I speak as a friend.” . . . MILOSEVIC: “No one is in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia.” VANCE: “Serbia cannot hope to win a military victory in Bosnia either directly or surreptitiously.” Ambassador Ocun explains that Vance meant either through the JNA or paramilitaries. MILOSEVIC: “That’s right. Do you think I want a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?” VANCE: “It looks that way.”
This is but a tantalizing peek into 16 diaries kept by Ambassador Ocun of meetings he attended between October 1991 and May 1993 in attempts to negotiate peace agreements as fighting raged first in Croatia, then in Bosnia. The diaries have been offered into evidence for the Trial Chamber to review at its leisure.
Ambassador Ocun’s first mission in the region was to negotiate an end to hostilities in Croatia. To do that, he and Cyrus Vance met with Milosevic and presented a proposal for a cease fire, protection of civilians in designated areas (United Nations Protected Areas, UNPAs) and a UN peacekeeping force in Croatia. Milosevic said the plan was “completely suitable.” When Vance asked how Federal Secretary of Defense Veljko Kadijevic would react, Milosevic said there would be no problem. When the two diplomats met with Kadijevic a short time later, he indeed had no problem with the plan. It appeared he'd been fully briefed and given marching orders before his meeting with the diplomats.
Milosevic had also assured Vance and Ocun that the Croatian Serbs would go along. That apparently was not so easy. Milosevic reported to the envoys at a December 2, 1991 meeting that Hadzic and Babic wouldn’t initially respect the accord, but he’d secured their consent. According to the Ambassador’s verbatim notes, Milosevic said, “I promised and I did.”
What became known as the Geneva Accord, establishing conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Croatia, was signed November 23, 1991, by Tudjman, Milosevic and Kadijevic. No one from the federal presidency signed it, eloquent testimony of where the power lay. The Accord had four main points:
1. Croatia will lift the blockade of JNA barracks.
2. JNA will begin withdrawal of personnel and equipment from Croatia and complete it according to an agreed schedule.
3. The parties will immediately instruct all units under their command, control and political influence to cease fire and make sure the paramilitaries or irregulars also observe the cease fire.
4. The parties will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Ambasssador Ocun testified that Milosevic committed himself and the federal authorities to paragraphs 2, 3, 4. In other words, the international community looked to Milosevic to deliver.
As negotiations for a ceasefire in Croatia were happening, so was the worst destruction of the war in Croatia – the siege of Vukovar. Ambassador Ocun accompanied Cyrus Vance to Vukovar on November 19, 1991, the day after the city had fallen to the JNA and Serbian forces. “Much of the town, almost every building, every structure was destroyed by shell fire,” the Ambassador testified. In contrast, the small JNA garrison that had been blockaded by Croatian forces was “practically untouched.” The objective of the JNA’s assault on Vukovar was allegedly to free the garrison. The almost total destruction of the town was wholly disproportionate to the stated objective. The Ambassador called it “a shocking sight.”
Since they had been alerted to a possible tragedy at the Vukovar hospital, Vance and Ocun tried to reach it. They were stopped by Major Veselin Sljivancanin. Vance, a former Secretary of the Army, angrily confronted the Major. Sljivancanin raised his rifle and refused to let them pass. The Ambassador testified to seeing “many affecting scenes of weeping civilians” at the reception center, as well as “many rough customers” intermingling with the JNA troops, conveying an “air of brooding and imminent menace.”
Back in Belgrade, the two diplomats met immediately with General Kadijevic, followed by a meeting with Milosevic. Vance confronted Kadijevic with the disproportionate and enormous damage done to Vukovar ostensibly to free a small garrison. Kadijevic replied that the garrison had run out of food and water. On the stand, Ocun pointed out that Borisav Jovic, one time president of the joint Yugoslav Presidency, stated in his memoirs that the Vukovar garrison was freed in September. Milosevic’s response was more sanguine: “He said the world would understand the destruction.”
At the meeting with Milosevic, Vance also raised the issue of paramilitaries: “I have heard disturbing reports of activities there [in Vukovar] by Serb irregulars.” Though Milosevic feigned surprise, the Ambassador reported, “It was clear to me at the time that he knew what was going on. I couldn’t imagine he didn’t. . . . and he was pretending to be surprised. . . .” “His concluding remarks at the meeting were that after the barracks were unblocked that the peacekeeping force could go into effect and we would have no problem with the JNA or Serbian irregulars regarding keeping the peace.”
There was also concern about Serb paramilitary activity in the Krajina, which Vance addressed to Milosevic. “Vance said he trusted the president and looked to him to deliver them [to comply with the Accord]. The president replied ‘I will use my influence. I am not their master, but I am sure they will fulfill their promise.’” When asked directly by prosecutor Dermot Groome, “Who was the primary person who you sought to confirm that the parties representing the Serbian side were still willing to observe their obligations under the cease fire agreement?” Ambassador Ocun replied, “President Milosevic.”
Vance also noted continued hostilities on the Dalmatian coast. Milosevic replied that Serbs had no links with Dalmatia, but added that after the JNA barracks were unblocked in Croatia the JNA would leave it alone.
The Ambassador’s testimony – and his diaries – make plain that Milosevic was the main player on the Serbian and Yugoslav side of the Croatian conflict. It is possible to conclude from this that he had de facto control over the JNA. If he didn’t have de facto control over the Croatian Serbs or the Serbian paramilitaries fighting in Croatia, he clearly had substantial influence over them, one measure of liability under the joint criminal enterprise theory with which he's been charged under Article 7(1) of the ICTY statute.
That is not the end of what Ambassador Ocun came to tell the Tribunal. He was also an active participant in efforts to stop the war in Bosnia, a subject that comprises 9 of his 16 notebooks. Milosevic figures prominently in them as well. His testimony continues.
While Cyrus Vance has since died, Ambassador Ocun was often able to give verbatim accounts of those meetings by referring to his meticulously kept diaries from that time. For example, in a 3 hour meeting with Milosevic, Vance, Foreign Minister Jovanovic and himself, Ambassador Ocun recorded an exchange about the role of paramilitaries in Bosnia.
VANCE: “What about Arkan on the Drina [on the Bosnian side]? General Adzic [JNA Chief of Staff] says he’s there.” Milosevic denies Arkan is there, says it is completely prohibited for him to go outside Serbia, then admits he was in Bijeljina but only as an individual. According to the Ambassador’s diary, Vance didn’t believe him: “No, that won’t wash,” he replied. Milosevic then says Arkan was only there at the beginning of the fighting. VANCE: “Let me be frank. People I trust have seen Arkan and other Serbian types with heavy equipment along the Drina. Why is this happening?” MILOSEVIC: “There were only some individuals. They are not in the control of Serb authorities. We forbade paramilitaries. Arkan was in Bijeljina only at the beginning.” VANCE: “To be perfectly frank, you and Serbia are being hurt. If this continues it will have a negative effect on Serbian recognition and de-recognition [declaring it an outlaw state].” MILOSEVIC: “I agree. We are being hurt. We can’t check on every Serb.” VANCE: “You have a real problem. You have to CLEAN IT UP. I speak as a friend.” . . . MILOSEVIC: “No one is in Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia.” VANCE: “Serbia cannot hope to win a military victory in Bosnia either directly or surreptitiously.” Ambassador Ocun explains that Vance meant either through the JNA or paramilitaries. MILOSEVIC: “That’s right. Do you think I want a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?” VANCE: “It looks that way.”
This is but a tantalizing peek into 16 diaries kept by Ambassador Ocun of meetings he attended between October 1991 and May 1993 in attempts to negotiate peace agreements as fighting raged first in Croatia, then in Bosnia. The diaries have been offered into evidence for the Trial Chamber to review at its leisure.
Ambassador Ocun’s first mission in the region was to negotiate an end to hostilities in Croatia. To do that, he and Cyrus Vance met with Milosevic and presented a proposal for a cease fire, protection of civilians in designated areas (United Nations Protected Areas, UNPAs) and a UN peacekeeping force in Croatia. Milosevic said the plan was “completely suitable.” When Vance asked how Federal Secretary of Defense Veljko Kadijevic would react, Milosevic said there would be no problem. When the two diplomats met with Kadijevic a short time later, he indeed had no problem with the plan. It appeared he'd been fully briefed and given marching orders before his meeting with the diplomats.
Milosevic had also assured Vance and Ocun that the Croatian Serbs would go along. That apparently was not so easy. Milosevic reported to the envoys at a December 2, 1991 meeting that Hadzic and Babic wouldn’t initially respect the accord, but he’d secured their consent. According to the Ambassador’s verbatim notes, Milosevic said, “I promised and I did.”
What became known as the Geneva Accord, establishing conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Croatia, was signed November 23, 1991, by Tudjman, Milosevic and Kadijevic. No one from the federal presidency signed it, eloquent testimony of where the power lay. The Accord had four main points:
1. Croatia will lift the blockade of JNA barracks.
2. JNA will begin withdrawal of personnel and equipment from Croatia and complete it according to an agreed schedule.
3. The parties will immediately instruct all units under their command, control and political influence to cease fire and make sure the paramilitaries or irregulars also observe the cease fire.
4. The parties will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Ambasssador Ocun testified that Milosevic committed himself and the federal authorities to paragraphs 2, 3, 4. In other words, the international community looked to Milosevic to deliver.
As negotiations for a ceasefire in Croatia were happening, so was the worst destruction of the war in Croatia – the siege of Vukovar. Ambassador Ocun accompanied Cyrus Vance to Vukovar on November 19, 1991, the day after the city had fallen to the JNA and Serbian forces. “Much of the town, almost every building, every structure was destroyed by shell fire,” the Ambassador testified. In contrast, the small JNA garrison that had been blockaded by Croatian forces was “practically untouched.” The objective of the JNA’s assault on Vukovar was allegedly to free the garrison. The almost total destruction of the town was wholly disproportionate to the stated objective. The Ambassador called it “a shocking sight.”
Since they had been alerted to a possible tragedy at the Vukovar hospital, Vance and Ocun tried to reach it. They were stopped by Major Veselin Sljivancanin. Vance, a former Secretary of the Army, angrily confronted the Major. Sljivancanin raised his rifle and refused to let them pass. The Ambassador testified to seeing “many affecting scenes of weeping civilians” at the reception center, as well as “many rough customers” intermingling with the JNA troops, conveying an “air of brooding and imminent menace.”
Back in Belgrade, the two diplomats met immediately with General Kadijevic, followed by a meeting with Milosevic. Vance confronted Kadijevic with the disproportionate and enormous damage done to Vukovar ostensibly to free a small garrison. Kadijevic replied that the garrison had run out of food and water. On the stand, Ocun pointed out that Borisav Jovic, one time president of the joint Yugoslav Presidency, stated in his memoirs that the Vukovar garrison was freed in September. Milosevic’s response was more sanguine: “He said the world would understand the destruction.”
At the meeting with Milosevic, Vance also raised the issue of paramilitaries: “I have heard disturbing reports of activities there [in Vukovar] by Serb irregulars.” Though Milosevic feigned surprise, the Ambassador reported, “It was clear to me at the time that he knew what was going on. I couldn’t imagine he didn’t. . . . and he was pretending to be surprised. . . .” “His concluding remarks at the meeting were that after the barracks were unblocked that the peacekeeping force could go into effect and we would have no problem with the JNA or Serbian irregulars regarding keeping the peace.”
There was also concern about Serb paramilitary activity in the Krajina, which Vance addressed to Milosevic. “Vance said he trusted the president and looked to him to deliver them [to comply with the Accord]. The president replied ‘I will use my influence. I am not their master, but I am sure they will fulfill their promise.’” When asked directly by prosecutor Dermot Groome, “Who was the primary person who you sought to confirm that the parties representing the Serbian side were still willing to observe their obligations under the cease fire agreement?” Ambassador Ocun replied, “President Milosevic.”
Vance also noted continued hostilities on the Dalmatian coast. Milosevic replied that Serbs had no links with Dalmatia, but added that after the JNA barracks were unblocked in Croatia the JNA would leave it alone.
The Ambassador’s testimony – and his diaries – make plain that Milosevic was the main player on the Serbian and Yugoslav side of the Croatian conflict. It is possible to conclude from this that he had de facto control over the JNA. If he didn’t have de facto control over the Croatian Serbs or the Serbian paramilitaries fighting in Croatia, he clearly had substantial influence over them, one measure of liability under the joint criminal enterprise theory with which he's been charged under Article 7(1) of the ICTY statute.
That is not the end of what Ambassador Ocun came to tell the Tribunal. He was also an active participant in efforts to stop the war in Bosnia, a subject that comprises 9 of his 16 notebooks. Milosevic figures prominently in them as well. His testimony continues.
