Moroccan Reforms Seen as Cup Half-Empty

As Morocco heads for a constitutional referendum, it is clear the opposition movement is not going to get the kind of democracy it has been pressing for, so the unrest of the past few months is likely to continue.

When King Mohammed unveiled the draft amendments in a speech to the nation on June 17, the proposed changes to the current system of government were far less than protestors had been calling for. In response, the February 20 Movement which is leading the protests staged a mass demonstration in Casablanca two days later.

The main change under the reform plan, which is to be put to a nationwide referendum on July 1, is that the prime minister would be nominated by the political party that holds most parliamentary seats, instead of being simply appointed by the king. The prime minister would be able to appoint ministers and dissolve parliament, powers previously held by the king alone.

The king would still be able to issue decrees; he would also remain head of the armed forces and oversee security affairs.

The protesters are calling for a parliamentary monarchy in which the king would remain head of state but cede his formal powers.

The February 20 Movement was founded by a group of young activists and students who were not affiliated to existing political parties. Since then, the movement has attracted left-wing parties, some Islamist organisations, business groups and members of the Amazigh or ethnic Berber movement.

According to Hashim Almiraat, a Moroccan blogger and free speech advocate based in France, “You have a society which is pretty much divided around the levels of powers that should be granted to the monarch. On the one hand, you have the democrats who want a parliamentary monarchy, similar to Spain, the UK or Sweden. On the other, you have people who want the king to stay as powerful as he is today. These people might clash at some point”

Since the protest movement remains deeply unsatisfied with a reform plan they believe is being imposed from above, the trial of strength is likely to continue.

“The solution of this crisis lies ultimately with the monarch himself,” Almiraat said. “He can influence and decide the outcome of the uprisings. If he clings to his prohibitions and does not relinquish any of his powers, then I’m afraid we will encounter more problems in Morocco.”

In the view of Arezki Daoud, editor of the North Africa Journal, “There will not be a smooth transition to democracy. Nevertheless, the situation will not be as bloody as the ones we saw in Syria and Yemen.”

Despite continuing opposition, the revised constitution is likely to go through in the referendum, since many Moroccans will either vote for it or abstain.

“The vote will almost certainly get a positive vote, because people generally want to be supportive of the king,” Michael Willis, a research lecturer at Oxford University and King Mohammed VI Fellow in Moroccan and Mediterranean Studies, told IWPR.

But Almiraat suspects the level of approval in the referendum may have more to do with low turnout than wholehearted popular support for the changes.

“It will be interesting to see not how many people vote yes during the referendum, but rather how many people abstain from voting,” he said. “People will not dare say no to the king out of fear, but many people will stay at home and not vote at all, protesting against a process they do not recognise as democratic.”

Almiraat predicted that the authorities would create a semblance of open debate by providing equal airtime to the country’s political parties in the run-up to the vote. But he says “90 per cent” of parties will back the constitutional changes.

“Simply because they are affiliated to the system, they have every interest in not disobeying the king,” he explained.

Almiraat cited an internet campaign by the Mamfakinch website for airtime to be divided instead between opponents and supporters of the draft constitution, saying, “It will be very interesting to see how the government will respond to that appeal.”

King Mohammed first announced plans for constitutional reform in a televised speech on March 9, as a response to street protests.

Ahmed Benchemsi, a Moroccan journalist and visiting scholar at Stanford University, says the speech was a historic event because “a Moroccan king surrendered to popular pressure”.

But instead of encouraging a nationwide debate, the king appointed a committee drawn from political parties, civil society groups and trade unions to draft the constitutional amendments.

“This was contradictory to what the streets were calling for, namely an elected assembly which would be able to draft a brand-new constitution,” Almiraat said.

The top-down nature of the process is a fundamental flaw, in Almiraat’s view.

“You have the state, which is supposed to transform and evolve into something more democratic… but then asks people to vote in favour of this constitution and use its huge media apparatus to do the propaganda in favour,” he said. “Where is the no vote in all this? Where is the opposition vote?”

Almiraat believes the promise of change, albeit directed by the monarch himself, may have sapped the strength of the protest movement. “From that moment, I think the February 20 Movement has somehow lost some of its momentum, because people have been divided on how to deal with that royal proposal,” he said.

Another reason why the Moroccan leadership has been able to fend off the challenge from street demonstrations is that the state is generally less repressive than some other Arab states.

“The country has more freedom of expression and association than most Arab countries. Therefore, there was not the build-up of pressure that you got in other ‘Arab Spring’ countries. There was also a feeling in Morocco that things were not perfect, but better than in other countries,” Willis said. “I interviewed one of the leaders of the protest movements a couple of months ago, and he smiled and said that if Morocco had been a little bit less liberal, our movement would have been more successful.”

The demonstrations were non-violent from the start, and participants chanted slogans in favour of peaceful action.

“They were very adamant to show that their objective was not to confront the authorities,” Almiraat said.

For their part, the authorities initially allowed protests to go ahead without violent interventions from the security forces. But that soon changed.

“As mainstream media attention was drawn to other Arab Spring countries such as Libya, Syria and Yemen, where the situation is much more dramatic, somehow the government got the wrong message that they were free to deal with the protesters as it suited them. From this moment, we started observing unprovoked attacks on protesters, with the police systematically violently disrupting any gathering in public squares in Rabat and Casablanca,” Almiraat said.

Another factor, he believes, may have been that the regime felt slighted by the continuing challenge to its monarch, even after he set out reform plans

“The king in Morocco is considered to be sacred. You are not allowed to laugh at him, criticise him or to challenge any of his decisions or speeches. What the February 20 Movement did was to break this taboo,” he continued. “Despite the king’s promise of change by appointing a constitution committee, the movement still called for more protests, which [represented an] assault on the king. From that point, the authorities were trying to intimidate the young and defiant protesters, and force them to refrain from any more protests because each time these protesters take to the streets, they are destroying the image of fear.”

Willis believes the level of violence may have been stepped up to prevent the opposition movement spreading beyond its main constituencies – young people and the educated middle class.

“Some people say… the movement was trying to move into working class districts of the city in order to mobilise people there,” he said. “That may be an explanation why more violence was used against the latest demonstrations.”

The policy seems to have changed again after protest movement activist Kamal Amari died in an encounter with police in the town of Safi on May 29. Eyewitnesses said he was surrounded and beaten by riot police, and died of his injuries a few days later because he refused to go to hospital for fear of being arrested or beaten again. The authorities have denied that his death was caused by an assault.

Amari was not the first protester to die, but his death attracted significant international media coverage. After the incident, the authorities suddenly began allowing protests to take place fairly undisturbed.

A bomb blast which killed 16 people at a cafe in Marrakesh in April focused concerns on the risk that Islamic extremist groups might try to exploit a period of political turbulence to destabilise the country.

Almiraat points out that Islamic groups in Morocco vary greatly, from fundamentalists who would not want to share power in a secular state to mainstream parties that are part of the political process.

Prior to this year’s protests, the largest opposition force in Morocco was the Justice and Spirituality Movement, JSM, which wants to revive the role of Islam in society. JSM was involved in the demonstrations from early on, but it has kept a low profile.

“The official press is saying that JSM is taking over the [protest] movement, but I don’t think that is necessarily true,” Willis said. “What they actually want… is a little bit unclear. They want to bring together a large national convention to discuss the future of Morocco. Some think they would want a religious state ultimately, but they argue they would want it by consent.”

The other force promoting Islamic values is the Party of Justice and Development, a legal party that is represented in parliament. The party is modelled partly on Turkey’s Justice and Development or AK Party, and similarly declares a commitment to democracy.

The PJD has been hesitant about endorsing the street protests, withholding support until its younger members began taking to the streets. Eventually, key figures within the PJD went public in support of the protest movement, but the party is still divided on support for the movement’s demands.

Mariann Markseth Omholt is an IWPR editorial intern in London.