Senior Officer Told KVM of Deportation Plan: Army officer revealed plan to destroy KLA and rid Kosovo of all Albanians
Days 30-31
Senior Officer Told KVM of Deportation Plan: Army officer revealed plan to destroy KLA and rid Kosovo of all Albanians
Days 30-31
Shortly before the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) pulled out of Kosovo on the eve of NATO bombing, a senior Yugoslav Army officer told Colonel Richard Ciaglinski, part of the KVM team, of FRY's plan to eliminate the KLA. The unnamed official, whose identity was protected by the Court, pulled out a map and showed the Colonel in detail where offensives would take place. The plan, which had to have required 'a great deal of planning and coordination' over weeks and months, was designed to totally and permanently eliminate the KLA. Following his presentation, the officer concluded with a statement the Colonel found even more shocking, 'And when we have finished dealing with the KLA, we will remove all Albanians from the territory of Kosovo forever.'
Colonel Ciaglinski went on to say that he understood from the Army official that the campaign would be a coordinated action of the Army, police, paramilitaries and special forces. 'We are only saving NATO and you a job, because if we don't deal with the KLA and Albanians, you will have to sometime in the future,' he quoted his confidential source. Colonel Ciaglinski said he informed his superior, General Drewienkiewicz, of this conversation but the General 'chose not to believe me.' It occurred at a time when a lot was happening, including an incident where two verifiers had been shot at. The Colonel said he also passed the information along to others.
Colonel Ciaglinski's testimony is a significant piece in establishing the prosecution's charge that the mass deportation of Kosovar Albanians was planned in advance. As further substantiation, Colonel Ciaglinski stated, 'And it happened that way.'
He went on to describe indications on the ground which led him to believe FRY was planning a spring offensive. 1) Troops were being deployed outside barracks in violation of the October Agreement between Milosevic and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. 2) Conscripts were being retained in Kosovo after their tour of duty expired and their replacements arrived. 3) Ammunition and supply columns were coming into the province. 4) Trains were arriving with new tanks which were being driven to places throughout Kosovo. 5) Incoming equipment was of higher quality. 6) More police were entering the province; they were well-equipped, trained and generally exhibited aggressive behavior. 7) Serb representatives on the Cooperation Committee which dealt with the KVM were being replaced by hardliners. 8) Serb forces were expanding the area of control along the border. 9) Garrison areas were becoming huge and the KVM was denied access. 10) Serb forces were increasing their aggressiveness toward KVM verifiers. By the time the KVM left Kosovo on the eve of NATO bombing, Serbian forces had effective control of the province. The KVM and Kosovo citizens had no room to move. The KVM was prevented from carrying out its mission, while Kosovar Albanians kept to their houses.
During his cross examination, Milosevic demanded that the Court secure the attendance of the unnamed Army officer. 'I demand of you that the witness who was mentioned who allegedly gave information should be heard here. And you shall issue all guarantees that he will not be detained. I'm asking that he be protected. He was smeared—saying he supplied information to the enemy. I'm asking that the witness be heard here with all protections for secrecy.' Judge May responded that the accused could submit a written application and it would be considered. To date, none has been submitted.
Milosevic also demanded of Colonel Ciagliniski whether a state doesn't have the right to protect itself against terrorists. While agreeing that it does, the Colonel pointed out that it cannot use disproportionate force as Milosevic had. He also noted that excessive force breeds more violence in response. He defended his use of the word 'insurgents' for the KLA because many members were local militia defending their families and property. While there were terrorists among the KLA, he said, the label came to be used for all Albanians, further fueling tension.
Colonel Ciaglinski described a conversation with Serbian forces following their attack on a doctor's house where KLA members had received treatment. The area looked like 'a nuclear bomb had been dropped,' according to the Colonel. The doctor and at least one other civilian were killed. When Colonel Ciaglinski and a colleague confronted the soldiers about attacking a house used as a medical facility, the soldiers acknowledged that they knew it was used as a medical facility, but considered it a legitimate military target because KLA soldiers were being treated there. Under the laws of war, medical treatment facilities are protected from attack.
Colonel Ciaglinski supported the prior testimony of General Drewienkiewicz that Serb and FRY authorities had obstructed the Kosovo Verification Mission from the beginning. Milosevic's response was an innovative, if ludicrous, interpretation of the October Agreement. He claimed that since the Agreement only permitted the deployment of three units, the KVM could only inspect those three units. The Colonel responded, 'It says we have full freedom of movement. It doesn't say those are the only units we can inspect. . . . Additional units . . . must be returned to Serbia. How could we verify that unless we went into your barracks?' He also testified that a surprise inspection of police observation posts revealed 40 manned sites, while the Agreement permitted only 9 manned sites with an additional 18 unmanned. Despite aggressive questioning, Milosevic was unable to alter the picture drawn by the KVM leaders of Kosovo as almost completely under control of Serbian forces on the eve of NATO bombing.
A further effort to paint the KVM as an advance force for NATO was similarly ineffective. When asked how he explained that the largest number of sites hit by NATO bombs were also sites visited by the KVM, Colonel Ciaglinski replied it was because they were military sites. He also reminded Milosevic that NATO overflights had been an agreed part of the verification mission.
Colonel Ciaglinski went on to say that he understood from the Army official that the campaign would be a coordinated action of the Army, police, paramilitaries and special forces. 'We are only saving NATO and you a job, because if we don't deal with the KLA and Albanians, you will have to sometime in the future,' he quoted his confidential source. Colonel Ciaglinski said he informed his superior, General Drewienkiewicz, of this conversation but the General 'chose not to believe me.' It occurred at a time when a lot was happening, including an incident where two verifiers had been shot at. The Colonel said he also passed the information along to others.
Colonel Ciaglinski's testimony is a significant piece in establishing the prosecution's charge that the mass deportation of Kosovar Albanians was planned in advance. As further substantiation, Colonel Ciaglinski stated, 'And it happened that way.'
He went on to describe indications on the ground which led him to believe FRY was planning a spring offensive. 1) Troops were being deployed outside barracks in violation of the October Agreement between Milosevic and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. 2) Conscripts were being retained in Kosovo after their tour of duty expired and their replacements arrived. 3) Ammunition and supply columns were coming into the province. 4) Trains were arriving with new tanks which were being driven to places throughout Kosovo. 5) Incoming equipment was of higher quality. 6) More police were entering the province; they were well-equipped, trained and generally exhibited aggressive behavior. 7) Serb representatives on the Cooperation Committee which dealt with the KVM were being replaced by hardliners. 8) Serb forces were expanding the area of control along the border. 9) Garrison areas were becoming huge and the KVM was denied access. 10) Serb forces were increasing their aggressiveness toward KVM verifiers. By the time the KVM left Kosovo on the eve of NATO bombing, Serbian forces had effective control of the province. The KVM and Kosovo citizens had no room to move. The KVM was prevented from carrying out its mission, while Kosovar Albanians kept to their houses.
During his cross examination, Milosevic demanded that the Court secure the attendance of the unnamed Army officer. 'I demand of you that the witness who was mentioned who allegedly gave information should be heard here. And you shall issue all guarantees that he will not be detained. I'm asking that he be protected. He was smeared—saying he supplied information to the enemy. I'm asking that the witness be heard here with all protections for secrecy.' Judge May responded that the accused could submit a written application and it would be considered. To date, none has been submitted.
Milosevic also demanded of Colonel Ciagliniski whether a state doesn't have the right to protect itself against terrorists. While agreeing that it does, the Colonel pointed out that it cannot use disproportionate force as Milosevic had. He also noted that excessive force breeds more violence in response. He defended his use of the word 'insurgents' for the KLA because many members were local militia defending their families and property. While there were terrorists among the KLA, he said, the label came to be used for all Albanians, further fueling tension.
Colonel Ciaglinski described a conversation with Serbian forces following their attack on a doctor's house where KLA members had received treatment. The area looked like 'a nuclear bomb had been dropped,' according to the Colonel. The doctor and at least one other civilian were killed. When Colonel Ciaglinski and a colleague confronted the soldiers about attacking a house used as a medical facility, the soldiers acknowledged that they knew it was used as a medical facility, but considered it a legitimate military target because KLA soldiers were being treated there. Under the laws of war, medical treatment facilities are protected from attack.
Colonel Ciaglinski supported the prior testimony of General Drewienkiewicz that Serb and FRY authorities had obstructed the Kosovo Verification Mission from the beginning. Milosevic's response was an innovative, if ludicrous, interpretation of the October Agreement. He claimed that since the Agreement only permitted the deployment of three units, the KVM could only inspect those three units. The Colonel responded, 'It says we have full freedom of movement. It doesn't say those are the only units we can inspect. . . . Additional units . . . must be returned to Serbia. How could we verify that unless we went into your barracks?' He also testified that a surprise inspection of police observation posts revealed 40 manned sites, while the Agreement permitted only 9 manned sites with an additional 18 unmanned. Despite aggressive questioning, Milosevic was unable to alter the picture drawn by the KVM leaders of Kosovo as almost completely under control of Serbian forces on the eve of NATO bombing.
A further effort to paint the KVM as an advance force for NATO was similarly ineffective. When asked how he explained that the largest number of sites hit by NATO bombs were also sites visited by the KVM, Colonel Ciaglinski replied it was because they were military sites. He also reminded Milosevic that NATO overflights had been an agreed part of the verification mission.
