The Serbianization of the People's Army
The Serbianization of the People's Army
In a 28 page statement made to investigators from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in August 2000, Croatian General Nojko Marinovic described the transformation of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) into a Serb nationalist army. When General Marinovic could no longer deny the change, he resigned his position at the head of an elite unit and offered his assistance in the defense of Dubrovnik.
General Marinovic was due to testify via video link on Tuesday, March 18, 2003, but his appearance was delayed when Milosevic failed to appear in court as a result of high blood pressure and a medical recommendation that he rest for a few days. No date has yet been set for the General's reappearance. A copy of his statement, however, was exhibited and made available to the press. The court appearance was set for Milosevic to have the opportunity to cross examine General Marinovic on his statement.
In his written statement, General Marinovic corroborates significant testimony the Court has heard about the JNA's siege of Dubrovnik, as well as the Serbianization of the JNA and its role in the war in Croatia.
In 1990, the General was a dedicated and outstanding career officer, having served in the JNA for almost 20 years. He believed in the JNA as the embodiment and protector of a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. While attending the War College in Belgrade, however, he had the first intimations that the JNA was changing. In several instances, he experienced Serb officers singing Serbian nationalist songs, something that would formerly have been severely punished. When he complained to a superior, it was brushed off.
Back in Trebinje (in Hercegovina) where he was stationed, after his stint at the War College, General Marinovic became aware that 'certain elements within the JNA were involved in large-scale arms smuggling. Effectively, the army - in operations orchestrated by KOS [military intelligence] -- were moving truckloads of weapons from arms depots and were distributing them to the Serb population.' At the same time, weapons were made inaccessible to territorial defense (TO) organizations in predominately Croatian and Muslim areas. The General testified in his statement that such a large-scale operation could not have occurred without 'the knowledge and cooperation of high-ranking officers.'
These actions, as well as JNA involvement in military actions in Pakrac, Plitvice, Borovo Selo, and other places, caused the General to do some soul searching about his career. 'It caused me unbelievable turmoil. I had invested my entire adult life in the army and I had an outstanding career. . . . I had very much respected the JNA as an institution and I think my loyalty to it prevented me from seeing clearly the path that the army was taking.'
As events progressed, denial became less possible. 'I had decided that I would stay in the JNA as long as the work I was doing was honorable and as long as I felt the institution was maintaining its honor. I had begun to conclude that that period was quickly coming to an end.' On September 17, 1991, he sent a telegram to his commander, Captain Djurevic: 'I can not understand the direction that the JNA is now taking and that [sic] I therefore ask you to relieve me of all of my duties and responsibilities.' Two hours after receiving the telegram, Captain Djurevic sent for him.
The Captain said he had been directed to convince Marinovic to retract his resignation by the 'guys above (meaning Belgrade)'. Indicating there was a listening device on his desk, Captain Djurevic moved away from it and lowered his voice. 'Do you really think I would attack Croatia? My wife is a Croat. My children were born and educated there and work there still.' 'As he said this,' General Marinovic wrote, 'I could see tears in his eyes.' Unable to convince Marinovic, the Captain hinted that he should be careful returning to Trebinje, a hint which enabled Marinovic to give the unknown listeners false information. Marinovic later learned that JNA officers had been instructed to obstruct and, if necessary, kill him in the event of war.
'I thanked him for his concern and we said our good-byes. As we parted, I noticed that he was crying.' Captain Djurevic was killed under suspicious circumstances a few weeks later. Marinovic wrote: 'I am convinced that he was killed by elements within the JNA -- specifically KOS -- because of his opposition to the Dubrovnik operation.'
General Marinovic's written testimony on the Defense of Dubrovnik will be the subject of our next report.
General Marinovic was due to testify via video link on Tuesday, March 18, 2003, but his appearance was delayed when Milosevic failed to appear in court as a result of high blood pressure and a medical recommendation that he rest for a few days. No date has yet been set for the General's reappearance. A copy of his statement, however, was exhibited and made available to the press. The court appearance was set for Milosevic to have the opportunity to cross examine General Marinovic on his statement.
In his written statement, General Marinovic corroborates significant testimony the Court has heard about the JNA's siege of Dubrovnik, as well as the Serbianization of the JNA and its role in the war in Croatia.
In 1990, the General was a dedicated and outstanding career officer, having served in the JNA for almost 20 years. He believed in the JNA as the embodiment and protector of a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. While attending the War College in Belgrade, however, he had the first intimations that the JNA was changing. In several instances, he experienced Serb officers singing Serbian nationalist songs, something that would formerly have been severely punished. When he complained to a superior, it was brushed off.
Back in Trebinje (in Hercegovina) where he was stationed, after his stint at the War College, General Marinovic became aware that 'certain elements within the JNA were involved in large-scale arms smuggling. Effectively, the army - in operations orchestrated by KOS [military intelligence] -- were moving truckloads of weapons from arms depots and were distributing them to the Serb population.' At the same time, weapons were made inaccessible to territorial defense (TO) organizations in predominately Croatian and Muslim areas. The General testified in his statement that such a large-scale operation could not have occurred without 'the knowledge and cooperation of high-ranking officers.'
These actions, as well as JNA involvement in military actions in Pakrac, Plitvice, Borovo Selo, and other places, caused the General to do some soul searching about his career. 'It caused me unbelievable turmoil. I had invested my entire adult life in the army and I had an outstanding career. . . . I had very much respected the JNA as an institution and I think my loyalty to it prevented me from seeing clearly the path that the army was taking.'
As events progressed, denial became less possible. 'I had decided that I would stay in the JNA as long as the work I was doing was honorable and as long as I felt the institution was maintaining its honor. I had begun to conclude that that period was quickly coming to an end.' On September 17, 1991, he sent a telegram to his commander, Captain Djurevic: 'I can not understand the direction that the JNA is now taking and that [sic] I therefore ask you to relieve me of all of my duties and responsibilities.' Two hours after receiving the telegram, Captain Djurevic sent for him.
The Captain said he had been directed to convince Marinovic to retract his resignation by the 'guys above (meaning Belgrade)'. Indicating there was a listening device on his desk, Captain Djurevic moved away from it and lowered his voice. 'Do you really think I would attack Croatia? My wife is a Croat. My children were born and educated there and work there still.' 'As he said this,' General Marinovic wrote, 'I could see tears in his eyes.' Unable to convince Marinovic, the Captain hinted that he should be careful returning to Trebinje, a hint which enabled Marinovic to give the unknown listeners false information. Marinovic later learned that JNA officers had been instructed to obstruct and, if necessary, kill him in the event of war.
'I thanked him for his concern and we said our good-byes. As we parted, I noticed that he was crying.' Captain Djurevic was killed under suspicious circumstances a few weeks later. Marinovic wrote: 'I am convinced that he was killed by elements within the JNA -- specifically KOS -- because of his opposition to the Dubrovnik operation.'
General Marinovic's written testimony on the Defense of Dubrovnik will be the subject of our next report.
