Through Their Own Words: What Military Documents Reveal

It is often said that the Nuremberg accused were convicted by their own written records. While there appears to be far less documentation from the Yugoslav wars, it is still considerable, particularly that originating from the military. This week in its case against Slobodan Milosevic, the Prosecution produced its expert military analyst and the report he made after reviewing extensive military documents available to the Prosecution.

Reynaud Theunens served as Balkans Analyst in the Belgian Ministry of Defense from 1992 -1999, during which period he was seconded to UN missions in the Balkans, including the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia. He was subsequently assigned to Belgian Military Intelligence until 2001 when he came to work for the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor as a military analyst.

Mr. Theunens analyzed the role of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA, subsequently the VJ, Yugoslav Army) in the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts, specifically on issues of command and control and relations of the JNA/VJ with other armed groups.

The witness reported that the goals of the JNA -- to maintain territorial integrity and sovereignty of the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) -- changed over time. By late summer 1991, as the JNA developed into a mainly Serb force, its goal of preserving the territorial integrity of the SFRY changed into consolidating Serbian control of areas under Serb leadership.

As Croatia moved toward secession from the SFRY, local police and territorial defense organizations split along Croat and Serb ethnic lines. To some extent, the JNA mirrored the split. Mr. Theunens writes: 'Orders and instructions from what remained of the SFRY Presidency, The Supreme Command and the Supreme Command Staff indicated that at least de facto the JNA moved towards ceasing to be the 'SFRY Army' and instead gradually developed into a mainly Serb force, serving Serbian goals.' Some JNA officers and soldiers who were ethnic Croats joined the Croatian National Guard which became the Croatian Army.

It was the transformed JNA that met with local Serb forces, trained them and supplied them. It also assumed command of them, according to documents Mr. Theunens reviewed. 'Documentary evidence indicates that (local) Serb(ian) TO (Territorial Defense) units and staffs operated under single, unified command and control with the JNA.' Documents also show that the JNA organized operational and tactical groups consisting of forces from the TO (later the VSK, Army of the Republic of Serbia Krajina), the Serbian TO, JNA and volunteers and paramilitaries.

Evaluating the amount, type and organized nature of support that the JNA provided to RSK forces, Mr. Theunens concludes, 'the assistance provided by the JNA was authorized and endorsed by the supreme (political) command levels of (S)FRY.' For the SFRY, the supreme command level was the Presidency and, in time of war or national emergency, the Supreme Command, both of which prior evidence has shown was controlled by Milosevic. Moreover, Mr. Theunens concluded, 'There are examples of Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, being involved in the decision-making process to provide assistance to the local Serb forces in Croatia.'

Strictly confidential JNA reports showed that it had command and control over the Serb forces, including paramilitaries, in Vukovar during the siege and subsequent massacre. Orders concerning the subordination of all units to JNA command were sent, on a need to know basis, to the Vukovar TO commander and the commander of Seselj's volunteers. 'Need to know' means documents are restrictively distributed only to those whose need to be informed about their content is absolutely necessary.

In addition, Mr. Theunens reported that video footage established the participation of Arkan's Tigers in the Vukovar operation. In the video, JNA General Andrija Biorcevic stated in a speech praising the role of Arkan in the Vukovar campaign, 'That was the greatest contribution of Arkan's volunteers. Some people say that I conspire with paramilitary formations. These are not paramilitary formations; they are people who came voluntarily to fight for the Serbian people . . . . We surround a village, they enter it, kill those who refuse to surrender and we go on.'

JNA Captain Miroslav Radic, commander of an infantry company, described the make-up of his forces in Vukovar in a late November 1991 press interview: 'At one point, there were about 500 people of different nationalities and with different party affiliations in the company which I commanded. There were active servicemen, volunteers, reservists, Chetniks and Serbian volunteers. I had to unite them under one command to ensure success.'

The documents also reveal the view of a former 'Chetnik Vojvoda,' Branislav Vakic, who stated, 'In the beginning of November 1991 we, the Serbian Chetniks, entered Vukovar via Negoslavci at the invitation of the JNA. That is when, from a Major of the then JNA, Veselin Sljivancanin, we [got] weapons and we co-operated with him, that is with the Yugoslav Army.'

A report from a JNA General, dated 19 October 1991, discussed the situation with Arkan's Volunteer Guard. According to his source, Arkan was supposed to have received ammunition, explosives, and grenades from the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP). The paramilitary leader was reported to be involved in distributing these to local TO staffs in the area. On cross examination, Milosevic asserted but failed to gain the witness's agreement that Arkan operated under the authority of the Federal MUP (he did earlier but not in 1991), the RSK TO and the VSK. Milosevic also ridiculed any possibility that Arkan, rather than the Serbian Red Cross, would deliver 'humanitarian aid,' ignoring the grenades, mines and explosives that were the primary items transferred.

Other reports confirmed that Dragan Vasilkovic (Captain Dragan) was operating in the RSK on behalf of the Serbian MUP. The Serbian MUP also engaged paramilitaries to train 'Martic's Police,' a feared local Croatian Serb police formation recruited by Milan Martic, an RSK leader who was considered Milosevic's man. Martic is named as a member of the Joint Criminal Enterprise with Milosevic in the indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Croatia. He awaits trial on a separate indictment.

According to the documents, certain paramilitary or volunteer units were subordinated to the JNA at the local level to take part in a specific operation. After completion of the operation, they were resubordinated to another JNA unit. Mr. Theunens testified that even if this was done at a lower level, it would have to be reported up the chain of command to the top. At least from 1993 to 1995, Milosevic and Perisic received all daily combat reports of RSK activity, according to official records. It was unclear whether they received these reports before that date. The reports included information on the involvement of the VJ and what material support had or had not been provided by the VJ to the RSK. Milosevic denied receiving such reports, maintaining that he didn't even have a single employee in his office who worked on military issues. The witness allowed that he hadn't said Milosevic received the documents, only that he was identified on them as an intended recipient.

Corroborating other testimony, Mr. Theunens said documents showed that retired and active duty JNA officers served in the RSK TO and the VSK while continuing to receive pay, benefits and credit for time served from the JNA. Milosevic maintains that only JNA officers originally from the region joined the VSK and VRS and only after leaving the JNA.

The alleged 'voluntary' redistribution of soldiers to the new armies in their home regions is belied by a request by SVK General Mile Novakovic (himself a former JNA officer) to General Perisic, Chief of the VJ General Staff, to take 'the necessary measures' for the return of 81 officers and noncommissioned officers who apparently had not been so eager to transfer from the JNA to the SVK. A November 1993 decision of the VSK Personnel Council imposed serious restrictions on the possibilities for soldiers assigned to the VSK to return to the VJ, based on the 'opinion of the General Staff of the VJ and the General Staff of the SVK. . . .'

Mr. Theunens also testified that the VSK Main Staff and VJ General Staff held regular coordination meetings. He cited a December 1993 memorandum by Colonel Cedo Radanovic, head of the office of the Chief of General Staff of the VSK, setting out an agenda for discussions at an upcoming December 17 meeting between the VSK Main Staff and the VJ General Staff. Primary headings included: command and control, morale, training, mobilization, and logistics support. The witness advised the Court that similar memoranda are available for January, February and May 1994. 'It shows coordination occurred at regular intervals and was standard procedure,' he concluded.

Turning to the JNA/VJ role in Bosnia, Mr. Theunens reported that military documents establish the JNA troops withdrawn from Croatia under the Vance Plan were moved to Bosnia. While Milosevic asserted that the JNA merely withdrew to another, nearby part of its own territory, the JNA used its forces to assist local Serbs prepare for war, the witness said. In April 1992, JNA units actively assisted local Serb forces in military actions against non-Serb villages. According to the report, the Serbian MUP and Ministry of Defense together with the JNA helped organize local Serb TO forces in majority Serb areas. When the JNA withdrew from Bosnia, it left considerable equipment, weapons and personnel behind for use by the Bosnian Serbs. By this time, May 1992, Bosnia had been recognized as an independent state by the European Union, United States and Croatia.

When the JNA left Bosnia after assisting local Serbs to establish an army, its role changed to one of support and assistance. Nevertheless, JNA (now VJ) units continued to participate in combat operations. One such operation was in the Drina River Valley in early March 1993. The ABiH (Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina) had succeeded in taking the western side of the border between BiH and Serbia. 'With the assistance of VJ troops, fire support, and re-supply, the VRS launched a series of successful (counter)offensives in the Drina Valley and around Srebrencia by mid-March 1993,' Mr. Theunens reported.

'Direct VJ involvement in combat operations in BiH after May 1992 was not limited to the Drina Valley - Serbian border region,' Mr. Theunens continued. VJ elements supported VRS operations against ABiH forces around Sarajevo from October 1993 to September 1994 in an operation called 'Pancir'. In the Pancir Operation around Sarajevo, Mr. Theunens pointed to an order issued by the VRS (Sarajevo-Romanija Corps) command directing participating units 'to conduct an operation aimed at 'securing favourable conditions for cutting Sarajevo in two . . . .'' Participating units included '120 troops and a helicopter squad from the VJ.'

Similarly, in Northwestern Bosnia, in what was known as the Bihac pocket, a special unit called 'Pauk' (spider) was formed to fight the ABiH 5th Corps. The unit, led by former JNA officer Mile Novakovic, coordinated its operations with the SVK, special Serbian MUP units, the VRS and Fikret Abdic's forces (renegade Bosniak forces fighting the BiH government). A video depicting some of the members of Pauk included General Mile Mrksic, former VJ Special Forces Commander and VRS Chief of the General Staff, Radojica 'Kobac' Bozovic, a member of the Serbian MUP, and Mihajlo 'Legija' Ulemek, former commander of Arkan's Serb Volunteer Guard and of the Serbian MUP RDB Special Operations Unit.

In addition to direct combat assistance, the VJ trained VRS military personnel and provided officers to serve in the VRS, as it had with the VSK. The officers continued to receive pay, benefits and promotions within the VJ system. In the early days after the JNA withdrawal from Bosnia, the 'VJ provided ammunition, fuel and other supplies to operate this equipment [that the JNA left behind]. VJ material support to the VRS was critical during this period as the RS had almost no independent war production capability, and imports from other sources were non-existent.' Soon after, the VJ General Staff and the VRS Main Staff agreed on a plan of ongoing re-supply from FRY to the RS, code-named 'IZVOR,' which regulated delivery for the rest of the war.

On cross examination, Milosevic criticized Mr. Theunens for not reporting the JNA's role to protect people and separate warring sides. The witness responded, 'At the end of summer 1991, the mission of interposition developed into a mission to provide support to local Serb forces, operating under a single command.'

Milosevic also tried to distinguish between volunteers and paramilitaries, saying the latter were outside the chain of command and illegal. Mr. Theunens repeated his direct testimony, that 'apparent volunteer groups operated under the single command and control of the JNA in operational or tactical groups.' His analysis, he said, was based on JNA orders, reports of security organs, and public announcements of the Ministry of Defense. When Milosevic insisted that uncontrolled paramilitary groups were responsible for looting and theft, the former military officer stated that in that case, the army was obliged to restore discipline, through its military police and military justice system, in order to maintain command and control of its own troops. If crimes by paramilitaries were not sanctioned, regular troops might feel freed to commit them.

Milosevic referred to a 23 October 1991 order from the JNA's First Army Commander, setting forth the need to disarm and arrest paramilitary groups. Mr. Theunens referred to a letter of the same date from Lieutenant Colonel Milan Eremija, morale officer of the Guards Division, citing abuses and atrocities committed by pararmilitary groups, including events at Lovas where prisoners were forced to walk through a minefield. He recommended disarming all paramilitary formations, mentioning Dusan Silni, the Chetniks and Arkan's soldiers by name. Importantly, he went on to write, 'Authorities of the Republic of Serbia must participate in the campaign.' The document has been exhibited before in the trial, together with testimony that the implication is disarmament of these paramilitaries, who came from Serbia, would not be effective unless Serbian authorities took part. Eremija's letter was later published in the international press.

Oddly, Milosevic then contradicted himself, maintaining that only legal authorities were entitled to set up armed formations according to law, so it was impossible to set up groups at random. Performing another pirouette, Milosevic claimed that opposition political parties established paramilitary groups, seeking Mr. Theunens' agreement that the party in power did not. In response, the witness pointed out that Arkan and Captain Dragan, who commanded paramilitary units, were affiliated with the Serbian MUP and Ministry of Defense. He further suggested that paramilitary groups set up by opposition parties would likely be subject to greater control by the authorities, who would be very interested in their activities.

The Accused next tackled evidence showing that former JNA officers, after they were attached to the VSK and VRS, continued to receive pay and benefits from the VJ through two administrative centers that General Momcilo Perisic, VJ Chief of the General Staff, established for that purpose. The 30th and 40th Personnel Centers were subordinated to the Personnel Administration of the VJ Main Staff. Milosevic attempted to show this was not evidence of VJ command and control over military operations of the VRS or VSK. Mr. Theunens pointed out that such personnel linkages did not stand alone; they should be considered with other evidence such as coordination meetings and the exchange of daily combat reports. Considering all the evidence, it is difficult to look at the VRS or VSK as stand-alone military forces.

Perhaps considering this, Milosevic demanded that Mr. Theunens present a single document in which the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ issues any kind of order to the Main Staff of the VSK or VRS. Mr. Theunens responded by drawing the Court's attention to a December 7, 1994 'strictly confidential' order from General Momcilo Perisic, VJ CGS, passing on an order from the President of Serbia (Milosevic) to Milan Martic, President of the RSK, and General Milan Celeketic, head of the SVK Main Staff. The Order reads:

'On the order of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, urgently facilitate the passage of UNPROFOR humanitarian aid in Western Bosnia (with forces in the Bihac pocket), for two reasons:
1. Because you, Mr. Martic, promised this to Mr. Yasushi Akashi
2. Because the decision on UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Western Bosnia is at stake.
Inform UNPROFOR (Mr. Akashi) in writing that you will perform this task you assumed immediately this evening (7 December 1994) and then do it.'

The order concluded by requiring Martic to report back to Milosevic and Perisic 'on the completed task' by 0800 hours the next day.

Milosevic argued that this was not an order, but an 'instruction,' the words having been erroneously translated from Serbian to English. Mr. Theunens quickly brought the Court's attention to a JNA regulation establishing 'instruction' as one form of an 'order.' The witness said that in military language instruction implies order. As for additional documents, Mr. Theunens pointed out the lack of full cooperation by RS and Serbia and Montenegro state authorities in providing requested documents. In other words, additional orders of this type may well exist but not be available to the Court.

Toward the end of his cross examination, the Accused challenged information in the report showing he had been put on notice of war crimes, yet failed to take any action to punish those responsible. One document was a January 21, 1992 letter from the US Helsinki Watch Committee to Milosevic and General Blagoje Adzic, acting Federal Defence Secretary. The organization advised that it had confirmed reports of serious human rights abuses by the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Army in the Croatian war, including 'summary executions of civilians; the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force against civilian targets; the torture and mistreatment of detainees; disappearances and the taking of hostages; the forced displacement and resettlement of civilian populations; and the killing of journalists covering the war.'

In his defence, Milosevic cited a response written by his chef de cabinet, Goran Milinovic. Milinovic made two points: 1. The crimes were not committed in the territory of Serbia, therefore Serbia could not be responsible. 2. The President of Serbia would ask Serbian authorities to investigate and if any citizens of Serbia participated in such crimes, they would be brought to justice. In response, Mr. Theunens directed the Court's attention to a 1995 Human Rights Watch Helsinki report on its investigation of war crimes trials in the former Yugoslavia. With respect to the RSK, the report found only one instance where the state had held an individual accountable for war crimes. 'A recently concluded trial convicted an RSK soldier of war crimes against six non-Serbs in the Vukovar area.' With regard to the FRY, the report found only one war crimes indictment of a FRY citizen -- and it had been postponed twice. Mr. Theunens wrote, 'The report expressed doubts about the Yugoslav government's willingness to try war crimes in its own courts.'

Since Mr. Theunens' report cited Major Veselin Sljivancanin, VJ commander at Vukovar, as an individual suspected of war crimes who was subsequently promoted by the VJ and FRY authorities, Milosevic asserted that Sljivancanin had been investigated and exonerated by a military court. Mr. Theunens' pointed out that Sljivancanin, who is detained in an ICTY detention cell awaiting trial, had been indicted by the ICTY for war crimes at the time of his promotions.

The presentation and introduction of documents in a trial may appear tedious, lacking the drama of other witness testimony. That belies its importance, however. The military documents introduced through Mr. Theunens provide significant evidence linking Serbia and the FRY to crimes committed in Croatia and Bosnia. Not only did Serbian and FRY authorities (VJ, Ministry of Defense, MUP) provide material and financial support to local Serbian forces in Croatia and Bosnia. It helped create their armies, supplied them with officers, coordinated actions with them and, indeed, participated in combat operations conducted on foreign soil, as did groups and individuals associated with the Serbian MUP. The VJ exercised command and control over the RSK, its TO and various paramilitary groups (most from Serbia).

The picture that emerges is one of a huge apparatus, consisting of the JNA, VSK, VRS, Serbian MUP, local territorial defense and police forces and paramilitary units. The various military organizations may have had separate names and identities, but they operated as part of a single, coordinated entity. Not all parts operated at the same time in the same events, but they shared the same goal and direction -- creating ethnically pure territories that would one day be connected.

Milosevic -- as President of Serbia, head of the most powerful Serb political party and most influential man in the region -- did not stand apart, ignorant of this huge apparatus. Indeed, he stands de jure at the top of the chain of command over Serbian MUP forces which fought in Croatia and Bosnia as part of combined forces under the JNA. In addition to controlling the JNA through controlling the rump Federal Presidency until the final demise of the SFRY, he also exercised de facto control over the VJ, after its formation. Though he apparently left little trace in his own hand of his participation, it becomes revealed through the organs, people and events he influenced or directed.