UN Official Says Milosevic Exerted “Profound Influence” over Bosnian Serb Leadership
Day 207
UN Official Says Milosevic Exerted “Profound Influence” over Bosnian Serb Leadership
Day 207
Prosecution witness Dr. Michael Williams described Milosevic as “the dominant political figure” in the Balkans with “a profound influence on the political and military leadership” of the Bosnian Serbs in 1994. Never denying his dominant role during cross-examination of the witness, Milosevic disputed the exact level and impact of his influence over Bosnian Serb leaders, including Republika Srpska (RS) President Radovan Karadzic and army General Ratko Mladic. Dr. Williams acted as the Director of Information for the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to the Former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, from February 1994 to April 1995.
As with the testimony-in-chief, much cross-examination focused on the negotiations surrounding the Bosnian Serb attack on the besieged UN “safe-haven” of Gorazde in April 1994. Prosecutor Dermot Groome asked Dr. Williams why the UN turned to Milosevic, then president of Serbia, when attempting to end the crisis, suggesting that Yugoslav president Zoran Lilic or Yugoslav foreign minister Vladislav Jovanovic would have been more appropriate intermediaries. Dr. Williams’ response – that Milosevic was the person capable of influencing events – reflects Milosevic’s own assertion that he personally resolved the Gorazde crisis by inviting negotiators to Belgrade and “insisting” that an agreement be accepted.
The resulting agreement mandated that Bosnian Serb forces remain outside of a three-kilometer zone around Gorazde, and was violated within three days. Akashi reportedly complained about the violation to Milosevic, who stated proudly in court: “I want to point out that even when Akashi is angry he comes to me.” By this, it seems Milosevic intended to establish that he was perceived as an ally of the U.N. when it came to controlling the Bosnian Serb leadership. This may well be true, but it also establishes that Milosevic was perceived as having the power to change the situation on the ground in Bosnia, and this is exactly what the prosecution would like to prove.
Milosevic has walked a tightrope of sorts when it comes to discussing his own influence over the recent history of the Balkans. He has repeatedly denied having command authority over the Bosnian Serb leadership, but at the same time considers it self-evident that he was the dominant player in negotiations during the conflicts in Bosnia (and Croatia and Kosovo), and seems to relish witnesses who agree. Milosevic described himself as using his authority to convince hostile Bosnian Serb leaders to accede to ceasefires and peace plans. Referring to the negotiations over the Gorazde attack, Milosevic asked rhetorically: “why would I have an 18 hour meeting if I could just order them (the Bosnian Serb leadership) to do something.” Williams responded that it was a typical pattern for the Bosnian Serbs to be extremely reluctant to come to an agreement unless it was on the “best possible terms” for them.
When Milosevic asserted that he couldn’t give orders to Mladic, Dr. Williams responded with “I don’t quite accept that.” Amicus Steven Kay also questioned Dr. Williams on this point in an excellent cross-examination that should serve Milosevic as a model of concision and relevance. In fifteen minutes, Kay established key points for the defense that had been neglected during the several hours Milosevic was allowed to question the witness, including the fact that General Mladic both had firm control over the Bosnian Serb army and responded violently to the “slightest provocation.” Kay was thus able to introduce the idea that Mladic’s personal intemperance was responsible for the worst abuses of the forces he controlled. Kay also attempted to establish that Milosevic had deep influence but not control over the Bosnian Serbs. Again, Williams refused to agree, drawing a distinction between the civilian and military leaderships of the RS, and stating that Milosevic was closer to General Mladic, who had “very close ties” to the Yugoslav army. Other witnesses have testified to Milosevic’s control over that body.
The prosecution does not need to show that Milosevic issued orders for crimes to be committed in Bosnia in order to prove its case against him. It must show that he knowingly participated in a joint criminal enterprise, which could mean instigating or aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation and execution of crimes. The indictment charges that he assisted and exercised substantial influence over the Bosnian Serb leadership in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
While Milosevic has not contested the scope of this influence, he has portrayed himself as a peacemaker trying to rein in the nationalist excesses of Karadzic, Mladic, and others.
This self-image conflicts with another role Milosevic plays in court: that of the Serbian nationalist and defender of Serbian honor. For every individual Bosnian Serb attack described by Dr. Williams, whether a sniper shooting in Sarajevo or the sustained bombardment of Gorazde, Milosevic insisted that it had been provoked by a Muslim offensive. He has employed this tactic consistently throughout the trial, most notably during testimony on Kosovo, when he would accept that “individual” Serbs committed crimes and express general outrage about them, but then accuse nearly every survivor witness of falsifying testimony about the crimes they survived. Despite Dr. Williams’s rigorous admissions that Bosnian Muslims also committed crimes against Serbs during the Bosnian conflict, Milosevic nonetheless accused him repeatedly of bias and propagandizing against Serbs in his position as Director of Information. Tellingly, Milosevic never departs from a rhetoric of ethnic allegiance that almost always denies the possibility of any specific crime or wrongdoing being committed by a Serb.
For example, Milosevic read out to Dr. Williams a statement attributed to UNPROFOR Commander General Sir Michael Rose suggesting that Bosnian Serbs were ready to sign a cease-fire in 1994 for the entire territory of Bosnia. In the statement, the ceasefire never occurred because Bosnian Muslims refused to relinquish weapons as a precondition to the peace agreement. Williams put the statement into context, explaining that the hope for a ceasefire between Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government was based on a lull in the siege of Sarajevo early that year (the crisis there later intensified) and the signing of a March 1994 cease-fire between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. There wasn’t a similar agreement with the Serbs, said Williams, precisely because of the sustained attack on the U.N. enclave at Gorazde, where Bosnian Muslim civilians were surrounded and shelled by heavy artillery. Williams highlighted the strangeness of a peace-making tactic that involves a brutal attack on civilians, and a subsequent offer to stop the attack on the condition that everyone in the region agree to give up their weapons. In his re-direct examination, Groome elicited from Dr. Williams the information that any cease-fire entered into at that time would have greatly benefited Bosnian Serbs by fixing confrontation lines at a moment when several “safe” enclaves were completely surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces.
Milosevic shuttled between his “statesman” mode and his nationalist mode in his interactions with Dr. Williams, claiming responsibility for pushing Bosnian Serb leaders towards peace at the same time that he denied Serbian responsibility for the misdeeds about which the witness testified. Perhaps most remarkably, he questioned the idea that Sarajevo was ever under siege, characterizing what Williams called an “active siege” as “passive place-holding,” and claiming that civilian access to basic utilities such as gas and electricity remained sufficient throughout the crisis, in direct contradiction to Dr. Williams’ testimony. His cross-examination was unable to shake other basic points of the testimony, which described a conflict typified by concerted and sustained attacks by Bosnian Serb forces against civilians trapped within UN safe zones. Williams told the court that these Bosnian Serb forces exhibited an inability to distinguish between military and civilian targets that was at times clearly premeditated. At the same time, the weaponry and equipment available to the two sides was grossly disproportionate in favor of Bosnian Serbs, who countered machine gun fire with heavy mortars and artillery.
Milosevic’s own authority over Bosnian Serb activities at the time remains a “crucial issue,” in Judge May’s words. It may be that his insistence on the power of his own influence will contribute more to the Prosecution's case than he yet understands.
As with the testimony-in-chief, much cross-examination focused on the negotiations surrounding the Bosnian Serb attack on the besieged UN “safe-haven” of Gorazde in April 1994. Prosecutor Dermot Groome asked Dr. Williams why the UN turned to Milosevic, then president of Serbia, when attempting to end the crisis, suggesting that Yugoslav president Zoran Lilic or Yugoslav foreign minister Vladislav Jovanovic would have been more appropriate intermediaries. Dr. Williams’ response – that Milosevic was the person capable of influencing events – reflects Milosevic’s own assertion that he personally resolved the Gorazde crisis by inviting negotiators to Belgrade and “insisting” that an agreement be accepted.
The resulting agreement mandated that Bosnian Serb forces remain outside of a three-kilometer zone around Gorazde, and was violated within three days. Akashi reportedly complained about the violation to Milosevic, who stated proudly in court: “I want to point out that even when Akashi is angry he comes to me.” By this, it seems Milosevic intended to establish that he was perceived as an ally of the U.N. when it came to controlling the Bosnian Serb leadership. This may well be true, but it also establishes that Milosevic was perceived as having the power to change the situation on the ground in Bosnia, and this is exactly what the prosecution would like to prove.
Milosevic has walked a tightrope of sorts when it comes to discussing his own influence over the recent history of the Balkans. He has repeatedly denied having command authority over the Bosnian Serb leadership, but at the same time considers it self-evident that he was the dominant player in negotiations during the conflicts in Bosnia (and Croatia and Kosovo), and seems to relish witnesses who agree. Milosevic described himself as using his authority to convince hostile Bosnian Serb leaders to accede to ceasefires and peace plans. Referring to the negotiations over the Gorazde attack, Milosevic asked rhetorically: “why would I have an 18 hour meeting if I could just order them (the Bosnian Serb leadership) to do something.” Williams responded that it was a typical pattern for the Bosnian Serbs to be extremely reluctant to come to an agreement unless it was on the “best possible terms” for them.
When Milosevic asserted that he couldn’t give orders to Mladic, Dr. Williams responded with “I don’t quite accept that.” Amicus Steven Kay also questioned Dr. Williams on this point in an excellent cross-examination that should serve Milosevic as a model of concision and relevance. In fifteen minutes, Kay established key points for the defense that had been neglected during the several hours Milosevic was allowed to question the witness, including the fact that General Mladic both had firm control over the Bosnian Serb army and responded violently to the “slightest provocation.” Kay was thus able to introduce the idea that Mladic’s personal intemperance was responsible for the worst abuses of the forces he controlled. Kay also attempted to establish that Milosevic had deep influence but not control over the Bosnian Serbs. Again, Williams refused to agree, drawing a distinction between the civilian and military leaderships of the RS, and stating that Milosevic was closer to General Mladic, who had “very close ties” to the Yugoslav army. Other witnesses have testified to Milosevic’s control over that body.
The prosecution does not need to show that Milosevic issued orders for crimes to be committed in Bosnia in order to prove its case against him. It must show that he knowingly participated in a joint criminal enterprise, which could mean instigating or aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation and execution of crimes. The indictment charges that he assisted and exercised substantial influence over the Bosnian Serb leadership in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
While Milosevic has not contested the scope of this influence, he has portrayed himself as a peacemaker trying to rein in the nationalist excesses of Karadzic, Mladic, and others.
This self-image conflicts with another role Milosevic plays in court: that of the Serbian nationalist and defender of Serbian honor. For every individual Bosnian Serb attack described by Dr. Williams, whether a sniper shooting in Sarajevo or the sustained bombardment of Gorazde, Milosevic insisted that it had been provoked by a Muslim offensive. He has employed this tactic consistently throughout the trial, most notably during testimony on Kosovo, when he would accept that “individual” Serbs committed crimes and express general outrage about them, but then accuse nearly every survivor witness of falsifying testimony about the crimes they survived. Despite Dr. Williams’s rigorous admissions that Bosnian Muslims also committed crimes against Serbs during the Bosnian conflict, Milosevic nonetheless accused him repeatedly of bias and propagandizing against Serbs in his position as Director of Information. Tellingly, Milosevic never departs from a rhetoric of ethnic allegiance that almost always denies the possibility of any specific crime or wrongdoing being committed by a Serb.
For example, Milosevic read out to Dr. Williams a statement attributed to UNPROFOR Commander General Sir Michael Rose suggesting that Bosnian Serbs were ready to sign a cease-fire in 1994 for the entire territory of Bosnia. In the statement, the ceasefire never occurred because Bosnian Muslims refused to relinquish weapons as a precondition to the peace agreement. Williams put the statement into context, explaining that the hope for a ceasefire between Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government was based on a lull in the siege of Sarajevo early that year (the crisis there later intensified) and the signing of a March 1994 cease-fire between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. There wasn’t a similar agreement with the Serbs, said Williams, precisely because of the sustained attack on the U.N. enclave at Gorazde, where Bosnian Muslim civilians were surrounded and shelled by heavy artillery. Williams highlighted the strangeness of a peace-making tactic that involves a brutal attack on civilians, and a subsequent offer to stop the attack on the condition that everyone in the region agree to give up their weapons. In his re-direct examination, Groome elicited from Dr. Williams the information that any cease-fire entered into at that time would have greatly benefited Bosnian Serbs by fixing confrontation lines at a moment when several “safe” enclaves were completely surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces.
Milosevic shuttled between his “statesman” mode and his nationalist mode in his interactions with Dr. Williams, claiming responsibility for pushing Bosnian Serb leaders towards peace at the same time that he denied Serbian responsibility for the misdeeds about which the witness testified. Perhaps most remarkably, he questioned the idea that Sarajevo was ever under siege, characterizing what Williams called an “active siege” as “passive place-holding,” and claiming that civilian access to basic utilities such as gas and electricity remained sufficient throughout the crisis, in direct contradiction to Dr. Williams’ testimony. His cross-examination was unable to shake other basic points of the testimony, which described a conflict typified by concerted and sustained attacks by Bosnian Serb forces against civilians trapped within UN safe zones. Williams told the court that these Bosnian Serb forces exhibited an inability to distinguish between military and civilian targets that was at times clearly premeditated. At the same time, the weaponry and equipment available to the two sides was grossly disproportionate in favor of Bosnian Serbs, who countered machine gun fire with heavy mortars and artillery.
Milosevic’s own authority over Bosnian Serb activities at the time remains a “crucial issue,” in Judge May’s words. It may be that his insistence on the power of his own influence will contribute more to the Prosecution's case than he yet understands.
