Verification Mission Never Had a Chance: General says FRY obstructed their mission, showing no intention to prevent war in Kosovo
Days 26-29
Verification Mission Never Had a Chance: General says FRY obstructed their mission, showing no intention to prevent war in Kosovo
Days 26-29
In three days of direct testimony, General Karol Drewienkiewicz, gave a detailed account of the period leading up to the Kosovo War. Beginning in mid-October 1998, General Drewienkiewicz served as a deputy to Ambassador William Walker, head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), whose job was to insure that the Agreement reached between Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and then-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was implemented. The Agreement was an eleventh-hour accord, signed by Milosevic to prevent NATO bombing. The General testified that FRY authorities made little effort to carry out the Agreement, and were for the most part uncooperative with the KVM.
In the Agreement, FRY promised to reduce police forces in Kosovo to the February 1998 level and return the Yugoslav Army (VJ) to barracks. They were to provide the KVM with weekly reports on deployments in excess of those allowed by the Agreement. Throughout 1998, Yugoslav and Serbian forces were substantially increased as they attempted to root out the Kosova Liberation Army. General Drewienkiewicz testified that no baseline figures were ever provided so it was impossible to ascertain if police forces were being scaled back to the February 1998 level. In addition, on site inspections were denied and no regular information on excess deployment was provided.
Nor did the FRY provide foreign experts, including forensic teams, access to the province as agreed. After the Racak massacre in January 1999, e.g., the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and her investigators were denied visas. From the beginning of the mission, FRY authorities violated their agreement for full cooperation with the KVM when they refused team members multiple entry visas and delayed action on initial applications. This, together with delayed responsiveness from OSCE member states in appointing members to the mission, seriously limited the effectiveness of the KVM. Over its five month life span, it never came near reaching the anticipated 2000-member force.
General Drewienkiewicz's testimony was a litany of frustrations with Yugoslav and Serbian forces, who appeared little interested in their obligations to implement the Agreement and prevent full scale war in Kosovo. While the KLA was not party to the Agreement, KLA leaders had agreed to a ceasefire, a promise they also failed to heed. For every action against Serbian police attributed to the KLA, there was a larger and, as the General warned Serbian and FRY officials, 'disproportionate' response. The result was a gradual escalation, until the KLA killed three police officers in January, and Serbian forces responded by surrounding and attacking the village of Racak, killing 45 noncombatants and wounding five. Another massacre in Rugova where 25 Kosovar Albanians were killed two weeks later was overshadowed by international outrage over Racak, which was considered by many 'a turning point' in the international response to what had been happening in Kosovo.
The General testified to accompanying Ambassador Walker to Racak 16 hours after the massacre. Entering the village, he saw the headless body of an elderly man in a yard. A little way from the village in a nearby gully, they found dozens more bodies apparently all killed by gunfire. None had weapons and all were wearing civilian attire, including slippers and Wellingtons not suitable for walking in the woods. When Ambassador Walker held a press conference and said a massacre had occurred and the Serbian forces were responsible, he was declared persona non grata and given 48 hours to leave the province, an order later rescinded.
The Racak massacre set the Rambouillet process in motion, as one final attempt to find a peaceful settlement for Kosovo. Yet General Drewienkiewicz's testimony showed that the Yugoslav side continued a massive military build-up in Kosovo while they participated in the peace process. KVM personnel were assaulted by Serb police, while the military command issued an attack order, including a directive that the KVM be kept out of conflict areas, a clear violation of the October Agreement. The attack order was found among recently discovered documents and was issued as the Rambouillet talks were taking place. It also included a directive to withdraw the civilian population from conflict areas, but the General testified no attempt was made to do so. He also said that he could discern no plan to deport the civilian population up to the time he and the KVM left Kosovo, i.e. March 20, four days before NATO commenced bombing. This conclusion was contradicted by a member of the General's team, who testified to a highly confidential communication from a senior official whose identity was protected by the court. Colonel Richard Ciaglinski testified the following day that he informed the General of this conversation but the General 'chose not to believe it.'
It is clear from the General's testimony as well as that of Colonel Ciaglinski that the OSCE mission was doomed from the outset. The KLA was not a party to the October Agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic, though it pledged to abide by a ceasefire, a pledge it violated throughout the period of KVM presence. At the same time, Milosevic's agreement to reduce forces meant nothing. From October 1998 to March 1999, Milosevic continued to increase forces within Kosovo and deploy them until he had effective control of the province. By March 24, 1999, the day NATO began bombing, Serbian forces were sufficiently strong to displace 90% of the Albanian population of Kosovo within a short time. Despite KLA re-armament, it was unable to prevent or stop it. While Milosevic claims the Albanian population was not forced out by Serb Forces but merely displaced as a natural consequence of war, survivor witnesses who have testified before the Tribunal thus far maintain that they would not have left their homes unless forced to do so. Colonel Ciaglinski's testimony, discussed in the next Report, provides significant support to their claims and the prosecution's case of mass deportation.
In the Agreement, FRY promised to reduce police forces in Kosovo to the February 1998 level and return the Yugoslav Army (VJ) to barracks. They were to provide the KVM with weekly reports on deployments in excess of those allowed by the Agreement. Throughout 1998, Yugoslav and Serbian forces were substantially increased as they attempted to root out the Kosova Liberation Army. General Drewienkiewicz testified that no baseline figures were ever provided so it was impossible to ascertain if police forces were being scaled back to the February 1998 level. In addition, on site inspections were denied and no regular information on excess deployment was provided.
Nor did the FRY provide foreign experts, including forensic teams, access to the province as agreed. After the Racak massacre in January 1999, e.g., the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and her investigators were denied visas. From the beginning of the mission, FRY authorities violated their agreement for full cooperation with the KVM when they refused team members multiple entry visas and delayed action on initial applications. This, together with delayed responsiveness from OSCE member states in appointing members to the mission, seriously limited the effectiveness of the KVM. Over its five month life span, it never came near reaching the anticipated 2000-member force.
General Drewienkiewicz's testimony was a litany of frustrations with Yugoslav and Serbian forces, who appeared little interested in their obligations to implement the Agreement and prevent full scale war in Kosovo. While the KLA was not party to the Agreement, KLA leaders had agreed to a ceasefire, a promise they also failed to heed. For every action against Serbian police attributed to the KLA, there was a larger and, as the General warned Serbian and FRY officials, 'disproportionate' response. The result was a gradual escalation, until the KLA killed three police officers in January, and Serbian forces responded by surrounding and attacking the village of Racak, killing 45 noncombatants and wounding five. Another massacre in Rugova where 25 Kosovar Albanians were killed two weeks later was overshadowed by international outrage over Racak, which was considered by many 'a turning point' in the international response to what had been happening in Kosovo.
The General testified to accompanying Ambassador Walker to Racak 16 hours after the massacre. Entering the village, he saw the headless body of an elderly man in a yard. A little way from the village in a nearby gully, they found dozens more bodies apparently all killed by gunfire. None had weapons and all were wearing civilian attire, including slippers and Wellingtons not suitable for walking in the woods. When Ambassador Walker held a press conference and said a massacre had occurred and the Serbian forces were responsible, he was declared persona non grata and given 48 hours to leave the province, an order later rescinded.
The Racak massacre set the Rambouillet process in motion, as one final attempt to find a peaceful settlement for Kosovo. Yet General Drewienkiewicz's testimony showed that the Yugoslav side continued a massive military build-up in Kosovo while they participated in the peace process. KVM personnel were assaulted by Serb police, while the military command issued an attack order, including a directive that the KVM be kept out of conflict areas, a clear violation of the October Agreement. The attack order was found among recently discovered documents and was issued as the Rambouillet talks were taking place. It also included a directive to withdraw the civilian population from conflict areas, but the General testified no attempt was made to do so. He also said that he could discern no plan to deport the civilian population up to the time he and the KVM left Kosovo, i.e. March 20, four days before NATO commenced bombing. This conclusion was contradicted by a member of the General's team, who testified to a highly confidential communication from a senior official whose identity was protected by the court. Colonel Richard Ciaglinski testified the following day that he informed the General of this conversation but the General 'chose not to believe it.'
It is clear from the General's testimony as well as that of Colonel Ciaglinski that the OSCE mission was doomed from the outset. The KLA was not a party to the October Agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic, though it pledged to abide by a ceasefire, a pledge it violated throughout the period of KVM presence. At the same time, Milosevic's agreement to reduce forces meant nothing. From October 1998 to March 1999, Milosevic continued to increase forces within Kosovo and deploy them until he had effective control of the province. By March 24, 1999, the day NATO began bombing, Serbian forces were sufficiently strong to displace 90% of the Albanian population of Kosovo within a short time. Despite KLA re-armament, it was unable to prevent or stop it. While Milosevic claims the Albanian population was not forced out by Serb Forces but merely displaced as a natural consequence of war, survivor witnesses who have testified before the Tribunal thus far maintain that they would not have left their homes unless forced to do so. Colonel Ciaglinski's testimony, discussed in the next Report, provides significant support to their claims and the prosecution's case of mass deportation.
