Witness Says Arkan Started War in Zvornik
Day 197
Witness Says Arkan Started War in Zvornik
Day 197
Protected witness B-24, a member of the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staff in Zvornik, told the Court how a simple request for assistance from Serbian State Security brought war and killing to his municipality.
As fears heightened in all Bosnian communities in 1991, B-24 attended a meeting of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo. Held at the Holiday Inn on December 19 and 20, 1991, the meeting was designed for party leaders (Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik and Biljana Plavsic, among others) to inaugurate their plan of action throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Municipal SDS leaders were given one of two versions of the plan depending on whether Serbs were in the majority or minority in their municipalities. Witness B-24 and others from Zvornik received Plan B, since Serbs constituted 30% of the population, while Muslims made up the remaining 70%.
The Plans provided instructions on what to do in the event of a crisis, beginning with the establishment of crisis staffs and the identification of who (by position) should be members. The Zvornik Crisis Staff was established December 22, 1991. By this time and beginning in the fall of 1991, the Zvornik Serbs, through their local SDS branch, had already received weapons from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), organized by Rade Kostic of the Serbian State Security Service (DB). Nevertheless, the Zvornik Crisis Staff continued talking with representatives of the local Muslim community in an attempt to calm matters and find peaceful solutions to problems. They made the mistake of seeking assistance from their Serb brethren across the Drina River in Serbia, who had other plans.
Witness B-24 contacted Rade Kostic, the Serbian DB agent who'd helped them obtain weapons. Kostic told him Zeljko Raznatovic, aka 'Arkan', would come when he finished his actions in Bjeljina, and directed him to visit Arkan in Bjeljina. After the witness waited more than an hour in the Bjeljina Cultural Center with a group of combatants who were having a luncheon, Arkan walked in. The entire group stood to attention.
After briefly hearing about the situation in Zvornik, Arkan called his deputy, Major Marko Pejic (aka 'Peja'), over and said he would lead the troops assigned to Zvornik. The next day the war broke out and Arkan and Pejic arrived in Zvornik. When Arkan heard the Crisis Staff had been meeting with local Muslims, he became angry and slapped them around. 'Who gave you authority to sell out Serbian land?' he demanded. According to the witness, Arkan then ordered the attack on Zvornik, which began at 4 a.m. the next morning. In the meantime, volunteers were streaming into Zvornik, many of them Serbs who'd fought in Croatia. They were given weapons and subordinated to Arkan's command.
Judge May interrupted cross examination on this topic to ask B-24, 'Why was it necessary for the Serbs to take Zvornik municipality?' B-24 responded, 'It wasn't considered a necessary action. I [as a member of the Crisis Staff] didn't see any plan to take Zvornik municipality. Under Plan B, we were to withdraw to Serb majority areas, in our case Karakaj. In Mali Zvornik [in the Republic of Serbia, site where negotiations with Muslims were held] we tried for a solution for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . . With the arrival of Arkan and slapping around of the Crisis Staff, [he ended that]. He ordered the attack on Zvornik.' Arkan also prohibited the Crisis Staff from having any more contact with the Muslim representatives.
Milosevic followed up with, 'Are you saying you blame the paramilitaries, especially Arkan?' B-24: ' While I was a member of the Crisis Staff, we never mentioned the possibility of attacking Zvornik militarily. It had a 70% Muslim population. We were all beaten, lined up, ordered about. Other men took over the Crisis Staff. We had to stand at attention when Arkan or Peja walked in. That's why I left.' [The witness left the Crisis Staff on April 20, less than two weeks after the Serb takeover of Zvornik.] Pursuing the issue, Milosevic demanded, 'Are you saying there would have been no war without him?' B-24 simply said, 'Yes.'
Lest anyone think this relieves Milosevic of responsibility, they should recall earlier testimony establishing that Arkan answered to the Serbian DB, which directed his activities. B-24's testimony bears this out. Rade Kostic of the Serbian DB was the go-between who arranged for Arkan's men to come to Zvornik. He also organized the supply and transport of at least some of the weapons supplied by the JNA to the Bosnian Serbs in Zvornik. The connections are all there -- Serbian DB, JNA, Bosnian Serbs.
The human tragedy also comes through in this witness's testimony as it has with others recently. Local Serbs and local Muslims were living together relatively peacefully. They did not want war. Without the agents provocateurs from Serbia (and the higher up political leaders among the Bosnian Serbs), the people in Zvornik -- Muslims and Serbs -- would have continued living together in peace. Instead, war came to Zvornik, hundreds of Muslim men were massacred, while women, children and the elderly were rounded up and forced to flee to Muslim-dominated enclaves, at the same time that Serbs there (Tuzla and Zenica, e.g.) fled to Zvornik. The witness said it was a complete and massive exchange of population -- from 10,000 to 15,000 Serb refugees arrived in Zvornik.
For a short time in 1993, B-24 became mayor of Zvornik. Milosevic asked how Muslims were treated. The witness's reply says it all: 'There were none.'
As fears heightened in all Bosnian communities in 1991, B-24 attended a meeting of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo. Held at the Holiday Inn on December 19 and 20, 1991, the meeting was designed for party leaders (Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik and Biljana Plavsic, among others) to inaugurate their plan of action throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Municipal SDS leaders were given one of two versions of the plan depending on whether Serbs were in the majority or minority in their municipalities. Witness B-24 and others from Zvornik received Plan B, since Serbs constituted 30% of the population, while Muslims made up the remaining 70%.
The Plans provided instructions on what to do in the event of a crisis, beginning with the establishment of crisis staffs and the identification of who (by position) should be members. The Zvornik Crisis Staff was established December 22, 1991. By this time and beginning in the fall of 1991, the Zvornik Serbs, through their local SDS branch, had already received weapons from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), organized by Rade Kostic of the Serbian State Security Service (DB). Nevertheless, the Zvornik Crisis Staff continued talking with representatives of the local Muslim community in an attempt to calm matters and find peaceful solutions to problems. They made the mistake of seeking assistance from their Serb brethren across the Drina River in Serbia, who had other plans.
Witness B-24 contacted Rade Kostic, the Serbian DB agent who'd helped them obtain weapons. Kostic told him Zeljko Raznatovic, aka 'Arkan', would come when he finished his actions in Bjeljina, and directed him to visit Arkan in Bjeljina. After the witness waited more than an hour in the Bjeljina Cultural Center with a group of combatants who were having a luncheon, Arkan walked in. The entire group stood to attention.
After briefly hearing about the situation in Zvornik, Arkan called his deputy, Major Marko Pejic (aka 'Peja'), over and said he would lead the troops assigned to Zvornik. The next day the war broke out and Arkan and Pejic arrived in Zvornik. When Arkan heard the Crisis Staff had been meeting with local Muslims, he became angry and slapped them around. 'Who gave you authority to sell out Serbian land?' he demanded. According to the witness, Arkan then ordered the attack on Zvornik, which began at 4 a.m. the next morning. In the meantime, volunteers were streaming into Zvornik, many of them Serbs who'd fought in Croatia. They were given weapons and subordinated to Arkan's command.
Judge May interrupted cross examination on this topic to ask B-24, 'Why was it necessary for the Serbs to take Zvornik municipality?' B-24 responded, 'It wasn't considered a necessary action. I [as a member of the Crisis Staff] didn't see any plan to take Zvornik municipality. Under Plan B, we were to withdraw to Serb majority areas, in our case Karakaj. In Mali Zvornik [in the Republic of Serbia, site where negotiations with Muslims were held] we tried for a solution for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . . With the arrival of Arkan and slapping around of the Crisis Staff, [he ended that]. He ordered the attack on Zvornik.' Arkan also prohibited the Crisis Staff from having any more contact with the Muslim representatives.
Milosevic followed up with, 'Are you saying you blame the paramilitaries, especially Arkan?' B-24: ' While I was a member of the Crisis Staff, we never mentioned the possibility of attacking Zvornik militarily. It had a 70% Muslim population. We were all beaten, lined up, ordered about. Other men took over the Crisis Staff. We had to stand at attention when Arkan or Peja walked in. That's why I left.' [The witness left the Crisis Staff on April 20, less than two weeks after the Serb takeover of Zvornik.] Pursuing the issue, Milosevic demanded, 'Are you saying there would have been no war without him?' B-24 simply said, 'Yes.'
Lest anyone think this relieves Milosevic of responsibility, they should recall earlier testimony establishing that Arkan answered to the Serbian DB, which directed his activities. B-24's testimony bears this out. Rade Kostic of the Serbian DB was the go-between who arranged for Arkan's men to come to Zvornik. He also organized the supply and transport of at least some of the weapons supplied by the JNA to the Bosnian Serbs in Zvornik. The connections are all there -- Serbian DB, JNA, Bosnian Serbs.
The human tragedy also comes through in this witness's testimony as it has with others recently. Local Serbs and local Muslims were living together relatively peacefully. They did not want war. Without the agents provocateurs from Serbia (and the higher up political leaders among the Bosnian Serbs), the people in Zvornik -- Muslims and Serbs -- would have continued living together in peace. Instead, war came to Zvornik, hundreds of Muslim men were massacred, while women, children and the elderly were rounded up and forced to flee to Muslim-dominated enclaves, at the same time that Serbs there (Tuzla and Zenica, e.g.) fled to Zvornik. The witness said it was a complete and massive exchange of population -- from 10,000 to 15,000 Serb refugees arrived in Zvornik.
For a short time in 1993, B-24 became mayor of Zvornik. Milosevic asked how Muslims were treated. The witness's reply says it all: 'There were none.'
