Serb Journalist Links Serbia to Crimes: Serbian forces involved in massacre at Vukovar
Day 110
Serb Journalist Links Serbia to Crimes: Serbian forces involved in massacre at Vukovar
Day 110
Because of his close connections with Serbian police and the JNA, Mr. Dulovic had access to conflicts and sources unavailable to many. In Vukovar, he had regular access to the JNA Command Center, a house at Ulica Nova 81. It was there he overheard Vojislav Seselj, head of the Serbian Radical Party and then leader of paramilitaries, declare the Serbianization of the JNA and ethnic cleansing of Vukovar. 'We're all one army. This war is a great test for Serbs. Those who pass the test will become winners. Deserters cannot go unpunished. Not a single Ustashe must leave Vukovar alive. We have accepted the concept of a federal army so that there is no legal basis for interference of foreign powers in our conflict. The army is fighting rebel Croats. The army has shown it was able to cleanse its ranks. We have a unified command consisting of military experts who know what they're doing.'
Mr. Dulovic was in Vukovar on November 20, 1991, when several hundred people were allegedly taken from the hospital and executed. He witnessed soldiers and paramilitaries escorting people from the hospital into JNA trucks. Though he didn't witness the massacre, he was told about it from two paramilitaries who participated. Their stories were confirmed by JNA and TO (territorial defense) officers. At a house where he was staying across the street from the Command Center, a red-bearded paramilitary from Kameni's unit of Seselj's men recounted the events of the previous night to five or six members of the household over coffee and slivovitz. He said he had been killing Croats from the Vukovar Hospital from 5 p.m. until 1 a.m. He also told the group that the victims had cried and begged not to be killed because they hadn't shot at anyone.
The red-bearded paramilitary's account was confirmed by a woman paramilitary known as Dragica from Novi Sad. In a private conversation with Mr. Dulovic, she said she had been shooting, too, and had killed people. But she objected to the man giving a public account of it. Dragica told the witness a bulldozer had been used to cover up the bodies. Later, Mr. Dulovic saw a pile of camouflage uniforms in front of the command center. The pant legs were soaked in blood. JNA Captain Miroslav Radic and TO Commander Stanko Vujanovic separately confirmed that a massacre had occurred. Vujanovic complained about having to use Seselj's drunken men, who were 'blabbing,' because there weren't sufficient regular troops.
After Vukovar an urgent telegram came into Mr. Dulovic's hands. It was from JNA Lieutenant Colonel Milan Jeremija, transmitting complaints of the Minister of Defense of Serbia to the Command of the First Military District. The Minister complained that the paramilitaries' objective was not to combat the enemy but 'to loot people's property and engage in sadistic abuse of civilians of Croatian nationality.' He went on to cite the village of Lovas where captured villagers were used for clearing a minefield resulting in the deaths of 17. He also complained about 'the deliberate spread of misinformation, exaggeration of numbers of opposing forces, the existence of snipers and of eyeballs gouged from the heads of Serbs.' A copy of the telegram was introduced into evidence.
The Minister recommended disarming the paramilitaries and stressed that Serbia should participate, since, according to the witness, no one else could accomplish it. Mr. Dulovic said he had never seen any attempt to implement the proposal.
In February 2000, Mr. Dulovic was called before a military court in Belgrade to testify about the Vukovar Hospital incident. The case was against 'unknown perpetrators,' which indicated to the witness that 'the State and the JNA stood behind them and didn't want to identify or accuse them.' Mr. Dulovic testified that only one man was brought to account for the crimes, despite the authorities having names of others.
According to the witness, the general mobilization in Serbia 'was such that hardly anyone responded; the call-up had almost failed.' As a result, the authorities were forced to rely on volunteers and paramilitaries. Nevertheless, they cannot bear total responsibility for the massacres. In the Vukovar Hospital case, JNA soldiers loaded the people into JNA trucks that transported them to the killing site. Bloodied uniforms were piled outside the JNA command center. And JNA officers knew about the massacre. Yet no adequate disciplinary action was taken. At the least, those officers have failed in their command responsibility under the Geneva Conventions and the ICTY Statute.
Mr. Dulovic's testimony about Vukovar is also important because it links Serbia to military actions against Croat civilians in Croatia, a fact which Milosevic has been vehemently denying because it links him, as then President of Serbia, to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Included in his testimony was the fact that local TO's were commanded by Serbian state security officers. The telegram passing on the Serbian Defense Minister's complaints and recommendations to a military command is another key piece of evidence showing Serbian involvement and implying Serbian ability to control paramilitaries -- many of them from Serbia.
Mr. Dulovic's testimony obviously upset some people back home. It was highly significant testimony -- coming from a Serb, with inside connections. Indeed, it might be characterized as the most explosive testimony in the eight month trial. One hopes its impact will be felt beyond the criminal circle in Belgrade by ordinary Serbs, Croats and Bosnians. It has implications beyond the trial for truth telling and development of a common view of history in the region. Despite the suspected threats that pulled a curtain over the remainder of Mr. Dulovic's testimony, what he said over several hours remains in the public record. It deserves to be widely distributed and read.
[A second report on Mr. Dulovic's Bosnia testimony will follow.]