General Testifies to Milosevic's Role in the Destruction of Yugoslavia
Day 159-160
General Testifies to Milosevic's Role in the Destruction of Yugoslavia
Day 159-160
In autumn 1991, Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) General Milosav Djordjevic petitioned to have his retirement delayed after one of his officers was brutally executed by Croatian forces. Initially, General Radislav Krstic denied the request, then changed his mind and eventually sent General Djordjevic to head a Coordinating Office under the Serbian Minister of Defense, staffed by other retired or nearly retired JNA officers. He served in that capacity from October 20 to December 22, 1991. Throughout, he remained an active duty JNA officer, as did the other staff.
The Coordinating Office's role was to facilitate the staffing, supply, financing and organization of the Serb Territorial Defense (TO) in the autonomous regions of Croatia. It was illegal for Serbia to do so, whether as one republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the territory of another republic, or as one state on the territory of another foreign state, following Croatia's independence.
More importantly, the existence and operation of the Coordinating Office connects Slobodan Milosevic, then-President of Serbia, to war and ethnic cleansing by Serb forces in Croatia. The witness testified that his boss, Tomislav Simovic, Serbian Minister of Defense, informed Milosevic about the work of the Coordinating Office on several occasions. 'I was told very clearly he had met the President of Serbia and probably [told him] some details about what we were doing. He briefed the President that such a group existed. I don?t know the details.'
General Djordjevic testified that the Coordinating Office received requests from the Croatian Serb TOs for personnel, supplies and weapons. When it could not fill requests directly, it passed them on to the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (SSNO) to do so. 'The Coordinating Group didn't engage in formation of the TO but did engage in providing assistance to the TO staff, in organizing structures and units such as TO brigades. . . . They helped in constituting units out of lower level manpower they had at their disposal,' General Djordjevic testified.
The Office secured funds from the financial administration of the Federal SSNO and the Minister of Finance of Serbia to pay salaries and benefits of the lower level reservists in the TO, which operated outside the JNA's Military District brigade structure. On at least one occasion, in response to a request from Milan Martic, Minister of the Interior of the SAO Krajina, to the Serbian Minister of the Interior, the Coordinating Office helped to secure the release of funds held in a Serbian account for the use of the Croatian Serbs.
In addition, JNA officers assigned to head TO units remained active duty officers. An order signed by General Krstic on 20 Sept. 1991, transferring eight JNA officers to the TO of the Serbian Autonomous Region of the Krajina stated: 'The above-mentioned [JNA officers] are obliged to report to the commander of the [TO] unit and remain in accordance with the needs of the unit and in accordance with the law of the armed forces, after which they will return [to the JNA].'
A chart produced by the prosecution showed the web-like structure of relationships among the JNA, Serbian Ministry of Defense and the Croatian Serb TOs. It provided a graphic illustration of the Serb bias in favor of the JNA by fall 1991. Fear of losing JNA support was also a major reason Milan Babic, political head of the SAO Krajina, refused to go along with the Vance Plan, which called for a cease fire and JNA withdrawal from Croatian territory. Nevertheless, General Djordjevic testified there was an understanding among JNA generals that they would come to the aid of the Croatian Serbs in the event Croatia moved against them, another indication of their sympathies among the Yugoslav republics.
On cross examination, Milosevic attempted to get the witness to agree that the evidence merely showed the Croatian Serb TO was fully integrated into the JNA chain of command. The presidents of the republics [such as himself], he stated, had no competency over federal authorities. General Djordjevic responded, 'That's how it should have been under the law.'
Several other pieces of the General's direct testimony should be noted. Prosecutor Nice produced an order of October 14, 1991, by General Adzic, Commander in Chief of the JNA, to insure that humanitarian law was observed, that there was to be no looting and no attacks on cultural objects. He further ordered that any breaches of the law should be submitted to the proper military authority. Mr. Nice asked General Djordjevic whether 'the order reflects a recognition of crimes having been committed, in your judgment?' The General responded in the affirmative. Later, the witness said he was not aware of any trials for violations of international humanitarian law, but it didn't mean there weren?t any. He just wasn't interested. On cross examination, however, he agreed with Milosevic that the order was nothing more than a regular reiteration of the Army's duty to comply with international law.
General Djordjevic also testified that the Serbian police were better funded than the federal army despite the fact that the police did not have need of heavy equipment and weapons as the army did. He found this 'shameful,' and on at least one occasion addressed his concerns to General Perisic, Army Chief of Staff. The witness told the Trial Chamber that Milosevic was turning the Serbian police into his Praetorian Guard.
When Milosevic, on cross examination, attempted to get General Djordjevic to back down, his efforts had the opposite effect. Though he spoke about it reluctantly, the General replied: 'Mr. Milosevic, as a citizen of Yugoslavia, I feel ashamed [that the Army was so poorly cared for] . . . .' The accused offered that Serbia didn't have an army for him, as President, to take care of. But the witness would not be cajoled: 'Serbia was preparing its police to be transformed into an army.' What is your evidence to corroborate that, Milosevic demanded. General Djordjevic referred to the quantity of weapons and financing of the Serbian police, adding, 'But I don't want to enumerate it because of the shame I feel.' Milosevic pressed on, telling the General that he had recently been accused in Court of financing the JNA and asking how the General could say he had a negative attitude to the Army. 'You testified against me. Do you believe I had a negative attitude to the JNA?' 'I have not come to testify against you,' retorted General Djordjevic. 'I have been invited and the Federal Government gave me permission to tell what I know. Whether it is against you, I don't know that. Don't make me say you hated the JNA, but you didn't respect it to the extent you didn't assist as far as you could.'
General Djordjevic also faulted Milosevic for his poor leadership which, he said, contributed to the break up of Yugoslavia. When the accused pressed him to agree that the secession of Slovenia and Croatia destroyed Yugoslavia, he did so but added, 'It is also true that you and the leadership of the country at the time and the Federal Secretary of National Defense . . .. assisted in speeding up this process [secession and break up] and you were not sufficiently responsible to find a solution as in the Czech Republic or Slovakia.' Milosevic attempted to interrupt him, but Judge May intervened. The General continued, citing Borisav Jovic's [member of the federal presidency] explanation in the book he wrote about the break up: 'De jure, it is Croatia and Slovenia who are at fault. De facto, it is something quite different. Let Mr. Milosevic read this [Borisav Jovic's book] so I don't have to tell him.'
A remarkable change occurred during Milosevic's cross examination of the witness. While he initially held strongly to his direct testimony, following a morning break, the General became more compliant to Milosevic's suggestions. There were nonetheless issues on which he would not back down.
In response to Milosevic's cross examination, General Djordjevic agreed that Croatian Serbs were mostly forced to organize in self-defense after the rise of extreme Croatian nationalism and Croatia's disarming of Serb dominated police forces. The witness also followed Milosevic's lead in testifying that all JNA barracks were attacked by Croatian forces and plans existed to liquidate JNA officers and their families. The JNA's role, he agreed, was to create a buffer zone between contesting forces in Croatia.
The General was perfectly willing to contradict his direct testimony, as well. The Coordinating Group, he said, worked for the Federal Minister of Defense, though partly for Serbia. It was an ad hoc body, with a consultative and advisory role, established to relieve the burden on the Federal Minister of Defense and the Military District Commands of the JNA. The Serbian Minister of Defense didn't take part in operative planning or training of military forces for the Krajina. For example, Milosevic asked, 'Is it quite clear that the Coordinating Group and the Minister of Defense of Serbia could not have anything to do with deployment or war operations in the Krajina.' 'Yes, it is,' the General replied. The Coordinating Group provided advice and did not issue orders to the Croatian Serb TO. Decision-making was retained by the Federal Supreme Command. The Coordinating Group relied on Federal Military Districts for logistical support for the Croatian Serbs. Funding the Croatian Serb TO was 'mostly' in accordance with the rules. And, while the Federal Minister of Defense advised Milosevic about the Coordinating Group, the witness offered that he 'simply informed you.'
In another curious change of position, General Djordjevic testified that Milosevic trusted Serbian Minister of Defense Simovic, because 'he was your man,' which 'means he was obedient to you.' When Milosevic responded that everyone was his own man and, if not, he couldn't do anything worthwhile, General Djordjevic quickly shifted position: 'General Simovic was his own man,' he said.
There were points, however, on which the General would not be moved. One was Milosevic's preference for the Serbian police over the JNA (later the VJ) (described above), which General Djordjevic felt acutely. Another was Milosevic's role in the selection and appointment of the JNA leadership. Milosevic asked, 'When the appointment of generals was at stake, was the SSNO opinion asked?' Apparently out of concern for Milosevic, General Djordjevic did not want to answer: DJORDJEVIC: 'Can we pass over this question for your sake?' Judge May, however, was not so solicitous. MAY: 'Why? Can you give us the answer? When the appointment of generals was at stake, is it the SSNO whose opinion it asked?' The Judge's intervention released the witness to answer, 'Formally so. In reality it was not like that. Mr. Milosevic required his generals to tell him what generals could be counted on and which could not.'
Milosevic also suggested to the witness that the leadership of Serbia had no reason to be in conflict with Slovenia and that it was Ante Markovic, Presidency President, who was responsible for military intervention. 'Did Serbia have anything to do with that?' 'According to my knowledge and from the Jovic book, you agreed. On June 27, 1990, you discussed how to get rid of Slovenia and half of Croatia. That is the truth.'
At another point, the accused got General Djordjevic to agree that Serbia had nothing to do with the war in Slovenia, either physically or organizationally. But when Milosevic said, 'It was beyond doubt that all events done at the time fell within the competence of Federal organs . . . .' the witness merely responded, 'That's how it should have been under the law.'
The General ended his testimony by referring again to Jovic's book. 'There was a principle thesis within the Serb leadership and Presidency that the Serbs should remain living in a common state, SFRY. In response to this thesis, I quoted the position of the Chief of Staff on 4-5 July, when he explicitly said it would lead to bloodshed because it [the common state] was inhabited by various ethnic groups. . . .'
Overall, General Djordjevic's testimony was a curious blend of stubborn adherence to the truth he came to tell, including confronting the accused over his role in the break-up of Yugoslavia and his denigration of the JNA, and an almost mesmerized obedience to Milosevic's suggestions about events. Like other witnesses before him, the General appears to be a man whose professional career was dedicated to the service of a federal state called Yugoslavia. When power shifted, he hardly knew where to place his loyalties. Seeing his army, and especially his colleagues, attacked by Croatian extremists, he threw in his lot with Serbia and the Serbianized JNA as a perceived way of fighting for Yugoslavia, and the principles and life he had believed in. Perhaps his contradictory testimony stems from anger at Milosevic for his part in Yugoslavia's break up and his wish that Milosevic might have meant what he said, and prevented it.
The Coordinating Office's role was to facilitate the staffing, supply, financing and organization of the Serb Territorial Defense (TO) in the autonomous regions of Croatia. It was illegal for Serbia to do so, whether as one republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the territory of another republic, or as one state on the territory of another foreign state, following Croatia's independence.
More importantly, the existence and operation of the Coordinating Office connects Slobodan Milosevic, then-President of Serbia, to war and ethnic cleansing by Serb forces in Croatia. The witness testified that his boss, Tomislav Simovic, Serbian Minister of Defense, informed Milosevic about the work of the Coordinating Office on several occasions. 'I was told very clearly he had met the President of Serbia and probably [told him] some details about what we were doing. He briefed the President that such a group existed. I don?t know the details.'
General Djordjevic testified that the Coordinating Office received requests from the Croatian Serb TOs for personnel, supplies and weapons. When it could not fill requests directly, it passed them on to the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (SSNO) to do so. 'The Coordinating Group didn't engage in formation of the TO but did engage in providing assistance to the TO staff, in organizing structures and units such as TO brigades. . . . They helped in constituting units out of lower level manpower they had at their disposal,' General Djordjevic testified.
The Office secured funds from the financial administration of the Federal SSNO and the Minister of Finance of Serbia to pay salaries and benefits of the lower level reservists in the TO, which operated outside the JNA's Military District brigade structure. On at least one occasion, in response to a request from Milan Martic, Minister of the Interior of the SAO Krajina, to the Serbian Minister of the Interior, the Coordinating Office helped to secure the release of funds held in a Serbian account for the use of the Croatian Serbs.
In addition, JNA officers assigned to head TO units remained active duty officers. An order signed by General Krstic on 20 Sept. 1991, transferring eight JNA officers to the TO of the Serbian Autonomous Region of the Krajina stated: 'The above-mentioned [JNA officers] are obliged to report to the commander of the [TO] unit and remain in accordance with the needs of the unit and in accordance with the law of the armed forces, after which they will return [to the JNA].'
A chart produced by the prosecution showed the web-like structure of relationships among the JNA, Serbian Ministry of Defense and the Croatian Serb TOs. It provided a graphic illustration of the Serb bias in favor of the JNA by fall 1991. Fear of losing JNA support was also a major reason Milan Babic, political head of the SAO Krajina, refused to go along with the Vance Plan, which called for a cease fire and JNA withdrawal from Croatian territory. Nevertheless, General Djordjevic testified there was an understanding among JNA generals that they would come to the aid of the Croatian Serbs in the event Croatia moved against them, another indication of their sympathies among the Yugoslav republics.
On cross examination, Milosevic attempted to get the witness to agree that the evidence merely showed the Croatian Serb TO was fully integrated into the JNA chain of command. The presidents of the republics [such as himself], he stated, had no competency over federal authorities. General Djordjevic responded, 'That's how it should have been under the law.'
Several other pieces of the General's direct testimony should be noted. Prosecutor Nice produced an order of October 14, 1991, by General Adzic, Commander in Chief of the JNA, to insure that humanitarian law was observed, that there was to be no looting and no attacks on cultural objects. He further ordered that any breaches of the law should be submitted to the proper military authority. Mr. Nice asked General Djordjevic whether 'the order reflects a recognition of crimes having been committed, in your judgment?' The General responded in the affirmative. Later, the witness said he was not aware of any trials for violations of international humanitarian law, but it didn't mean there weren?t any. He just wasn't interested. On cross examination, however, he agreed with Milosevic that the order was nothing more than a regular reiteration of the Army's duty to comply with international law.
General Djordjevic also testified that the Serbian police were better funded than the federal army despite the fact that the police did not have need of heavy equipment and weapons as the army did. He found this 'shameful,' and on at least one occasion addressed his concerns to General Perisic, Army Chief of Staff. The witness told the Trial Chamber that Milosevic was turning the Serbian police into his Praetorian Guard.
When Milosevic, on cross examination, attempted to get General Djordjevic to back down, his efforts had the opposite effect. Though he spoke about it reluctantly, the General replied: 'Mr. Milosevic, as a citizen of Yugoslavia, I feel ashamed [that the Army was so poorly cared for] . . . .' The accused offered that Serbia didn't have an army for him, as President, to take care of. But the witness would not be cajoled: 'Serbia was preparing its police to be transformed into an army.' What is your evidence to corroborate that, Milosevic demanded. General Djordjevic referred to the quantity of weapons and financing of the Serbian police, adding, 'But I don't want to enumerate it because of the shame I feel.' Milosevic pressed on, telling the General that he had recently been accused in Court of financing the JNA and asking how the General could say he had a negative attitude to the Army. 'You testified against me. Do you believe I had a negative attitude to the JNA?' 'I have not come to testify against you,' retorted General Djordjevic. 'I have been invited and the Federal Government gave me permission to tell what I know. Whether it is against you, I don't know that. Don't make me say you hated the JNA, but you didn't respect it to the extent you didn't assist as far as you could.'
General Djordjevic also faulted Milosevic for his poor leadership which, he said, contributed to the break up of Yugoslavia. When the accused pressed him to agree that the secession of Slovenia and Croatia destroyed Yugoslavia, he did so but added, 'It is also true that you and the leadership of the country at the time and the Federal Secretary of National Defense . . .. assisted in speeding up this process [secession and break up] and you were not sufficiently responsible to find a solution as in the Czech Republic or Slovakia.' Milosevic attempted to interrupt him, but Judge May intervened. The General continued, citing Borisav Jovic's [member of the federal presidency] explanation in the book he wrote about the break up: 'De jure, it is Croatia and Slovenia who are at fault. De facto, it is something quite different. Let Mr. Milosevic read this [Borisav Jovic's book] so I don't have to tell him.'
A remarkable change occurred during Milosevic's cross examination of the witness. While he initially held strongly to his direct testimony, following a morning break, the General became more compliant to Milosevic's suggestions. There were nonetheless issues on which he would not back down.
In response to Milosevic's cross examination, General Djordjevic agreed that Croatian Serbs were mostly forced to organize in self-defense after the rise of extreme Croatian nationalism and Croatia's disarming of Serb dominated police forces. The witness also followed Milosevic's lead in testifying that all JNA barracks were attacked by Croatian forces and plans existed to liquidate JNA officers and their families. The JNA's role, he agreed, was to create a buffer zone between contesting forces in Croatia.
The General was perfectly willing to contradict his direct testimony, as well. The Coordinating Group, he said, worked for the Federal Minister of Defense, though partly for Serbia. It was an ad hoc body, with a consultative and advisory role, established to relieve the burden on the Federal Minister of Defense and the Military District Commands of the JNA. The Serbian Minister of Defense didn't take part in operative planning or training of military forces for the Krajina. For example, Milosevic asked, 'Is it quite clear that the Coordinating Group and the Minister of Defense of Serbia could not have anything to do with deployment or war operations in the Krajina.' 'Yes, it is,' the General replied. The Coordinating Group provided advice and did not issue orders to the Croatian Serb TO. Decision-making was retained by the Federal Supreme Command. The Coordinating Group relied on Federal Military Districts for logistical support for the Croatian Serbs. Funding the Croatian Serb TO was 'mostly' in accordance with the rules. And, while the Federal Minister of Defense advised Milosevic about the Coordinating Group, the witness offered that he 'simply informed you.'
In another curious change of position, General Djordjevic testified that Milosevic trusted Serbian Minister of Defense Simovic, because 'he was your man,' which 'means he was obedient to you.' When Milosevic responded that everyone was his own man and, if not, he couldn't do anything worthwhile, General Djordjevic quickly shifted position: 'General Simovic was his own man,' he said.
There were points, however, on which the General would not be moved. One was Milosevic's preference for the Serbian police over the JNA (later the VJ) (described above), which General Djordjevic felt acutely. Another was Milosevic's role in the selection and appointment of the JNA leadership. Milosevic asked, 'When the appointment of generals was at stake, was the SSNO opinion asked?' Apparently out of concern for Milosevic, General Djordjevic did not want to answer: DJORDJEVIC: 'Can we pass over this question for your sake?' Judge May, however, was not so solicitous. MAY: 'Why? Can you give us the answer? When the appointment of generals was at stake, is it the SSNO whose opinion it asked?' The Judge's intervention released the witness to answer, 'Formally so. In reality it was not like that. Mr. Milosevic required his generals to tell him what generals could be counted on and which could not.'
Milosevic also suggested to the witness that the leadership of Serbia had no reason to be in conflict with Slovenia and that it was Ante Markovic, Presidency President, who was responsible for military intervention. 'Did Serbia have anything to do with that?' 'According to my knowledge and from the Jovic book, you agreed. On June 27, 1990, you discussed how to get rid of Slovenia and half of Croatia. That is the truth.'
At another point, the accused got General Djordjevic to agree that Serbia had nothing to do with the war in Slovenia, either physically or organizationally. But when Milosevic said, 'It was beyond doubt that all events done at the time fell within the competence of Federal organs . . . .' the witness merely responded, 'That's how it should have been under the law.'
The General ended his testimony by referring again to Jovic's book. 'There was a principle thesis within the Serb leadership and Presidency that the Serbs should remain living in a common state, SFRY. In response to this thesis, I quoted the position of the Chief of Staff on 4-5 July, when he explicitly said it would lead to bloodshed because it [the common state] was inhabited by various ethnic groups. . . .'
Overall, General Djordjevic's testimony was a curious blend of stubborn adherence to the truth he came to tell, including confronting the accused over his role in the break-up of Yugoslavia and his denigration of the JNA, and an almost mesmerized obedience to Milosevic's suggestions about events. Like other witnesses before him, the General appears to be a man whose professional career was dedicated to the service of a federal state called Yugoslavia. When power shifted, he hardly knew where to place his loyalties. Seeing his army, and especially his colleagues, attacked by Croatian extremists, he threw in his lot with Serbia and the Serbianized JNA as a perceived way of fighting for Yugoslavia, and the principles and life he had believed in. Perhaps his contradictory testimony stems from anger at Milosevic for his part in Yugoslavia's break up and his wish that Milosevic might have meant what he said, and prevented it.
