Bosnian Serb Official Says Serbia Actively Participated in Bosnian War
Day 263
Bosnian Serb Official Says Serbia Actively Participated in Bosnian War
Day 263
Miroslav Deronjic continued fulfilling his part of his plea agreement with the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) by testifying in the trial of former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. With the end of its case looming, the Prosecutor introduced the bulk of Mr. Deronjic's evidence through his written statement. In addition to including detailed information about Srebrenica 1995, he also provided extensive information on Serbia's arming of the Bosnian Serbs.
Mr. Deronjic's statement on Srebrenica was the same as that introduced in the Krstic Appeal and analyzed by CIJ in its November 25, 2003, report, 'Srebrenica Exposed: A Word About Plea Agreements.' Milosevic spent considerable time questioning him about connections he made between Radovan Karadzic, President of the Republika Srpska (RS), and ethnic cleansing and mass killings of the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica, despite the fact that Milosevic contends neither he nor Serbia had anything to do with it. The Accused spent considerably less time on Mr. Deronjic's testimony about Serbia's arming of the Bosnian Serbs, an issue which more directly implicates him. Perhaps it shows just how damning Deronjic's information on Karadzic and Srebrenica was.
Milosevic homed in on Karadzic's statement to the witness on July 8 or 9, to the effect that all of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica need to be killed. To say such a thing is 'madness,' the Accused protested. He proferred written orders by General Milenko Zivanovic, Commander of the Drina Corps (July 2), and General Tolimir, Mladic's Assistant for Intelligence and Security (July 9), which included the direction to treat civilians and prisoners of war according to the Geneva Conventions. The Tolimir order specifically required efforts to insure the maximum safety to UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) and the civilian population, and to refrain from destroying property and civilian facilities. Mr. Deronjic said he had seen neither of these orders during the Srebrenica Operation. He agreed with Milosevic that they contradicted the oral order to 'kill them all.' Written orders, Deronjic testified, were smokescreens and rarely given to anyone. Interestingly, the witness who followed Deronjic to the stand, C-57, a former JNA officer, gave corroborative testimony, stating that orders given orally were often inappropriate to put in writing and the practice was not to do so.
The Accused tried several more angles to discredit Karadzic's statement. 'How could he give such an order to Deronjic when he, Deronjic, had no control over the police?' The witness replied that it was a comment, not an order. 'Didn't the Western Slavonia principle Karadzic referred to mean mass expulsion, not killing?' Deronjic said it was the common understanding that the principle referred to Croats allegedly killing Serb soldiers and civilians alike fleeing Operation Flash. 'Why then,' Milosevic persisted, 'did Karadzic later give you three options to pass on to the civilians at Potocari (UN base in the Srebrenica municipality), none of which included extermination?' Deronjic reiterated that Karadzic didn't just say 'kill them all,' but qualified it by referring to the Western Slavonia principle, where killing combined with other methods to drive out the Serbs and by adding, 'everything you can.'
Milosevic attacked Deronjic for not explicitly telling Karadzic when the killings started in the Srebrenica area. In one telephone conversation, Deronjic used allusion and code because the line was not secure. But, he said, he went to see Karadzic the next day and told him in person of the Kravica warehouse massacre and liquidations of POW's near the battlefield. Karadzic dismissed them as 'revenge' killings (they happened before the mass killing operation). Deronjic pointed out that he was not Karadzic's only source of information -- he also received regular intelligence from the military and the State Security.
In yet another conversation Deronjic had with Karadzic on the telephone, the RS President, speaking through a third party, told the witness that the 'goods' had to be placed in the warehouse by the next day. Deronjic understood 'goods' to refer to captured Bosnian Muslim men and the warehouse to refer to detention facilities in Zvornik or Bijeljina. He agreed with Milosevic that Karadzic's order was to evacuate these prisoners, not to kill them. Because it was not a secure line, the intermediary reported that Karadzic said he would send someone with instructions for Deronjic, who wanted the prisoners out of his jurisdiction.
Within several hours, Colonel Ljubisa Beara of the Bosnian Serb Army turned up, a little tipsy. With no prior introduction, he presented himself at Deronjic's office. 'I have orders from the top,' he reportedly announced, 'that these people [prisoners] should be killed.' He wanted to do it in Bratunac, but Karadzic had promised Deronjic nothing would happen in Bratunac, the prisoners would be taken elsewhere. Milosevic took this as evidence that Beara was not sent by Karadzic. But when Deronjic confronted Beara with the statement 'that is not what Karadzic ordered,' Beara backed down. When Deronjic told Beara that Karadzic had ordered the prisoners be taken elsewhere, he added, Bijeljina/Batkovici, though it is unclear whether Karadzic said this. There was an existing prison at Batkovici, prompting Milosevic to suggest that what Karadzic meant was the prisoners should be taken there to be questioned, not killed. Deronjic agreed.
It was an odd concession, given that Deronjic testified in the Blagojevic case that Karadzic told him the prisoners should be taken to the South [sic -- direction should be North], towards the warehouses in Bijeljina and Zvornik. Deronjic told that Court he interpreted Karadzic's general direction to mean the military prison in Batkovici, but Karadzic did not explicitly say so. Nor was anything said about either questioning or killing. Because clear instructions couldn't be given over the telephone, Karadzic said he would send someone. Deronjic stuck to his belief that the someone sent by Karadzic was Beara for two reasons: no one else came and Beara took charge of the prisoners. Of interest is Momir Nikolic's testimony in the Blagojevic case, where he claimed to be present at the Beara meeting. He recalled that Deronjic explicitly said the prisoners were not to be killed in Bratunac. In other words, Deronjic knew from his prior conversation with Karadzic as well as Beara's 'instructions' that Karadzic intended the prisoners to be killed, not questioned.
Whether Karadzic sent someone to kill or question the prisoners, it is clear he was intimately, continually involved with the Srebrenica operation. While the Kravica warehouse killings and the on-site liquidation of prisoners taken in combat might be considered opportunistic, what happened subsequently was anything but. The mass execution of 7,000 to 10,000 Bosnian Muslim males could not have been carried out without substantial organization and coordination -- and knowledge at the highest level, at the very least up to General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the VRS Main Staff. Given Karadzic's intimate involvement in the operation and his position as Commander in Chief of the Army, it seems unlikely he remained ignorant until after the fact. Even if he did, he subsequently announced in the RS Assembly, after the massacre was generally known, that 'I approved that radical mission and I feel no remorse for it.' Neither the VRS nor its Commander in Chief ever punished anyone for the massacre of civilians and POWs.
Karadzic is not on trial here, though he has been indicted (he remains at large). This is Milosevic's trial. He has maintained throughout that neither he nor the Republic of Serbia had anything to do with Srebrenica. Contradictory evidence has been slight. Why then would he spend so much time defending Karadzic, when he should have been questioning the witness about his allegations that Serbia armed the Bosnian Serbs? Perhaps, Karadzic provides a link to Milosevic that is not yet evident.
CIJ will address Deronjic's testimony about Serbia's arming and training of Bosnian Serbs in its next report.
Mr. Deronjic's statement on Srebrenica was the same as that introduced in the Krstic Appeal and analyzed by CIJ in its November 25, 2003, report, 'Srebrenica Exposed: A Word About Plea Agreements.' Milosevic spent considerable time questioning him about connections he made between Radovan Karadzic, President of the Republika Srpska (RS), and ethnic cleansing and mass killings of the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica, despite the fact that Milosevic contends neither he nor Serbia had anything to do with it. The Accused spent considerably less time on Mr. Deronjic's testimony about Serbia's arming of the Bosnian Serbs, an issue which more directly implicates him. Perhaps it shows just how damning Deronjic's information on Karadzic and Srebrenica was.
Milosevic homed in on Karadzic's statement to the witness on July 8 or 9, to the effect that all of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica need to be killed. To say such a thing is 'madness,' the Accused protested. He proferred written orders by General Milenko Zivanovic, Commander of the Drina Corps (July 2), and General Tolimir, Mladic's Assistant for Intelligence and Security (July 9), which included the direction to treat civilians and prisoners of war according to the Geneva Conventions. The Tolimir order specifically required efforts to insure the maximum safety to UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) and the civilian population, and to refrain from destroying property and civilian facilities. Mr. Deronjic said he had seen neither of these orders during the Srebrenica Operation. He agreed with Milosevic that they contradicted the oral order to 'kill them all.' Written orders, Deronjic testified, were smokescreens and rarely given to anyone. Interestingly, the witness who followed Deronjic to the stand, C-57, a former JNA officer, gave corroborative testimony, stating that orders given orally were often inappropriate to put in writing and the practice was not to do so.
The Accused tried several more angles to discredit Karadzic's statement. 'How could he give such an order to Deronjic when he, Deronjic, had no control over the police?' The witness replied that it was a comment, not an order. 'Didn't the Western Slavonia principle Karadzic referred to mean mass expulsion, not killing?' Deronjic said it was the common understanding that the principle referred to Croats allegedly killing Serb soldiers and civilians alike fleeing Operation Flash. 'Why then,' Milosevic persisted, 'did Karadzic later give you three options to pass on to the civilians at Potocari (UN base in the Srebrenica municipality), none of which included extermination?' Deronjic reiterated that Karadzic didn't just say 'kill them all,' but qualified it by referring to the Western Slavonia principle, where killing combined with other methods to drive out the Serbs and by adding, 'everything you can.'
Milosevic attacked Deronjic for not explicitly telling Karadzic when the killings started in the Srebrenica area. In one telephone conversation, Deronjic used allusion and code because the line was not secure. But, he said, he went to see Karadzic the next day and told him in person of the Kravica warehouse massacre and liquidations of POW's near the battlefield. Karadzic dismissed them as 'revenge' killings (they happened before the mass killing operation). Deronjic pointed out that he was not Karadzic's only source of information -- he also received regular intelligence from the military and the State Security.
In yet another conversation Deronjic had with Karadzic on the telephone, the RS President, speaking through a third party, told the witness that the 'goods' had to be placed in the warehouse by the next day. Deronjic understood 'goods' to refer to captured Bosnian Muslim men and the warehouse to refer to detention facilities in Zvornik or Bijeljina. He agreed with Milosevic that Karadzic's order was to evacuate these prisoners, not to kill them. Because it was not a secure line, the intermediary reported that Karadzic said he would send someone with instructions for Deronjic, who wanted the prisoners out of his jurisdiction.
Within several hours, Colonel Ljubisa Beara of the Bosnian Serb Army turned up, a little tipsy. With no prior introduction, he presented himself at Deronjic's office. 'I have orders from the top,' he reportedly announced, 'that these people [prisoners] should be killed.' He wanted to do it in Bratunac, but Karadzic had promised Deronjic nothing would happen in Bratunac, the prisoners would be taken elsewhere. Milosevic took this as evidence that Beara was not sent by Karadzic. But when Deronjic confronted Beara with the statement 'that is not what Karadzic ordered,' Beara backed down. When Deronjic told Beara that Karadzic had ordered the prisoners be taken elsewhere, he added, Bijeljina/Batkovici, though it is unclear whether Karadzic said this. There was an existing prison at Batkovici, prompting Milosevic to suggest that what Karadzic meant was the prisoners should be taken there to be questioned, not killed. Deronjic agreed.
It was an odd concession, given that Deronjic testified in the Blagojevic case that Karadzic told him the prisoners should be taken to the South [sic -- direction should be North], towards the warehouses in Bijeljina and Zvornik. Deronjic told that Court he interpreted Karadzic's general direction to mean the military prison in Batkovici, but Karadzic did not explicitly say so. Nor was anything said about either questioning or killing. Because clear instructions couldn't be given over the telephone, Karadzic said he would send someone. Deronjic stuck to his belief that the someone sent by Karadzic was Beara for two reasons: no one else came and Beara took charge of the prisoners. Of interest is Momir Nikolic's testimony in the Blagojevic case, where he claimed to be present at the Beara meeting. He recalled that Deronjic explicitly said the prisoners were not to be killed in Bratunac. In other words, Deronjic knew from his prior conversation with Karadzic as well as Beara's 'instructions' that Karadzic intended the prisoners to be killed, not questioned.
Whether Karadzic sent someone to kill or question the prisoners, it is clear he was intimately, continually involved with the Srebrenica operation. While the Kravica warehouse killings and the on-site liquidation of prisoners taken in combat might be considered opportunistic, what happened subsequently was anything but. The mass execution of 7,000 to 10,000 Bosnian Muslim males could not have been carried out without substantial organization and coordination -- and knowledge at the highest level, at the very least up to General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the VRS Main Staff. Given Karadzic's intimate involvement in the operation and his position as Commander in Chief of the Army, it seems unlikely he remained ignorant until after the fact. Even if he did, he subsequently announced in the RS Assembly, after the massacre was generally known, that 'I approved that radical mission and I feel no remorse for it.' Neither the VRS nor its Commander in Chief ever punished anyone for the massacre of civilians and POWs.
Karadzic is not on trial here, though he has been indicted (he remains at large). This is Milosevic's trial. He has maintained throughout that neither he nor the Republic of Serbia had anything to do with Srebrenica. Contradictory evidence has been slight. Why then would he spend so much time defending Karadzic, when he should have been questioning the witness about his allegations that Serbia armed the Bosnian Serbs? Perhaps, Karadzic provides a link to Milosevic that is not yet evident.
CIJ will address Deronjic's testimony about Serbia's arming and training of Bosnian Serbs in its next report.
