Azerbaijan's First President Recalls Soviet Collapse

Ayaz Mutallibov, the first post-Soviet leader of Azerbaijan, says he regrets nothing about his role in the transition to independence, although he still believes it would have been better to stay part of a reformed USSR.

Mutallibov, who was elected president of Azerbaijan in September 1991, was forced to resign in March the following year. He fled to Moscow, and only returned to Azerbaijan in August 2011 to attend his son’s funeral.

IWPR: Two decades have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. How did you react to the announcement by the Russia, Ukrainian and Belarusian presidents that this had happened?

Ayaz Mutallibov: Most people believe that the trigger for the USSR’s collapse was the state of emergency [August 1991 coup by communist hardliners], which helped accelerate centrifugal forces. It was then that Boris Yeltsin came to occupy centre of stage in Moscow….In those first months after August 1991, nearly all the republics declared sovereignty. There was no way back from that.

The Belavezha Agreement [founding the CIS] was thus to be expected. But it was also a surprise as we were not invited to take part. Only the Slavic republics gathered there.

IWPR: You nevertheless insisted on Azerbaijan joining the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS, even though many people criticised you for that.

Mutallibov: A second meeting took place in Almaty on December 21 after the Commonwealth had been announced at that first meeting in Minsk.

Western states acknowledged Russia as the legal successor of the USSR, politically and economically. This placed major constraints on leaders of the newly-independent countries, since they had to take with Russia’s status into account. Azerbaijan, in particular, had to take it into consideration because since 1988 our country had been subject to a powerful catalyst for negative political processes. Events in Karabakh were our weak point… The cautious steps I took were a result of this, not a desire to please Moscow as the media interpreted it.

By the way, I would like to point out that we were not expected at that December 1991 meeting. We hadn’t been invited…. When I appeared in the meeting hall that afternoon, everybody looked at me with surprise, since they were all aware the president of Azerbaijan wasn’t to take part in the summit.

[Belarussian leader Stanislau] Shushkevich said, “We discussed this earlier and decided to refuse to accept Azerbaijan into the CIS at this stage. The reasons are simple – there is a war in Azerbaijan now…. Resolve the conflict and we will discuss it again.” [After Mutallibov argued his case, Russian leader Boris] Yeltsin raised his head, looked at Shushkevich and said: “Include Azerbaijan in the list of CIS members.”

[Ukrainian leader Leonid] Kravchuk’s support and my own insistence on being accepted into the CIS saved Azerbaijan from collapse at that crucial juncture. It would have meant immediate separation from Moscow and from the United Nations. On March 2, 1992, all the countries that had signed the pact to join the CIS were accepted into the UN….

Do you consider that I failed to think about these matters in good time? All future presidents of Azerbaijan should thank me.

IWPR: Would it have been possible to preserve the Soviet Union in some revised form? And would that have been a good idea?

Mutallibov: For 70 years, we developed as parts of the same state, and our economic ties were so close that when they were severed, it was a disaster for all our nations. For example, we used to get 80 per cent of our raw industrial materials from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Suddenly everything changed, and you had to pay for things before you got them….

This degree of economic integration meant that all the republics should have stayed within one country, although it could have been a confederation rather than a federation.

It was I who proposed such a new confederation at a meeting with [Mikhail] Gorbachev. No one said a word. Gorbachev looked at me, and I continued, “Don’t be so surprised – if we take this decision now, we will avert economic problems later. Tomorrow will be too late”.

Some analysts now say we should have retained the Soviet Union, in a different format. A large country wouldn’t have collapsed, the republics could have kept their territories, and we would have avoided all these wars. Gorbachev had an opportunity to do this when 75 per cent of the population voted to keep the USSR in revised format in March 1991, but he missed it. He simply blew his chance.

IWPR: Are there any decisions you made as president of Azerbaijan that you remember with particular gratification, or that you regret?

Mutallibov: I don’t regret anything, but I don’t say everything was good. If I had another chance, I would do the same.

The only thing for which I blame myself is that I overestimated some of my opponents. I thought our country’s democratic reputation was the most important thing for all of us, but for most of them, personal interest was the principal motivation. I blame myself for believing in them.

I could not have become an authoritarian leader, because western countries, the United States in particular, were watching how the former Soviet republics behaved before deciding how to engage with them. Every country was to be dealt with according to how democratic it was, so I was principally interested in Azerbaijan’s democratic reputation.

I knew I’d receive no thanks for this, but I never expected to be away from my country for 19 years.

Interview conducted by Samira Ahmedbeyli, an IWPR staff reporter in Azerbaijan.