Milosevic, Undisputed Leader, Lost Kosovo: Petritsch testifies to Milosevic's control and ill-advised actions leading to war and Serbia's loss of Kosovo
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Milosevic, Undisputed Leader, Lost Kosovo: Petritsch testifies to Milosevic's control and ill-advised actions leading to war and Serbia's loss of Kosovo
78
--Number One Undisputed Leader--
Milosevic remained the number one undisputed leader in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including over matters in Kosovo, according to testimony by Wolfgang Petritsch, former Austrian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and one of three European Union negotiators at the failed Rambouillet Peace Talks preceding the Kosovo War. His ultimate authority became clear through Petritsch's many meetings with his subordinates and was reinforced during the Rambouillet negotiations. The Ambassador cited two examples he thought were significant, prior to Rambouillet.
One occurred when the Ambassador pressed Branko Bugacic, Milosevic's foreign policy advisor, to allow an international forensic team to investigate alleged massacres against Serbs and Albanians. When Bugacic reported it would be allowed, he said Milosevic had made the decision. Another occasion involved an exchange of prisoners which Ambassador Petritsch helped negotiate in late 1998. The KLA had already turned over a group of Serbian prisoners when the Racak massacre happened. Ambassador Petritsch said he worried that, as a result, Serbs would renege on their part of the bargain. They didn't. Nikola Sainovic, Milosevic's advisor on Kosovo, reported to Ambassador Petritsch that once again the decision was Milosevic's.
The Ambassador's impressions of Milosevic's overarching authority were borne out during the Rambouillet negotiations. He testified that Sainovic traveled to Belgrade to consult Milosevic at least once during the negotiations, and that he believed the delegation had regular telephone contact with the accused. At the conclusion of the Rambouillet talks, both sides appeared to have reached agreement on political issues. However, the Yugoslav team lacked authority to negotiate how the agreement would be implemented (i.e. the military part of the agreement). Hashim Thaci, representing the Kosova Liberation Army, also needed time to persuade his colleagues to accept the proposed demilitarization of the KLA. Therefore, a three week hiatus was called before final negotiations in Paris.
By March 8, however, when Ambassador Petritsch met with Milosevic, Milutinovic and others in Belgrade, their willingness to reach a negotiated settlement had evaporated. Ambassador Petritsch testified, 'It was Mr. Milosevic who didn't like it [the political agreement] and he decided not to continue the path of negotiation.' When the Paris meeting convened, the FRY team not only opposed an implementation agreement, but also the political agreement to which it had essentially agreed in Rambouillet. Their non-negotiation stance was confirmed during a last ditch attempt on March 22, to avert NATO intervention when the Ambassador and his co-negotiators, Christopher Hill and Boris Majorski, met with Milosevic in Belgrade. He was aloof and not engaged. According to Ambassador Petritsch, 'My impression was that he had already made up his mind and was not listening.'
In cross examining the Ambassador, Milosevic was not shy in admitting that he had ultimate decision-making authority over Kosovo. 'Isn't it logical that the delegation [at Rambouillet] should consult the president of the state on questions of paramount importance?' According to the Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions, however, the president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, who was available at Rambouillet, had greater power than Milosevic as president of the FRY. In practice, as Petritsch learned, power followed Milosevic regardless of what the written law said.
Ambassador Petritsch's testimony pointed yet one more finger at Milosevic as the ultimate power and decision-maker in the Kosovo conflict. While a necessary element of the prosecution's case, it is unlikely to surprise anyone in the Balkans. What should be of interest to current Milosevic supporters is Petritsch's evidence establishing that Milosevic lost Kosovo for Serbia.
--Milosevic Lost Kosovo for Serbia--
According to Petritsch, if Milosevic had signed the Rambouillet Accords, including the proposed military implementation, Kosovo would remain a part of the FRY. 'The Contact Group and the negotiators took special care regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. It was written into the Accords on three occasions to make it clear beyond any doubt.'
While Milosevic complained that the Accords' provision for a final solution to Kosovo's status in three years based on the will of the people amounted to legalizing the 'snatching away of Kosovo,' Petritsch countered that it spelled out that both sides had to agree. Final status would have been based on the will of all the people -- Albanian, Serb and other ethnicities. Moreover, the negotiators included the Helsinki Final Act in the Accords 'on purpose' because it provided that there could be no change of existing borders. 'This was the guarantee to Yugoslavia to keep Kosovo in Serbia. It was misrepresented in Serbia.' With FRY agreement, Petritsch said, the Helsinki Final Act would have come into force and been the basis for any future agreement between the parties. 'You didn't sign and you must bear the consequences,' Petritsch told Milosevic.
In addition, if Milosevic had signed the Rambouillet Accords, non-Albanian ethnic groups in Kosovo would have been granted 40% of parliamentary power, greatly in excess of their percentage in the population. This was provided in order to strengthen the ethnic communities, Petritsch testified. Milosevic complained that FRY had proposed a bicameral legislature at Rambouillet -- one house representative of the population, the other providing equality among ethnic groups. It was accepted by the negotiators and the Albanians, Petritsch answered, but Yugoslavia then gave up the idea.
Milosevic quoted several journalists and commentators to the effect that acceptance of an international force to assure the political agreement was implemented amounted to 'occupation' of FRY. The proposed military part of the agreement, he claimed, provided that an international force would have 'free and unrestricted passage and access throughout the FRY,' including air space and territorial waters. That's correct, Petritsch answered, 'this text was taken from the Dayton Accords which you had signed. . . . SFOR has even today the right to use what you have described,' for logistical purposes and to gain entry into the territory to fulfill its mission.
Under questioning by the Amici, Ambassador Petritsch pointed out that the present situation is 'less favorable to Belgrade' than what would have been provided under Rambouillet. In the latter case, the KLA would have been disbanded and disarmed and Yugoslav border forces would have been allowed to enforce the FRY's sovereignty.
In the end, Milosevic rejected the Rambouillet Accords and a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Kosovo crisis because he refused to give international forces powers he had already given them in 1995. He rejected a settlement that would have guaranteed the territorial integrity of the FRY, including Kosovo, into the future. It is highly unlikely that Milosevic misunderstood the Accords. This raises the question that may never be answered in this trial: why did Milosevic prefer war over peace, defeat over a successful resolution? In the end, after 10,000 dead and massive destruction, it didn't even secure his hold on power.
Milosevic remained the number one undisputed leader in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including over matters in Kosovo, according to testimony by Wolfgang Petritsch, former Austrian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and one of three European Union negotiators at the failed Rambouillet Peace Talks preceding the Kosovo War. His ultimate authority became clear through Petritsch's many meetings with his subordinates and was reinforced during the Rambouillet negotiations. The Ambassador cited two examples he thought were significant, prior to Rambouillet.
One occurred when the Ambassador pressed Branko Bugacic, Milosevic's foreign policy advisor, to allow an international forensic team to investigate alleged massacres against Serbs and Albanians. When Bugacic reported it would be allowed, he said Milosevic had made the decision. Another occasion involved an exchange of prisoners which Ambassador Petritsch helped negotiate in late 1998. The KLA had already turned over a group of Serbian prisoners when the Racak massacre happened. Ambassador Petritsch said he worried that, as a result, Serbs would renege on their part of the bargain. They didn't. Nikola Sainovic, Milosevic's advisor on Kosovo, reported to Ambassador Petritsch that once again the decision was Milosevic's.
The Ambassador's impressions of Milosevic's overarching authority were borne out during the Rambouillet negotiations. He testified that Sainovic traveled to Belgrade to consult Milosevic at least once during the negotiations, and that he believed the delegation had regular telephone contact with the accused. At the conclusion of the Rambouillet talks, both sides appeared to have reached agreement on political issues. However, the Yugoslav team lacked authority to negotiate how the agreement would be implemented (i.e. the military part of the agreement). Hashim Thaci, representing the Kosova Liberation Army, also needed time to persuade his colleagues to accept the proposed demilitarization of the KLA. Therefore, a three week hiatus was called before final negotiations in Paris.
By March 8, however, when Ambassador Petritsch met with Milosevic, Milutinovic and others in Belgrade, their willingness to reach a negotiated settlement had evaporated. Ambassador Petritsch testified, 'It was Mr. Milosevic who didn't like it [the political agreement] and he decided not to continue the path of negotiation.' When the Paris meeting convened, the FRY team not only opposed an implementation agreement, but also the political agreement to which it had essentially agreed in Rambouillet. Their non-negotiation stance was confirmed during a last ditch attempt on March 22, to avert NATO intervention when the Ambassador and his co-negotiators, Christopher Hill and Boris Majorski, met with Milosevic in Belgrade. He was aloof and not engaged. According to Ambassador Petritsch, 'My impression was that he had already made up his mind and was not listening.'
In cross examining the Ambassador, Milosevic was not shy in admitting that he had ultimate decision-making authority over Kosovo. 'Isn't it logical that the delegation [at Rambouillet] should consult the president of the state on questions of paramount importance?' According to the Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions, however, the president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, who was available at Rambouillet, had greater power than Milosevic as president of the FRY. In practice, as Petritsch learned, power followed Milosevic regardless of what the written law said.
Ambassador Petritsch's testimony pointed yet one more finger at Milosevic as the ultimate power and decision-maker in the Kosovo conflict. While a necessary element of the prosecution's case, it is unlikely to surprise anyone in the Balkans. What should be of interest to current Milosevic supporters is Petritsch's evidence establishing that Milosevic lost Kosovo for Serbia.
--Milosevic Lost Kosovo for Serbia--
According to Petritsch, if Milosevic had signed the Rambouillet Accords, including the proposed military implementation, Kosovo would remain a part of the FRY. 'The Contact Group and the negotiators took special care regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. It was written into the Accords on three occasions to make it clear beyond any doubt.'
While Milosevic complained that the Accords' provision for a final solution to Kosovo's status in three years based on the will of the people amounted to legalizing the 'snatching away of Kosovo,' Petritsch countered that it spelled out that both sides had to agree. Final status would have been based on the will of all the people -- Albanian, Serb and other ethnicities. Moreover, the negotiators included the Helsinki Final Act in the Accords 'on purpose' because it provided that there could be no change of existing borders. 'This was the guarantee to Yugoslavia to keep Kosovo in Serbia. It was misrepresented in Serbia.' With FRY agreement, Petritsch said, the Helsinki Final Act would have come into force and been the basis for any future agreement between the parties. 'You didn't sign and you must bear the consequences,' Petritsch told Milosevic.
In addition, if Milosevic had signed the Rambouillet Accords, non-Albanian ethnic groups in Kosovo would have been granted 40% of parliamentary power, greatly in excess of their percentage in the population. This was provided in order to strengthen the ethnic communities, Petritsch testified. Milosevic complained that FRY had proposed a bicameral legislature at Rambouillet -- one house representative of the population, the other providing equality among ethnic groups. It was accepted by the negotiators and the Albanians, Petritsch answered, but Yugoslavia then gave up the idea.
Milosevic quoted several journalists and commentators to the effect that acceptance of an international force to assure the political agreement was implemented amounted to 'occupation' of FRY. The proposed military part of the agreement, he claimed, provided that an international force would have 'free and unrestricted passage and access throughout the FRY,' including air space and territorial waters. That's correct, Petritsch answered, 'this text was taken from the Dayton Accords which you had signed. . . . SFOR has even today the right to use what you have described,' for logistical purposes and to gain entry into the territory to fulfill its mission.
Under questioning by the Amici, Ambassador Petritsch pointed out that the present situation is 'less favorable to Belgrade' than what would have been provided under Rambouillet. In the latter case, the KLA would have been disbanded and disarmed and Yugoslav border forces would have been allowed to enforce the FRY's sovereignty.
In the end, Milosevic rejected the Rambouillet Accords and a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Kosovo crisis because he refused to give international forces powers he had already given them in 1995. He rejected a settlement that would have guaranteed the territorial integrity of the FRY, including Kosovo, into the future. It is highly unlikely that Milosevic misunderstood the Accords. This raises the question that may never be answered in this trial: why did Milosevic prefer war over peace, defeat over a successful resolution? In the end, after 10,000 dead and massive destruction, it didn't even secure his hold on power.
