Kyrgyzstan: Little Progress on Rebuilding Stable Society

Saule Mukhametrakhimova

Central Asia Editor

Thursday, 9 June, 2011

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A year after Kyrgyzstan experienced unprecedented ethnic violence, nationalist sentiment is in full flight and no political leader is willing to stand up against it, a leading regional expert warns. 

In an interview for IWPR, Dr Neil Melvin discussed the causes of last year’s bloodshed and the worrying implications of the wave of nationalism that has appeared in Kyrgyzstan’s politics since then.

Currently director of the Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Dr Melvin was senior advisor to the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities in 2001-05, with responsibility for the Central Asian states.

This year, the Central Eurasia Project of Open Society Foundations published a report by Dr Melvin called Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence.

IWPR: Looking back, how would you describe last year’s events in southern Kyrgyzstan – in light of the publication of findings from the official and international investigations that have been conducted?

Neil Melvin: Many have identified the violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan as an ethnic conflict. I believe this is inaccurate. It implies that the source of the violence was a conflict between the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities.

I believe that the source of conflict lay elsewhere in Kyrgyzstani society – it was a bitter struggle for power between different political factions centred on control of the state. This was essentially an intra-ethnic, Kyrgyz struggle that focused on removing former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and his allies from power [in April 2010].

The violent confrontation that emerged from this struggle eventually spilled over into ethnic relations, as the opposition called on leaders of the Uzbek community to join their fight. It was at this point that the violence became ethnicised. There were clearly sources of inter-ethnic tension in the south before June, but these were not the sources of the violence.

So I view last summer’s events as interethnic violence in the context of a broader political conflict.

IWPR: How would you assess the current state of reconciliation and efforts to prevent the country sliding into another conflict?

Melvin: Kyrgyzstan has made important political progress since the violence of June 2010 with the adoption of a new constitution [late June 2010], parliamentary elections [October] and the formation of a governing coalition.

All this has been achieved, however, without major progress either in reconciliation or in rebuilding a stable multiethnic society.

In fact, if anything, developments have moved the other way – Kyrgyz nationalism has burst into the open in full force and none of the current political leaders is willing to confront this development. The Uzbek community has been demonised and blamed in a one-sided way for the violence.

There has been little serious attempt to understand the complex historical and political processes that led to the violence, or to address the actions of powerful individuals in orchestrating what happened. Post-conflict justice has been the justice of the victor.

IWPR: In aftermath of the conflict, nationalism has risen high on the political agenda and there are signs that it is having an impact on political decision-making. Why is the nationalist agenda becoming very much part of mainstream politics?

Melvin: Nationalism has been a central current in Kyrgyzstani politics since independence. While it was effectively hidden beneath the surface for many years, the dominant narrative and process of state-building in Kyrgyzstan has been an ethnic, national one.

What has happened in recent years is that the struggle for power between competing Kyrgyz networks has drawn more and more on national themes. Incumbents have been presented by challengers as “unpatriotic”, as not really representing the Kyrgyz and their issues. This message has played especially well with rural Kyrgyz communities, which have experienced considerable difficulties and suffering as the economy has deteriorated and villages have faced chronic social deprivation.

The violence last summer has further accelerated these trends, with politicians preparing for the autumn presidential election [October 2011] by exploiting nationalist agendas as much to discredit opponents as to prove their own nationalist credentials.

IWPR: There’s a view that the authorities are not being decisive enough in condemning such displays of nationalism. Why do you think they seem unable to do this?

Melvin: The authorities have been extremely weak in countering rising ethno-nationalist sentiments in part because they are part of this movement. The April anti-Bakiev movement drew on nationalist ideas, and members of the provisional government reflect those views.

There are very few representatives of minority communities in real positions of power in Kyrgyzstan to challenge such views. Moreover, as the summer of violence as well as the post-conflict victor’s justice have demonstrated, it is now dangerous to challenge the prevailing mood.

Ahead of the presidential election, no politician wishes to lose votes by standing up for the minorities. A clear illustration of this is parliament’s decision to make [Kimmo Kiljunen] the head of an international commission that investigated last year's deadly interethnic clashes in the south of the country persona non grata.

IWPR: Analysts are warning that some political parties will play the nationalist card to advance their candidates in the forthcoming presidential election. What are the chances that the next president will be a politician with nationalist views, unlike the current president, Roza Otunbaeva, who’s seen as a moderate?

Melvin: It is hard to see how anyone other than a politician with strong ethnic Kyrgyz nationalist credentials can win the presidential competition. Of course, some of the more extreme figures may not succeed due to rivalries amongst themselves that may split the nationalist vote.

It may be, though, that an individual who makes virulent comments during the president election turns out to be more moderate in office. Being in government, after all, normally requires compromise and consensus-building, at least in a democracy. Here the international community will have a vital role to play in helping persuade the new president and the government to tackle the legacy of the summer 2010 violence in a more inclusive and effective way.

IWPR: In your report, you criticised the international community for being unable or unwilling to respond effectively to the violence. What are they doing to achieve peace-building and reconciliation, and how would you assess their efforts?

Melvin: Since the violence of 2010, the international community – governments, international organisations and NGOs – have considerably stepped up their efforts in Kyrgyzstan. Various initiatives are being launched to provide humanitarian assistance, strengthen conflict prevention, train the police and so on.

Unfortunately, the international community lacks a clear political and coordinated strategy to promote reconciliation and prevent a return to violence. In the 1990s, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities played a positive role in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and the Balkans in these issues. Today, the OSCE is weakened, but no other international actors has stepped in to take on this role.

There is an urgent need for the international community to develop a focused political dialogue with Kyrgyzstan’s politicians, backed by practical measures and with the wide support of key international players – Russia, the European Union, the United States, Uzbekistan and major donor organisations – in order to moderate nationalist extremism and develop ways to promote peaceful integration.

IWPR: What lessons need to be learned from the violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, in terms of post-conflict recovery and reconciliation?

Melvin: The violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2010, following on from the violence in April when former president Bakiev was overthrown, has highlighted the growing fragility in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan, together with Tajikistan, is facing major challenges that neither is likely to be able to overcome on its own.

At the same time, there is a security vacuum opening up in the region. None of the existing security frameworks – the OSCE, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – is able to deliver the human security necessary for ensuring genuine stability.

The violence of 2010 was a real warning to the governments of Central Asia and the international community that the existing situation needs to change, and that there needs to be a new level of attention to the region's problems matched by enhanced engagement and resources, notably in the areas of conflict prevention and conflict management. It would also be prudent to begin planning for the possibility of deploying peace operations in the region at some future date.

Unless we see a greater focus on the region, there is a real risk that the events of 2010 could mark the beginning of a phase of growing conflict.

Saule Mukhametrakhimova is IWPR Central Asia editor, based in London.