Kyrgyzstan's Faded Revolution

A year after the revolution that toppled President Kurmanbek Bakiev, progress towards a fairer political system has been decidedly mixed, while the hoped-for economic upturn has not been forthcoming, commentators say.

Political analysts interviewed by IWPR hailed last year’s constitutional reform that produced a system in which parliament, not a strong presidency, dominates. The multi-party legislature is a major shift away from the more authoritarian systems that are a feature of other Central Asian states.

Other than that, though, commentators expressed disappointment that the political forces that replaced Bakiev had failed to implement effective government, preferring instead to focus on promoting their own positions and interests.

Analysts also criticised the government’s failure to restore stability, manage crises and plan for the future. This is a major concern given that the dire economic situation could, unchecked, lead to more unrest, especially in southern areas where the pace of rebuilding after serious ethnic violence last summer has been slow.

Anti-government protests on April 6-7 last year forced Bakiev from office, and left at least 70 people dead as police fired into crowds of demonstrators.

The instability continued in the months that followed, culminating in June in several days of all-out violence between ethnic Kyrgyz in and around Osh and Jalalabad, in which more than 400 people were killed and some 400,000 were forced from their homes by attacks, arson and looting.

Political analyst Tamerlan Ibraimov sees the major achievement of the year as the dismantling of an authoritarian presidential system, and the emergence of a pluralist parliament, which was elected in October as a product of the constitutional referendum held in June.

Now, he says, “There isn’t a lone figure, or a narrow group around him, who take the decisions. There are several groups that wield substantial influence, and they are all in parliament.”

Ibraimov said it had become more difficult for incumbent administrations to use the entire apparatus of the state to bolster support and steamroll their way through elections.

“The [post-Bakiev] authorities were unable to apply substantial administrative pressure, as they’d only just come to power and hadn’t consolidated their position, and also because there were so many different parties,” he said.

But this upsurge in formal political activity was not matched by the mood of the electorate, which remained largely apathetic, Ibraimov said. As a result, he claimed, some parties had reverted to seeking support elsewhere – from the underworld. This led to a reappearance of well-tried tactics of bribery and intimidation in the election campaign.

“Criminal groups have well-developed networks across the country. They exercise real power, especially in the provinces,” he added.

Some commentators say that while last year’s regime change offered a historic opportunity to break with the past and build a democracy, what happened in practice was that power remained within elite groups, and was simply transferred from one to another.

Zainidin Kurmanov, who served as speaker of parliament towards the end of Bakiev’s rule, said political developments since April 2010 amounted to a change in form but not substance.

All that had happened, he said, was “a realignment of forces, one ‘nomenklatura’ group replacing the other”.

The 2005 revolution, in which Bakiev replaced long-term president Askar Akaev, and last year’s change of power resulted in a continual influx into government of individuals who often lacked any experience in public administration.

“Those who entered politics were either people who wanted to protect their business interests, or who... had failed to be successful in other areas,” he said.

Kurmanov argues that what is lacking is a clear vision from government of how Kyrgyzstan is to be extricated from crisis and put on the right track towards development.

Political analyst Nur Omarov agreed that there was no strategic vision at the top. The government appeared unable to guess what might happen beyond one or two months ahead, he said.

Economist Azamat Akeleev said the position was getting worse due to a combination of unfocused policies and continuing doubts about Kyrgyzstan’s stability.

In a recent public lecture at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek, Akeleev noted that foreign direct investment last year showed a 33 per cent fall on 2009.

He listed the many obstacles to recovery, including the nationalisation of assets linked to the Bakiev family and the revoking of licences in the mineral extracting sector; and businesses coming under pressure from organised crime.

In addition, he noted that neighbouring states had been reluctant to fully reopen their borders to trade with Kyrgyzstan because of persistent concerns about stability.

In the case of Uzbekistan, cross-border trade has been hampered by the tensions created by last year’s violence in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Toktobubu Dyikanbaeva, director of Kyrgyzstan’s Institute of Economics, said that with a presidential election due later this year, the authorities would be under pressure to increase spending. But doing so would force an unpleasant choice, she told the Expert KG news agency. The budget deficit would either have to be covered by increasing the tax take, which would likely curb growth further; or else with foreign loans, increasing the already substantial external debt burden.

Media freedom in Kyrgyzstan was one of the few areas about which the analysts interviewed for this report were reasonably upbeat. They said there was no visible pressure on private media outlets, which used to be common under previous administrations. The state television and radio company, used as mouthpiece for the Bakiev and Akaev administrations, has now been transformed into a public service broadcaster.

Dina Tokbaeva is IWPR regional editor for Central Asia. Additional reporting by Pavel Dyatlenko of the Polis-Asia think-tank and Nina Muzaffarova, an IWPR intern in Bishkek.

This article was produced jointly under two IWPR projects: Building Central Asian Human Rights Protection & Education Through the Media, funded by the European Commission; and the Human Rights Reporting, Confidence Building and Conflict Information Programme, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of IWPR and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of either the European Union or the Foreign Ministry of Norway.