Moldova’s High Stakes Elections

Tatiana Puiu

IWPR media expert

Monday, 14 October, 2024

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On October 20, Moldova will vote in both a presidential election and constitutional referendum seen as key to determining the country’s geopolitical direction.

IWPR’s Molodvan media expert Tatiana Puiu explains what is at stake in both these votes and what promises the contenders are making to their constituencies.

Why are these elections seen as so pivotal?

These votes will be crucial in a country where the transition to democracy and a market economy has been slower than in many post-Soviet states.

Presidential elections are being held on the same day as a constitutional referendum on EU membership; both could significantly influence the geopolitical direction of the country, especially considering that Moldova will also hold parliamentary elections in 2025.

The October 20 elections will decide whether the country will continue on the path of democratic reform and European integration or choose closer relations with Russia.

Moldova has already been granted candidate status for EU membership. If the referendum passes, the country's constitution will state that Moldova's strategic objective is European, regardless of the geopolitical "colour" of future governments.

What arguments are the pro-European and pro-Russian politicians making to their constituencies?

Eleven presidential candidates are running in the October 20 elections. The incumbent and front-runner Maia Sandu has European integration as the main theme of her election campaign, promising to prepare Moldova for EU membership by 2030.

“Our generation has the democratic, free mission to integrate Moldova into the European family,” she said when she outlined her electoral plan.

Former prosecutor-general Alexandr Stoianoglo, a political newcomer who has vowed to ensure "the triumph of law over debauchery," attract investment and modernise social goals, is her main contender.

He has the backing of the main opposition Socialist party (PSRM), whose leader and former president Igor Dodon said that he had decided not to run in order to unite the anti-Sandu opposition around a common candidate.

Renato Usatîi, the former mayor of Balti and leader of Our Party, is also a close opposition contender with a chance of getting into the second round with his avowedly unified platform.

“Moldova must not lean to the right or to the left, because it risks collapse. Therefore, I will only promote the vector of national development,” he said in a campaign speech.

Other significant candidates include Irina Vlah, the former head of the traditionally pro-Russian Gagauz autonomous region. She remained ambiguous over her political programme, announcing she would focus on the “concrete problems of the people and solutions to them” but without specifying what these would be.

In fifth place, according to recent polls, comes Ion Chicu, the candidate of the Party of Consolidation and Development of Moldova, whose promises include increased pensions and social allowances as well as the revamping of state institutions.

How is the political landscape organising ahead of the referendum?

There are 15 political parties registered to agitate for a Yes or No vote on October 20. Several other parties will boycott the referendum without having registered. Of the 15 registered, 13 will campaign for a Yes vote and two for a No vote.

The PSRM will boycott the referendum as will the Chicu’s Party for the Development and Consolidation of Moldova.

The two parties which have registered for the No option are the Party of Communists, headed by former President Vladimir Voronin and the Renaissance Party, one of the groupings associated with fugitive pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor.

The ruling Action and Solidarity (PAS) party will obviously be supporting a Yes vote. Sandu argues that rejecting Russian influence means avoiding the chaos and war that have already destabilised the region. PAS has pledged to facilitate educational exchange programmes, create thousands of new jobs through EU-funded projects, and ensure that Moldovan students and professionals have greater access to opportunities across Europe.

Pro-European politicians emphasise alignment with democratic values, human rights and the rule of law, promising that EU integration will support judicial reforms and increase transparency and accountability in governance.

On the other hand, pro-Russian politicians argue that Russia remains the biggest market for Moldovan products and that maintaining good relations with Moscow will secure these trade channels. They promise lower gas prices, wage increases and higher social payments, arguing that Russia has better resources to support Moldova economically than the EU.

They also insist that EU integration will force Moldova to abandon traditional values in favour of liberal ones.

For example, the Party of Socialists and others have campaigned heavily on anti-LGBTI narratives, arguing that EU integration would mean adopting policies that undermine family values.

Pro-Russian politicians warn that EU membership would automatically lead to NATO membership, which, according to them, contradicts Moldova's neutral status. They argue that EU membership would involve Moldova in geopolitical conflicts and align it against Russia.

What role is disinformation playing in the run-up to the election?

The pro-Russian parties don't need necessarily to win outright to disrupt the reform plans; they just need to get enough support to prevent a strong pro-European majority.

So Russia has activated a wide array of communication tools and channels to disseminate disinformation within Moldova.

For example, Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, frequently issues statements critical of Moldova's pro-European government. These are widely covered in the Moldovan media and can influence public perception.

Local officials have also been cited as key figures in disseminating pro-Russian narratives and organising protests.

This disinformation often portrays the West as being incompatible with the conservative and family values that are important to Moldovan identity. These messages are particularly effective in the Gagauzia region, where pro-Russian sentiments are strong.

According to a report published last month by a delegation of the National Institute for Democracy, there is a very high risk of destabilisation from Russia.

“The greatest threat to electoral integrity is foreign malign influence from Russia, including foreign information manipulation and interference, which predominantly involves propagating false information on social media platforms, as well as related illicit financing” stated NDI delegation leader Pekka Haavisto, a former minister of foreign affairs of Finland.

At the same time, the NDI delegation cautioned that efforts to combat malign influence operations must not undermine the principles of credible elections, including a free and open exchange of ideas.

How are these elections being seen in the breakaway territory of Transnistria and the autonomous region of Gaugazia?

These two regions are protected by Russia and leaders from Transnistria and Gagauzia have emphatically declared themselves anti-EU.  

Even though Gagauzia has benefited a lot from EU projects, including large infrastructure developments, they are still manipulated and the majority vote pro-Russia. The governor – bashkan - of Gagauzia constantly promotes anti-Chisinau and anti-EU narratives and any opposition has been diminished and reduced. It is evident that the Kremlin aims to delay Moldova’s integration into the EU, to destabilise the country, and to strengthen its influence over Transnistria and Gagauzia.