Russian General's Testimony Is Unconvincing

The Cold War is alive and well, at least in the worldview of Russian General Leonid Gregorovich Ivashov, who testified for Slobodan Milosevic in his trial for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The former General is the one who, ahead of NATO forces, precipitously led Russian troops to take control of Pristina Airport at the end of the Kosovo war, causing an international incident with NATO allies. The action, ordered by Russian President Boris Yeltsin according to the General, was ultimately resolved peacefully. The incident is indicative of the Russians' contradictory attitude towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia that prevailed throughout negotiations over Kosovo. General Ivashov represents the hard line pro-Serb, anti-western position, as his testimony made clear.

Ivashov testified that the United States had a broad plan to destroy the rump Yugoslavia (FRY), to discredit its civilian and military leadership and secure the secession of Kosovo at least as early as 1997. The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), established by the United Nations Security Council to monitor a ceasefire, was merely a smokescreen for US/NATO war preparations as they awaited a pretext to attack the FRY. According to Ivashov, the US never wanted a peaceful resolution to the Kosovo crisis, since its true aim was to deploy NATO in Yugoslavia and use the war as a testing ground for new weapons.

The General, who the Court ruled was not an expert and, therefore, could testify without providing an advance report but could not give his opinion, based his conclusion about the US plan on several general sources, he told the judges. When pressed by Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice for his best evidence, he cited an alleged 1997 U.S. National Security Council decision to carry out a military operation against Yugoslavia. Neither the General nor Milosevic could produce it. He further cited a US military field manual on psychological warfare, issued in 1962. It described exactly what occurred regarding Kosovo, the General said. Another source was a 1993 US Army document stating that the US had interests worldwide and could use military force to secure them. In addition, he referred to unspecified conversations with unnamed diplomats from unidentified states. On cross examination, he cited a quote from Henry Kissinger in Newsweek magazine who apparently disagreed with the NATO attack.

Such 'evidence' elicited a strong rebuke from Presiding Judge Patrick Robinson. First, because it is only tangentially relevant to Milosevic's defence against war crimes and crimes against humanity. Second, 'It will not be of much value to your case if the witness cannot substantiate what he says. If there is no evidence of this plan, it is of very little value.' Milosevic appeared surprised that the General's assertion was not sufficient to establish the truth of his proposition.

On cross examination, Ivashov also alluded to confidential documents which he was not authorized to disclose. That elicited a sharp response from the Prosecutor, 'You have chosen to come here and make extraordinary, broad allegations and are now telling us it is on the basis of secret information?!' The Witness responded that it was his opinion. (Only the opinion of experts is generally admissible.) Judge Robinson expressed his opinion that the evidence is almost valueless if the Court cannot see the documentation. Judge Iain Bonomy joined in instructing Milosevic on proper management of his case, advising that he would never find evidence credible on the basis of only one witness. The evidence must be reinforced by documentation or other witnesses. The Court was no happier when the General quoted excerpts from various sources, where he didn't bring the documents or refused to give them to the Court. In such circumstances, it is impossible to test the evidence, the judges said.

The General described NATO troop buildup in the region, as well as military exercises undertaken in the summer of 1998. These reinforced his view that NATO was planning an attack on Yugoslavia. He did not relate these activities to escalating violence within Kosovo, the lack of success in securing a political solution and very plain and public threats to use force against Serbian forces if they didn't stop killing civilians, destroying their homes and driving them into the mountains. At the time, the Contact Group, of which Russia was a member, was pressing the FRY to cease repression of Kosovo Albanians and its disproportionate response to Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) provocations. It equally called on the KLA to refrain from violence against Serbian police and others.

At the same time, according to the Witness, Russia was advising the FRY to react more harshly to 'KLA terrorism,' including sending in the Yugoslav Army (VJ). They should also open fire immediately when faced with any KLA activity, rather than provide a warning as Yugoslav policy then required, the Russians maintained. In this context, one is reminded of the two hour warning Serb forces were supposed to have given the Jashari family before massive firepower was directed against the family compound, resulting in the deaths of about 50 people, including many women and children.

The above contradictions reveal disagreement between Russian political and military officials over Kosovo policy. While the military was pressing the FRY to increase military action against the KLA, its political leaders supported the Contact Group in reproving the FRY over its disproportionate response. Though testifying that he was consulted as an expert as the Contact Group formulated some of its official positions, Ivashov said he disagreed with their approach. '[A] terrorist network had been established . . . consisting of many thousands of armed men. Any terrorist act could not be dealt with by just two policemen. There had to be a reaction. Most of the terrorist actions were widescale, massive and well-planned. It was necessary to use major force of the security forces and the Yugoslav Army.' Nor did he believe the FRY's response to the KLA was disproportionate, since they issued explicit orders to the contrary. (The Court has heard evidence that written orders were not transmitted to soldiers in the field and that oral orders often contradicted them.) At the same time, the General testified that Russia's position always was the same -- to find a peaceful solution for Kosovo.

Ivashov told the Court that Russia supported strong action against the KLA because it feared destabilization in the region, particularly as a result of massive refugee flows. He blamed the KLA, and later, NATO, for forcing people to flee their homes. His evidence supporting NATO's responsibility was the fact that the flow of refugees was three or four times greater after NATO bombing began than it was nearly a year earlier. He did not consider the possibility that the FRY used NATO bombing as a cover to step up the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians, as the Court has heard from other witnesses. The confluence of bombing and refugee increase was enough for him, but likely not enough for the Court.

Nice elicited the fact that Ivashov had not been in Kosovo in 1998 or at any time during or shortly after the war. When he asked if the General had spoken with any refugees, Ivashov replied that he had spoken with two Albanian Catholics who live in the diaspora. They told him they were forced to leave by the KLA, who threatened to kill them if they didn't join. This evidence is so thin as to be embarrassing, especially compared to documented reports of thousands of refugees that they were forced from their homes by armed Serbian forces, who beat, killed and terrorized them, took or destroyed their property, including their homes, means of livelihood and all identification documents.

According to Ivashov, NATO and the US were in collusion with the KLA. His evidence was an alleged Serbian State Security intercept between KLA leader Hashim Thaci and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, in which Albright is supposed to have promised the Albanians would get a referendum on independence if they agreed to the presence of NATO troops. Ivashov gave different dates for this intercept, the earliest in the summer of 1998. When the Court asked the Witness to 'pass it over' so they could take a look at it, he refused to do so, saying he had no authority from his government or that of Serbia. In that case, Judge Robinson pronounced, 'the evidence is almost valueless.' Indeed, Thaci and the Albanians were not reluctant to have NATO troops in Kosovo. They did not need persuading on this point.

As for the KVM, deployed in Kosovo from October 1998 to March 20, 1999, to monitor the cease fire and withdrawal of a specified number of Serbian Security forces, Ivashov called it a smokescreen to conceal preparation for military aggression against the FRY. Some KVM monitors, he accused, were scouting targets for eventual NATO bombing. Prosecutor Nice suggested that NATO had no need to rely on an ad hoc group to point out targets, given its substantial intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities.

Ivashov contended that KVM reports were biased in favor of the KLA and against Serbian authorities. William Walker, head of the mission, rejected Russian reports, Ivashov said, refusing to incorporate and transmit them to the OSCE. Because the KVM's reports were not objective, he told the Court, Russia provided information directly to the OSCE. Ivashov also complained that Walker and the monitors talked often with the KLA, evidencing their collusion. Nice referred to the UN Resolution establishing the KVM, wherein it was directed to maintain contact with the KLA.

When General Ivashov was unable or unwilling to provide any documentary evidence to support his testimony, Judge Robinson advised Milosevic that he considered the allegations against the KVM important for which corroboration would be necessary.

The pretext for military action that the US and NATO had been waiting for came with the Racak massacre, the General testified. When Milosevic proved unable to properly lead evidence on Racak, Judge Robinson took over to show how it's done. Unfortunately for Milosevic, Ivashov had no direct knowledge of events in Racak. Neither he nor any Russian observer had been at the scene of the massacre. The Russians' conclusion that the Kosovo Albanians died as a result of armed skirmishes between the KLA and Serbian forces and was not a massacre of civilians was based on their analysis of military activities in the area and their interpretation of the report of the Finnish forensic team. Such 'evidence' is wholly inadequate to call into question the Prosecution's sizeable evidence of a civilian massacre, including testimony from the head of the Finnish forensic team and other on-site investigators, as well as survivors.

Ivashov also complained that Walker refused to believe information the Russians provided showing that the US and NATO countries were arming the KLA. When asked about the evidence, he admitted it wasn't direct evidence but was a conclusion reached from the fact that captured KLA weapons were of a kind manufactured in the US and other NATO countries. He admitted they were available in non-NATO countries as well.

The Witness concluded direct examination with a paean to Milosevic, the peacemaker. In seven lengthy meetings with the former president, Ivashov found he expressed 'no aggressive sentiment in regard to violating the rights of Albanians. . . . To the contrary,
Mr. Milosevic discussed his plan -- perhaps somewhat idealistic -- that pertained to peace, development, education, and the rights of Albanians to a certain level of autonomy. . . . At every meeting, he spoke of the main objective of the Government was to prevent any violence in the area and encourage development. . . .'

Nice began a hard hitting and devastating cross examination by reassuring the General that he had no intention of defending the US, NATO or even the United Kingdom against whom Ivashov had made very serious allegations. His sole purpose was to test the evidence, he told the Witness. Having secured Ivashov's understanding, Nice went on to say he would use the same standards to test his evidence as he used to test the evidence of an ordinary Albanian villager. As someone who had lived for a long time in a Communist country, 'you would expect no difference, would you?' he asked. Ivashov immediately took offense to what he considered an insinuation that he could not be objective. Judge Bonomy intervened to correct the misunderstanding. The Prosecutor merely was referring to the fact that everyone was to be treated equally under Communism.

Nice demolished much of Ivashov's evidence by showing it was unsupported and speculative. He relied on documents which were unavailable, confidential or he refused to provide them to the Court. At one point, Nice advised the Court that Ivashov's evidence was so lacking in support and credibility that he might ask the Court to disregard it altogether. He reminded the Witness that he had taken an oath 'to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.' Selectively providing information to the Court was not fulfilling his pledge, the Prosecutor stated.

Milosevic objected that Nice was badgering the witness, but Judge Robinson ruled he had done nothing improper. He was merely testing the evidence.

Using an uncharacteristically (for him) aggressive style, Nice summarized Ivashov's evidence (set out above) supporting his conclusion that the US had a long term plan for the destruction of Yugoslavia, then asking rhetorically: 'This is your best evidence?' The Witness reacted angrily, 'This distortion of someone's evidence is below human dignity.' The Presiding Judge again told the Witness it is perfectly proper for the Prosecutor to test the evidence in this manner.

Nice confronted Ivashov with a stack of documents produced by the Contact Group (U.S., U.K., Russia, Italy, France and Germany) throughout the period leading up to the conflict. Responding to the General's assertion that the Contact Group was not authorized by the UN Security Council or any other international legal body, but was 'something like an international conference,' the Prosecutor 'respectfully' suggested that was incorrect. He then read from the UN Secretary General's report of 30 April 1998 to the effect that the Secretary General relied on Contact Group assessments and information 'as foreseen in paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1160.'

The Prosecutor read substantial parts of official Contact Group statements which expressed concern over both KLA violence and the FRY's oppression of Kosovo Albanians and disproportionate response to the KLA, while praising Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova's nonviolent approach. On more than one occasion, the Contact Group stated that the way for Belgrade to defeat terrorism was to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process. Russia, as a member of the Contact Group, agreed with these assessments, Nice pointed out, which contradicted Ivashov's testimony that the FRY and Serbia resisted the KLA in a 'totally lawful and well-behaved' manner. While saying information from the Russian KVM (Kosovo Verification Mission) monitors may have reached the Contact Group, Ivashov strongly asserted that 'no officers of the Russian Army ever supplied any information to the Contact Group.'

Taking on the General's testimony that NATO colluded with the KLA, Nice quoted NATO General Klaus Naumann when he testified before the Tribunal. NATO was unable to control or influence the KLA because it was prohibited from having contact with groups or individuals designated as terrorist, Naumann had told the Court. Naumann also faulted the KLA for provoking retaliation, but was equally strong in criticizing Serb forces for their disproportionate response.

Expressing that he only had respect for General Naumann, Ivashov nevertheless stuck to his testimony that Serb forces did not use excessive force. His conclusion was based on orders issued by the VJ General Staff that all necessary measures were to be taken to avoid excessive use of force.

Reviewing statements and documents of the KVM, William Walker, NATO, and the Contact Group (all were provided to the Court) Nice discredited Ivashov's testimony that war against the FRY was a desired end and foregone conclusion and international forces used the KLA to achieve it. All the cited sources criticized KLA violence, as well as the FRY's disproportionate response.

Nice recollected Ivashov's selective quote from the OSCE Report, 'Kosovo: As Seen, As Told,' to the effect that, prior to NATO intervention, Serbian forces 'acted harshly only in areas of KLA concentration. Their punitive actions were targeted only against terrorist and separatist organizations . . . .' The Prosecution was unable to locate the quotation in the report -- and, typically, the General provided no guidance. Nice countered it with a quote from the OSCE report, properly cited, that directly contradicted Ivashov's quotation: 'The scale on which human rights violations recur is staggering. It is established that over 90% of Kosovo Albanians, 1.45 million people, were displaced by 9 June 1999. The death toll only can be guessed at. . . . Violence meted out to people was extreme and appalling, as reported by refugees.' When asked if he accepted this conclusion, Ivashov said he did only insofar as the report deals with human rights violations committed primarily by terrorist organizations and that a massive exodus of the population began with the start of NATO bombing. One is left wondering if the Report was accurately translated into Russian.

Overall, General Ivashov's testimony was unimpressive. Even before Nice's devastating cross examination, the General discredited his own testimony by providing nothing to support it, not even logical inference. As Judge Robinson advised Milosevic, by failing to properly prepare his witnesses, he is mismanaging his trial. While he may have 'won' the right to control his defence, he has so far shown himself incapable of producing credible evidence even to support his largely irrelevant political case, let alone a legal one. Perhaps his difficulty stems from a misguided belief that saying something is true makes it so.