Rugova Puts Milosevic on Notice: Kosovo President testifies to conversations with the Accused while under house arrest
Day 40
Rugova Puts Milosevic on Notice: Kosovo President testifies to conversations with the Accused while under house arrest
Day 40
Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, President of Kosova, founder of the LDK (Democratic League of Kosova), and leader of the decade-long Kosova Albanian nonviolent resistance movement, testified about the history of troubles within the province, and their exacerbation following Milosevic's assumption of power and the revocation of Kosova's autonomous status within Yugoslavia. While he stood up to Milosevic?s blistering cross examination, his testimony also disclosed that he was unable to do so when he had the opportunity during the Kosovo war.
Seven days after NATO bombs began falling, Dr. Rugova's house was surrounded and he and his family were placed under de facto house arrest, i.e. there was no formal arrest but he was not able to leave his house or receive visitors. On April 1 and May 4, he was taken to Belgrade under police guard to meet with Milosevic. Both meetings appear to have been stage managed for the press. He was also 'escorted' to an additional meeting with Serbian President (and Milosevic co-indictee) Milan Milutinovic.
In his first meeting with Milosevic and the following meeting with Milutinovic, Dr. Rugova was asked to sign a prepared 'Agreement' to find a political solution to the Kosovo 'situation.' He testified that he did so under coercion. In court, he speculated about the purpose of the agreements: 'They thought they could compromise me politically and discredit me in the eyes of the Kosovar public and foment conflict among Albanians on the political stage.' When asked if they were effective, he quietly answered, 'No.'
The somewhat disappointing, but understandable, aspect of Dr. Rugova's disclosures in court about his meetings with Milosevic was that he only told Milosevic in general terms what Serbian forces were doing in Kosovo. In his first hour-long meeting with Milosevic, Dr. Rugova 'informed him of what was happening in Kosova, that people are leaving the place and so on. I gave him a general picture.' When pressed by the prosecutor to state whether he had mentioned any of the crimes committed against the people, Dr. Rugova answered, 'I made some mention, but he certainly knew. In fact, I didn't go into details. . . .' Asked specifically what he had told him Serbian forces were doing, he finally answered, 'I expressed my concern over my associates first, and told him that people are being driven out of Kosova by military and police forces and other groups. I asked him to find out what was the matter, to do something, and he was listening to me.' Despite further questioning, Dr. Rugova never clearly said he told Milosevic anything more specific. Milosevic's response, beyond 'listening,' was to fault the international community.
During his second and final meeting with Milosevic, Dr. Rugova testified that they only discussed his desire to leave the country (which was arranged next day), 'We didn't say anything important about Kosova.'
In the meeting with Milutinovic, also attended by Nikola Sainovic then-Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and also a co-accused, Dr. Rugova testified that he was more forthcoming. 'I told him [Milutinovic] . . . that Kosova was being emptied of people, that there is oppression, violence committed against people.' Milutinovic's response was the same as Milosevic's earlier, whatever was happening was being caused by the international community.
Lest these statements appear to have put Milosevic on notice of crimes being committed in Kosovo, the Amici, Mischa Wladimiroff, asked Dr. Rugova if he had been afraid during the two meetings with the accused. To which, the witness answered, 'I welcomed the NATO bombing. I was also afraid. I had to be cautious in what I did in those circumstances.' Mr. Wladimiroff: 'Am I right in thinking then that you could not speak openly or in a detailed way about your concerns about the way the Serb forces acted against the Kosovo population during the second meeting [the first meeting during the war]?' Dr. Rugova: 'Yes, that's right.' Mr.Wladimiroff: 'Your third meeting was only concerned with your wish to travel with your family to Italy . . . ?' Dr. Rugova: 'Yes, that's right. . . .' Mr. Wladimiroff: 'No other relevant issues were touched on?' Dr. Rugova: 'No. No.'
Given that he and his family were prisoners of the FRY, and that other human rights activists and leaders of the Kosovar Albanian community had been taken away by Serbian forces at the outset of the war (and later turned up dead), Dr. Rugova's fears were well-taken. But for establishing that Milosevic knew about the deportations, killings, lootings and property destruction going on in Kosovo, Dr. Rugova's testimony was not that helpful.
Dr. Rugova did provide circumstantial evidence tending to support the prosecution's charge that the deportation was a highly planned and coordinated operation. It included the following: 1) military and police reinforcements were sent into Kosovo during the time-out period after the Rambouillet conference; 2) Targeted activists, such as the human rights lawyer Bajram Kelmendi and his sons, were hunted down and killed on the first night of NATO bombing; 3) all phone lines into Kosovo were immediately cut when the bombing began; 4) on the first night of bombing, the LDK headquarters and the USAID office in Pristina were burned; 5) the army, police, special forces and local Serbs acted in a coordinated manner.
Dr. Rugova's testimony and cross examination necessarily verged into political matters, which have limited relevance to the case and, given their breadth and the nature of the proceeding, must be approached with caution. Nevertheless, the Court allowed Milosevic some leeway in questioning about post-indictment political matters. The answers may not all have been to his liking.
Mr. Milosevic: 'Do you believe that Serbs are going to give up on Kosovo and Metohija altogether, Mr. Rugova?'
Dr. Rugova: 'I believe they will, and they should give up Kosova. . . . Kosova belongs to the Kosovars. That is, the Albanian majority, the Serbs of Kosova, the Bosnians of Kosova, the Turks and others who live there . . . . So I don?t know what Serbs are you talking about giving up Kosova. But if you mean Belgrade, it should give it up because Kosova belongs to the Kosovars. And the sooner you do that, the better we'll be.'
If Dr. Rugova's messages to Milosevic during his captivity were ambiguous, his message to him before the International Tribunal, where Milosevic is a prisoner, was not. While Milosevic led his nation to war, Dr. Rugova made clear that he will lead his to peace--and opened a door for reconciliation.
Seven days after NATO bombs began falling, Dr. Rugova's house was surrounded and he and his family were placed under de facto house arrest, i.e. there was no formal arrest but he was not able to leave his house or receive visitors. On April 1 and May 4, he was taken to Belgrade under police guard to meet with Milosevic. Both meetings appear to have been stage managed for the press. He was also 'escorted' to an additional meeting with Serbian President (and Milosevic co-indictee) Milan Milutinovic.
In his first meeting with Milosevic and the following meeting with Milutinovic, Dr. Rugova was asked to sign a prepared 'Agreement' to find a political solution to the Kosovo 'situation.' He testified that he did so under coercion. In court, he speculated about the purpose of the agreements: 'They thought they could compromise me politically and discredit me in the eyes of the Kosovar public and foment conflict among Albanians on the political stage.' When asked if they were effective, he quietly answered, 'No.'
The somewhat disappointing, but understandable, aspect of Dr. Rugova's disclosures in court about his meetings with Milosevic was that he only told Milosevic in general terms what Serbian forces were doing in Kosovo. In his first hour-long meeting with Milosevic, Dr. Rugova 'informed him of what was happening in Kosova, that people are leaving the place and so on. I gave him a general picture.' When pressed by the prosecutor to state whether he had mentioned any of the crimes committed against the people, Dr. Rugova answered, 'I made some mention, but he certainly knew. In fact, I didn't go into details. . . .' Asked specifically what he had told him Serbian forces were doing, he finally answered, 'I expressed my concern over my associates first, and told him that people are being driven out of Kosova by military and police forces and other groups. I asked him to find out what was the matter, to do something, and he was listening to me.' Despite further questioning, Dr. Rugova never clearly said he told Milosevic anything more specific. Milosevic's response, beyond 'listening,' was to fault the international community.
During his second and final meeting with Milosevic, Dr. Rugova testified that they only discussed his desire to leave the country (which was arranged next day), 'We didn't say anything important about Kosova.'
In the meeting with Milutinovic, also attended by Nikola Sainovic then-Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and also a co-accused, Dr. Rugova testified that he was more forthcoming. 'I told him [Milutinovic] . . . that Kosova was being emptied of people, that there is oppression, violence committed against people.' Milutinovic's response was the same as Milosevic's earlier, whatever was happening was being caused by the international community.
Lest these statements appear to have put Milosevic on notice of crimes being committed in Kosovo, the Amici, Mischa Wladimiroff, asked Dr. Rugova if he had been afraid during the two meetings with the accused. To which, the witness answered, 'I welcomed the NATO bombing. I was also afraid. I had to be cautious in what I did in those circumstances.' Mr. Wladimiroff: 'Am I right in thinking then that you could not speak openly or in a detailed way about your concerns about the way the Serb forces acted against the Kosovo population during the second meeting [the first meeting during the war]?' Dr. Rugova: 'Yes, that's right.' Mr.Wladimiroff: 'Your third meeting was only concerned with your wish to travel with your family to Italy . . . ?' Dr. Rugova: 'Yes, that's right. . . .' Mr. Wladimiroff: 'No other relevant issues were touched on?' Dr. Rugova: 'No. No.'
Given that he and his family were prisoners of the FRY, and that other human rights activists and leaders of the Kosovar Albanian community had been taken away by Serbian forces at the outset of the war (and later turned up dead), Dr. Rugova's fears were well-taken. But for establishing that Milosevic knew about the deportations, killings, lootings and property destruction going on in Kosovo, Dr. Rugova's testimony was not that helpful.
Dr. Rugova did provide circumstantial evidence tending to support the prosecution's charge that the deportation was a highly planned and coordinated operation. It included the following: 1) military and police reinforcements were sent into Kosovo during the time-out period after the Rambouillet conference; 2) Targeted activists, such as the human rights lawyer Bajram Kelmendi and his sons, were hunted down and killed on the first night of NATO bombing; 3) all phone lines into Kosovo were immediately cut when the bombing began; 4) on the first night of bombing, the LDK headquarters and the USAID office in Pristina were burned; 5) the army, police, special forces and local Serbs acted in a coordinated manner.
Dr. Rugova's testimony and cross examination necessarily verged into political matters, which have limited relevance to the case and, given their breadth and the nature of the proceeding, must be approached with caution. Nevertheless, the Court allowed Milosevic some leeway in questioning about post-indictment political matters. The answers may not all have been to his liking.
Mr. Milosevic: 'Do you believe that Serbs are going to give up on Kosovo and Metohija altogether, Mr. Rugova?'
Dr. Rugova: 'I believe they will, and they should give up Kosova. . . . Kosova belongs to the Kosovars. That is, the Albanian majority, the Serbs of Kosova, the Bosnians of Kosova, the Turks and others who live there . . . . So I don?t know what Serbs are you talking about giving up Kosova. But if you mean Belgrade, it should give it up because Kosova belongs to the Kosovars. And the sooner you do that, the better we'll be.'
If Dr. Rugova's messages to Milosevic during his captivity were ambiguous, his message to him before the International Tribunal, where Milosevic is a prisoner, was not. While Milosevic led his nation to war, Dr. Rugova made clear that he will lead his to peace--and opened a door for reconciliation.
