Syria Becomes Focus of Iranian-Turkish Rivalry
As unrest continues across the Arab world, regional players Turkey and Iran are seeking a greater role in the region.
Syria Becomes Focus of Iranian-Turkish Rivalry
As unrest continues across the Arab world, regional players Turkey and Iran are seeking a greater role in the region.
IWPR’s chief of mission in Iraq Ammar al-Shahbander examines the pressure points in Syria in particular and the broader strategic factors at play across the region.
What power rivalries are emerging in the region?
There is a clear re-emergence of a regional power-struggle between Iran and Turkey. From the 16th century, the Iranian and Ottoman empires fought on and off for control of the Middle East.
The founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk, took a step back from Ottoman expansionism and concerned himself with domestic affairs. The country’s secular institutions like the army remain uninterested in reasserting an Ottoman-era style role in the region.
But the governing party, the AKP, regards itself as the new Ottoman ruler in modern shape. I see Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a sultan in a suit.
In Iran, the powerful Safavid empire waned after its zenith in the 16th century, and the country’s attention was taken up by wars with Russia and other concerns – and in the modern era, by the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the war with Iraq that followed. But now Iran, too, is also increasingly seeing opportunities to regain its role as a regional superpower.
I believe that Turkey has struck a deal with its international partners, including the United States, to lead a moderate Islamist resurgence in the Middle East. That places it on a collision course with Iranian ambitions and interests.
Syria is currently the greatest cause of international concern. How is the unrest there affecting other regional actors?
The case of Syria has serious implications for all the countries that are caught up in the Arab Spring. Its former allies seem to be deserting it. Ankara has given Damascus a final warning, and there are reports of Turkish troops being sent to reinforce the border.
Saudi King Abdullah’s criticism of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was extraordinary, as is the united stand now being taken by the Gulf states.
Al-Jazeera’s Arabic-language TV has undergone a significant shift. It has upped its coverage of the Syrian revolution and now seems to be fully on board there, as it was in the Egyptian revolt – with live broadcasts, serious risk-taking in its reporting, and a reliance on material provided by the protesters. This has to have been a political decision taken by Qatar, where the station is based. Given that the Qataris have been aligned with Iran and Syria as well as with the US, this signals a strategic shift.
At the same time, it is clear that President Assad remains a very important asset for Tehran. A senior Iranian cleric recently issued a fatwa defending the Syrian regime and denouncing the protests as a US-Zionist imperialist conspiracy.
Syria and Iran may be planning to re-ignite trouble the Israeli-Lebanese border by encouraging attacks by Hizbollah. This could force the international community to take the pressure off Assad. Another potential source of violence in Lebanon is the recent indictment of Hizbollah members for the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.
The US has been pressuring Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki to open the borders to Syrian refugees. So far Maliki has not agreed to do so – I assume this is because he fears Iranian reprisals.
Within Iraq, there’s been a massive increase in the number of attacks over the last two months. I see two objectives behind this – putting more pressure on the US ahead of their withdrawal, and showing Washington that if it continues squeezing Assad, Iran is capable of opening up the Iraqi front.
Is there a danger Syria might descend into sectarian conflict?
In Syria, many members of the Druze, Christian and Shia minorities believe their very existence would be at risk if Islamists take over, so they’d prefer Assad rather than that option.
There is a possibility that we will see a civil war like the one in Iraq, and it could be even more vicious. Sectarian hatred in Syria has historically been far stronger than in Iraq.
Syria is essentially a tribal society. You don’t need a conscious decision to turn this revolution into a civil war – all you need is a handful of angry people to obtain weapons and start using them. Alternatively, a massacre perpetrated by the regime could trigger a chain reaction.
Is the Syrian opposition likely to change its position on international intervention?
No one wants to call for international military intervention because they don’t want to seem unpatriotic. But if publicly they speak out against intervention, in private many are begging for it.
Since there are many different political affiliations within the grassroots opposition, there’s no consensus on what form an intervention might take. Some would want to see action by Turkey since it is a Muslim country, while others would prefer NATO or other western troops.
Then again, NATO intervention wouldn’t necessarily mean troops on the ground; I don’t think we will see that in Syria. NATO engagement might consist more of financial assistance or training.
The longer the crackdown continues in Syria and the harsher it gets, the harder it will get for activists to plead the cause of non-violence.
What role is emerging for Islamists across the wider region?
Islamists are playing a significant role across the region, from Egypt to Tunisia, Libya to Yemen. I personally believe the idea of moderate Islamism is a myth. A recent Friday demonstration in Cairo, for example, was scary - it was dominated by Salafis, and it’s frightening that they can mobilise in such large numbers. It was not the Muslim Brotherhood that was in control.
Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood will end up leading the Islamist movement in Egypt because it is better organised. But in order to lead all the different factions, it will have to radicalise further.
In Libya too, the majority of the militias fighting the regime are Islamist. In Tunisia, Islamists are also playing a larger role, and continue to cooperate with the Algerian Islamists to whom they’ve always been close.
Islamists formed an important part of the civil disturbances that led to revolution in Yemen.
In Syria, we haven’t so far seen the Muslim Brotherhood playing such a large public role. But the fact the mosques are serving as organisational centres, with demonstrations taking place after Friday prayers that - especially during Ramadan – shows that the Islamists are engaged as a social group and are partially leading the movement for change.